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AbSf1{ACf 
There has been no systematic study of railway innovation in 
Colonial ~frica. Kesearch suggests that such an omission leaves an 
important gap in the economic literature on Colonial Africa, and 
that railway projects were of significance in the development of 
Africa's trade and commerce. This thesis examines the early railway 
development in the Gold Coast within the context of transport 
innovation and economic development in Africa. 
'fhe thesis is divided into three partso Part I accounts 
for the policy decisions leading to railway construction in the ~old 
Coast, and how this resulted in a particular configuration of railway 
lines and ~ss0ciated ports and harbours. The needs of the British 
economy, at particular points in time, for the development of greater 
overseas markets, and access to better sources of raw materials, are 
examined in a chronological manner. How each step in the process 
contributed to the introduction and expansion of railways in the 
Colony is also evaluated and understood. uecisions as to where tracks 
were to be placed and where ports and harbours were to be sited 
were found to be primarily dictated by the location of mineral deposits 
- mainly gold and manganese - so that the lines were not intended to 
stimulate internal commerce and industry directly. fhe strategic 
interests of the Colonial Government in building the pioneer railway 
line from farkwa to Kumasi, and the implications of this particular 
extension for Ashanti politics is also highlighteo. 
In Part 11 consideration is given to the study of the railways 
as a commercial or business enterprise, - how it was organised, 
v 
how it mobilised the resources and skills needed for the construction 
and operation of the transport system. Attention is focussed on the 
details of the recruitment of railway workers, the acquisition of land, 
the mechanisms by which funds were raised to pay for the lines, and 
the management and conduct of labour relations in an attempt to 
elucidate overall colonial policy regarding issues of public finance, 
land tenure and labour in the Colonies.fhe financial constraints of 
railway investment on the Colonial Government's activities in other 
sectors of the economy - more especially rural development - are noted 
as were the ambiguities of land titles which acted as a constraint 
on the natural urban and commercial developments following from 
railway construction. Light is thrown on the limitations of spin-off 
effects from a technology developed anu perfected in one part of the 
world and replanted wholesale into anothe~and in particular, the 
relatively low levels of skills acquisition among African railway 
workers. The overall efficiency and profitability of the railways are 
then discussed where it is suggested that a combination of motor 
competition, improvements in operational efficiency,and the onset 
of the Great Uepression, led to a diminishin~ return in ~old Coast 
railway investment by the late 1920's. 
In Part III the potential impact of new modes of 
transportation on economic activity in a p<.lrt of the world which was 
previously seriously deficient in internal transport and communications 
are evaluated. Amongst the social and economic impacts discussed 
are backward linkages from the railways to local production, the role 
of the railways in stimulatin~ external vs internal trade on the one 
hand, and extraction 01 minerals and torestry resources vs agricultural 
developments on the other. fhe etlects on output and employment in 
vi 
commerce and traditional craft production, and the role 01 the 
railways in tra(lstormin~ the urban lanoscape or the ~old Coast and 
its implications for public health, are also discussed. ~ concluding 
chapter then relates the findings of the individual chapters to the 
concern of the thesis as a whole: the connection between railway 
innovation and economic development in the less developed economies of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the first place, gains accruing 
from the provision of transport services were found to be generally 
higher than in the advanced industrial economies. but backward 
linkages and spin-off effects to local production were negligible 
and instead railway investment tended to reinforce existing technological 
and financial dependence on the advanced industrial nations. fhe 
pattern of railway development and its accompanying social and 
welfare investments were also found to be heavily biased in favour ot 
external trade and urban developlnent, while the rural communities 
remained relatively underdeveloped. 
rhe thesis thus sug~ests the need tor a simple mode ot 
transportation that would provide si~nificant backward linkages to 
local production, and at the same time carry a second transport 
'revolution' further to the doorsteps oi the African rural communities. 
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INTKOUUCflON 
The importance of railways in the political economy of 
Colonial Africa was recognised almost as soon as the railway systems 
W3re established, and was stressed by contemporary administrators! 
2 
and scholars alike. Sadly though, despite the upsurge of scholarly 
interest in the economic history of Africa since the mid 1960's 
detailed studies of either the impact of railways on particular sectors 
of the African economies3 or accounts of railways themselves are still 
hard to come by.4 In his book The Economic History of West Africa5 
Hopkins drew attention to this dearth of literature on the history of 
railways in Colonial Africa, but more than ten years have since passed, 
and his hope that the comment would generate scholarly interest in the 
subject remains unfulfilled. This is in striking contrast to the well-
6 documented studies of the West African shipping trades. This lack 
of interest in the study of African railways is particularly disappointing 
because the influential role which railways have played in Western 
7 ~onomic growth leads one naturally to ask whether Western experience 
has been repeated in Africa, and if not how the differences may be 
explained. This thesis is a contribution to the study of railways in 
colonial Airica, and more specifically, to that of the Gold Coast, 
modern Ghana. 
Uespite the lack of detailed studies many works dealing with 
Africa's Colonial past have made either explicit or implicit assumptions 
about the nature or impact of railway construction, but there has been 
nothing like the relative consensus about the 'progressive' contribution 
of ~ailways to economic development that characterises the literature 
2 
on the history of railways in Western Europe and North America. 8 This 
is mainly because the views and arguments expressed about railways in 
Colonial Africa merely reflect trends in the economic literature on 
Colonial Africa itself. On the one hand there is 3 tradition of 
scholarship deriving from nineteenth and early twentipth century 
protagonists of liberal imperialism,9 and the post war 'modernisation' 
10 
school of thought, which sees railways in Colonial Africa in terms 
of the 'diffusion' of technology and the associated spread of the social 
and economic organisation of the advanced capitalist societies into 
'traditional' societies. Thus "the material development of Africa 
1 i ' ,"11 ( ) " ies n one word - transport Lugard and railways are the seven 
pillars of unequal wisdom in West Africa" (Pedler).12 Indeed Harx 
himself writing on British India envisaged railways performing a similarly 
influential role in capitalist development there as it had in the West!13 
On the other hand, there is the post-war Marxist and nationalist schools 
of thought which reject this "optimistic view" about the progressive 
role of capitalism, and for that matter, railways in Africa. They 
argued that the~e was, and still is, a fundamental contradiction 
between capitalist development in the Colonies and capital accumulation 
in the metropolis bEcause the principal aim of the Western bourgeoisie 
was to incorporate the colonies into the world market primarily as 
consumers and primary producers, rather than as rival secondary producers. 
The result of this process is the development of underdevelopment, and 
from this perspective railways are merely regarded as the living 
14 
testir.:onies of the perpetuation of this underdevelopment. However, 
there is presently a reaction to the dependency approach, one important 
element of which is a reassertion of Marx's optimistic view about the 
d . 15 progressive development of capitalism on a world wi e SCLle. 
3 
The argument of this thesis starts from the assumption that 
any failure on the part of railways in Colonial Africa to reproduce the 
experiences of their Western progenitors requires investigation, and 
cannot be explained away simply in terms of a "conspiracy" on the part 
of the metropolitan bourgeoisie to "create" underdevelopment. In this 
context a study of Gold Coast Kailways may assist in our understanding 
of the nature and effects of railway and for that matter the penetration 
of Western capitalism into Colonial Africa. In which ways, if any, did 
the construction and operation of railways contribute to development or 
underdevelopment in Africa? If U~ latter was the case, was there any 
evidence of an "invincible" determining hand behind the scene, 
In the particular context of the Gold Coast and the economic 
literature on railways, the picture i3 not very dii~erent from that of 
the general African p.~ttern - neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. 
The one published book on the Gold Coast that approaches a detailed 
study of railways is Gould's Transportation Pattern in Ghana. 16 
However, as a Geographer, Gould's primary concern was to measure the 
spatial movement of traffic rather than to provide a comprehensive account 
of the railways. Other works impinging on the role and impact of 
17 18 19 . 20 
railways include MacPhee, Kay, Howard, and Dlckson - to mention 
the better known. But none of these works have been based on any close 
empirical study of the railways themselves. The present work then differs 
from all the others in that it seeks to provide a comprehensive account 
of early railway development in the Gold Coast, and its impact on the 
Colonial economy. 
The thesis is divided into three parts, each of which focusses 
4 
on different aspects of railway development and operation. Part I 
accounts for policy decisions leading to railway construction in the 
Gold Coast and how this resulted in a particular configuration of 
railway lines and associated ports and harbours. Chis is, to a 
considerable extent, a "tas~' which has to be handled in a chronological 
manner, so that each step in the process can be evaluated and understood. 
This will also enable us to establish the "intentions" behind railway 
innovation in Africa as distinct from the "effects" of the railways. 
One of the weaknesses of the dependency approach is its failure to 
draw this distinction and hence the tendency to regard the existence 
of one as evidence for the other. This work is carried out in 
Chapters 1 - 4. 
Part II examines the railways as a business or commercial 
enterprise - how it was organised, how it mobilised the resources and 
skills needed for construction and operation. In adopting this approach 
I am following the ideas of Alfred Chandler in his American Railroads21 
where he demonstrated that by virtue of being historically the first 
large scale commercial enterprises to be undertaken, railways called 
for the solution of unprecedented problems in engineering, recruitment, 
training and organisation of workers on a large scale, mobilisation of 
massive investment capital, as well as large scale alienation of land, 
and that the solution to all these problems marked a significant step in 
the growth of managerial knowledge, training and organisation for large-
scale industry generally. Part of the aim here is to assess the 
limitations of "spill-off" effects from a technology developed and 
perfected in one part of the world and replanted wholesale into another. 
5 
The concept of "transfer of technology" is itself, to an extent, on 
trial. Moreover, in British West Africa where railways were owned 
and operated by the colonial governments, they occupied a central point 
in the formation of colonial policy. Consequently, a study of the 
organisation and mobilisation of resources for the railways will also 
elucidate the British Government's attitudes towards issues regarding 
public finance, labour and land tenure in the colonies. This is covered 
in chapters 5 to 9. finally, ~art III examines the effect of railway 
development on the Colonial economy of the Gold Coast. This is an 
atte;.,pt to evaluate the potential impact of new modes of transportation 
on economic activity in a part of the world which was previously 
seriously deficient in internal transport and communications. 
The period covered in this thesis begins in 1879, when the first 
recorded proposals for railway construction were made, and ends in 1929, 
by which time the basic railway network and associated ports and harbours 
had been completedo 1929 was also the beginning of the Great Depression 
which introduces a new phase in the Colonial economy. 
The reader will note that throughout the thesis the term 
"Gold Coast" is used flexibly to refer to the geographical area which 
has become present day Ghana. This has been done for two reasons. first, 
the railways themselves were at the time officially designated as "Gold 
Coast Railways". Second, the intent is to emphasise the fact that the 
railways were "Colonial" l{ailways. 
Based on primary research from the llriginal Correspondence, 
ltailways I.>epartmental l{eports, Blue Books, Government G3zettes and other 
official publications held at the Public ltecords Uffice and supplemented 
l> 
by the relevant secondary literature, "Gold Coast Railways: The r~aking 
of a Colonial Lconomy" tells the story of the introduction and expansion 
of railways into the Gold Coast and its social and economic effects. 
, 
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CHAPl'£I{ 1 
A SLOW BEGINNING, 1879-1895 
frankel's observation in 1938 that railways in Colonial Africa 
were essential for administrative and strategic purposes, and hence, 
by implication, that these objectives had priority, reflects a long-
t d " " 1 W" " 1 s an 1ng V1ew. r1t1ng in 924 about the railways in the British West 
African colonies Lilian Knowles argued that: 
no impulse has been more potent in causing the railways to be 
built into the interior than the fact that the french were 
creating a railway net in their West African possessions which 
would, unless countered by British railway development, tap 
and absorb the trade of the British possessions. L 
In the same year, Allan McPhee expressed similar views, albeit 
in more eulogistic language, about the Gold Coast railways. According 
to McPhee, the British lacked knowledge about the economic resources of 
the country because no comprehensive geological maps existed at the time 
and therefore all the Gold Coast railways were "mere economic speculations, 
being built for administrative, strategic, and philanthropic purposes.,,3 
In recent times, scholars have adopted a more critical approach towards 
the Gold Coast railways which locates them within the developing economic 
needs of Colonialism. Writing in 1972, G.B. Kay argued that it was gold 
which originally attracted the British to the Gold Coast and therefore 
their first act of colonialism was to construct a railway in the iJestern 
districts to link the gold mines to the nearest port at Sekondi. 4 
following this line of interpretation Khoda Howard further argued that 
railway investment in the Gold Coast was geared towards the interests of 
the expatriate bourgeoisie so long as it did not conflict with the interests 
11 
of the colonial state itself, and that it was Africans who bore the 
brunt of such investments. 5 However, a systematic study remains to 
be carried out as to how decisions were arrived at in relation to the 
selection of the three principal routes which formed the triangular 
railway system - a study which alone can lead to a better understanding 
of the role that the railways were intended to play in the colonial 
political economy. Such an understanding is also necessary if any 
meaningful evaluation of the actual impact of the railways on the Gold 
Coast economy is to be made. It is for these reasons that Part I of 
this thesis will concentrate on exploring the forces behind the 
formation of railway policy over the five decades before 1929. 
The earliest phase in the hi~tory of the Gold Coast railway 
system was one of indecision and delay, resulting from a lack of official 
commitment to a railway policy. Uiscussion of possible railway 
construction began as early as 1879, but it was not until 1893 that 
the Colonial Office finally authorised railway surveys in the colony, as 
part of a general scheme for the whole of British West Africa. Before 
1893 initiatives came mainly from private railway speculators who tried 
to convince the Colonial Office that railways could be built and operated 
successfully in the Gold Coast. This cha7ter examines the nature of these 
private railway schemes, the reasons why the Colonial Office turned 
them down, and the attempts of the Colonial Government itself to devise 
an appropriate railway strategy. 
Uuring the 1870's and 1880's, trade and communications between 
the coast and the interior depended almost entirely upon human porterage 
over rough and poorly maintained roadways. :here was some attempt bv the 
12 
Colonial administration to clear existing trade routes and construct new 
roads on which officials could travel by hammock. Chiefs were granted 
annual stipends on condition that they mobilised communal labour for 
road clearance, with an additional allowance of £2 per mile being 
allowed for work carried out. 6 But such improvements were conducted on 
a limited scale, and as late as 1889 it was reported that: 
~xcept in the immediate vicinity in the largest coast towns, 
there were no roads in the country. The so-called roads 
are mere footpaths 12-18 inches broad, with the high bush on 
either side, tortuous, blocked with falling trunks, flooded 
with water in the rainy season, interrupted by bridgeless 
. 7 r1vers ••• 
Such conditions placed serious constraints on trade. Head 
loading required considerable amounts of labour and its costs were 
relatively high. Over many years hammock men and carriers were paid 
1/- per day plus 3d subsistence, and this had come to be the accepted 
market rate for all wage labour. It therefore cost about £10 to 
transport one ton of goods for 60 miles, and on this basis it was 
estimated that transport costs amounted to fifty per cent of t~ price 
. 8 paid to African producers of palm 011 and rubber. When corporate mining 
activity commenced in the interior, transport problems were even more 
acute. Mining equipment had to be designed in such a way that it could 
be broken down into small units of not more than 50lbs., to be carried 
by one person. Such a procedure was slow, inefficient and unreliable, 
and it was not uncommon for porters to abandon their awkward loads in 
9 
the bush. 
If the Gold Coast Colony's trade and production were to be 
increased, there was an obvious need for improved transport facilities. 
13 
Such requirements were heightened both by the growth in the volume of 
Gold Coast exports, particularly of rubber, during the last quarte~ of 
the nineteenth century and by the introduction of Dritish mining Capital 
into the western districts. The Ashanti War of 1873-74 gave fresh 
publicity to the existence of gold deposits in the Wassau and Tarkwa 
districts, and by 1878 two expatriate mining companies had commenced 
operations there. The first Gold Coast "jungle boom" was underway, and 
by 1882 no less than tw~lvr companies were engaged in gold mining in 
10 the colony. However, the earliest initiatives for the introduction 
of railways into the Gold Coast appears to have come more from the 
mercantile community engaged in the Gold Coast's import-export trades 
than the mining companies struggling to establish themselves in the 
Western districts. 
The first such proposal was put forward in 1879 when Fitzgerald, 
the editor of the African Times, and Hercer, former Uirector of Public 
Works in the Gold Coast, sought a government guarantee for a proposed 
company to build three railway lines - one from Accra to Kpong on the 
Volta to serve the eastern palm oil and cotton districts, another from 
Saltpond to serve the palm oil and rubber districts of the Central 
Province, and a third from Shama near Sekondi to the Wassau gold mines in 
11 the Western Province. failing a quick Colonial Uffice response, the 
two men got some influential merchants with West African connections, 
including two Hembers of Parliament, to sign a petition on the urgent 
12 
need for the railways and with this they renewed their applicationo 
further proposals followed from Le Hrun, a irench merchant who was also 
Agent for the Netherlands Government in the Gold Coast, for a fifty mile 
13 line to link Elmina and Prahsu, and from r~ Bary, a British railway 
14 
engineer, for a coastal line to link Accra with £lmina. 14 Then, in 
May 1883, 48 expatriate merchants in the Colony banded together to float 
the idea of a forty mile line from Elmina to open up the central 
agricultural areas. 15 
Such proposals envisaged substantial government assistance as 
well as approval, but the reaction of both the Colonial government and 
the Colonial Office was one of extreme caution. There were three areas 
of offical concern. first, all of the schemes sought;1 government 
guarantee of interest on the capital outlay. .~ilway construction by 
private companies supported by a government guarantee had been a common 
feature of transport innovation in the British Empire during the ~;~~ 
decade of the nineteenth century, but by the 1870's the system was coming 
under attack. In India, for example, it had engendered widespread 
speculation and serious over-capitalisation, and substantial subsidies were 
being paid out of Indian revenues to British investors. Consequently, 
from 1869 the Government of india began to build its own railways, at 
a lower cost than under the guarantee system, and from 1879 it embarked 
on a policy of gradual, take-over of all lines. 16 Against such a 
background, the Golonial Office was unhappy with the idea of introducing 
the guarantee system into the Gold Coast. "The days of guarantees are gone", 
one official noted in consideration of the fitzgerald-l-lercer proposal, 
although he was prepared to sanction a lower figure than the promoters 
.. . d 17 haa in min • 
Second, the railway speculators were looking for free grants of 
land along the proposed routes, with rights to trade, to cultivate and to 
mineo in fact, the proposals could be seen as part of the mineral and 
15 
forestry concession scramble of the time which aimed at laying claims to 
vast territories for future speculation. 18 The Colonial Office was 
worried about the political and social consequences of such large scale 
alienation of land in a colony where land remained under chiefs. The 
Colonial Office was therefore very careful to point out that technically 
it had no power to make land grants outside the immediate vicinity of 
the coastal forts and castles.1~ When proposals included the idea of a 
r..orthwards extension into Ashanti - as did one from Hessrs Bircham & Company 
in 1887 - the officials were quick to point out that, because Ashanti 
was not under British jurisdiction, they "cannot grant the ordinary 
1 1 f . l· t· f . 1 . ,,2 0 ega aC1 1 les or ral way constructlon. 
Finally, the Colonial Office suspected that the various promoters 
lacked sufficient backing from private capital to merit serious 
consideration. When for example, fitzgerald and Hercer were asked to 
demonstrate their financial capabilities, their only response was to 
argue that so-called IIresponsible capitalists"would never be attracted 
. 21 to the colony w1thout some lead from the government. Similarly, when 
the Colonial Office demanded evidence from Le Brun to show that his 
proposal was a "bona fide" one and that the requisite private capital would 
be forthcoming, nothing more was heard from him.
22 
The Colonial Office, 
aware of the dubious financial background of many such guarantee and 
coneession hunters, laid down conditions to be fulfilled before detailed 
consideration of any application. Survey reports, estimates of potential 
traffic and information on the credit-worthiness of the applicants had to 
be supplied. These, the Secretary of State argued, would ensure that 
agreements would be reached with responsible people who were able to show 
d . . f' f 23 that they could undertake the ~ork an glve securlty or ltS per ormance. 
10 
But while officials were prepared to consider private initiatives, 
opinion was coming round to the view that, given the highly speculative 
nature of the proposals coming before the Colonial Uffice, railway 
building in the Gold Coast, and indeed in British West Africa as a whole, 
should be seen as an activity more for the state itself than for private 
capital. Thus the Earl of Derby, commenting on the scheme of the 4b Gold 
Coast merchants, state~ that if a private company could construct and 
operate railways profitably then the colonial government would be as well 
to do so ·v~~\~., as direct revenue would accrue to the Treasury. Besides, 
the administrative and strategic needs of the Colonial state would be 
better served by a system of government ownership.24 
Such schemes threw the task of taking the initiative for railway 
construction onto the colonial government in Accra, which was very slow 
to perceive the advantages of a state railway programme. Governor 
Griffith, whose term in office lasted from 1883 to 1895, was particularly 
prone to see difficulties and problems in the way of railway development. 
His correspondence with the Colonial Office continuously stressed the 
absence of labour for large-scale construction projects, believing 
that such labour would have to be imported, and he pointed out the 
severe environmental barriers which would have to be overcome. Above all, 
he was concerned with the financial constraints on the colonial 
government. Commenting on one proposal for a line from Sekondi to 
Tarkwa in 1889 he stated: 
The time has not yet arrived when this Government could undertake 
the construction of such a line or the provision of any such 
guarantees ••• If ever the development of the country and 
the gold mines justified such a step which 1 hope may yet prove 
to be the case, the question can be considered in relation to 
17 
25 
the state of the finances at the time. 
Despite the apparent lack of interest, the railway issue never 
entirely disappeared from the official papers. The activities of rival 
colonial powers partly ensured this, for Britain's competitors in West 
Africa proved more active in the field of transport. Consequently, 
their trade began to penetrate areas which British merchants regarded as 
being within their sphere of influence. In German Togoland for instance, 
the Lome-Kpando-Kete Krachie road was by 1890 successfully competing 
with the Volta route for the trade of the Salaga and Kentampo markets 
in what was to become the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. 26 
The Togoland administration had also granted a concession to an organisation 
called the German Colonial Kailway Construction and Operating Company in 
1890: the company would receive a grant of land for which it would pay 
an annual rent and share profits with the government. 27 Similarly, in 
the Ivory Coast, the french construction of roads into the interior 
surpassed comparative British attempts in the Gold Coast. Consequently, 
British commercial interest groups began to perceive railway development 
as a means of protecting and cxp~nding their activity in the region. 
Indeed this had become all the more urgent in view of the fact that the 
Brussels Conference of 1889-1890 had called on all the ~uropean powers to 
back up their claims to colonial territories in Africa by the establishment 
of effective administrations particularly throllgh the construction of 
28 
railways and roads. Thus the London Chamber of Commerce made 
representations to the Colonial Uffice early in 1890 which stressed 
the need for both improved road communication and the construction of 
railways in order to establish their control over the interior territories 
as far as the Niger, the "natural boundary" of the Gold Coast.
29 
The 
~Ianchester Chamber of Commerce later described the growing international 
10 
rivalry in more dramatic terms: "The French and Germans", the Chamber 
noted, "have established firm footholds on the coast, and are pushing 
inland with a tendency to converge in the North", and accordingly 
called for railways into the interior to prevent further pre-emption of 
British trade and commerce. 30 
In the meantime, the rate of applications from private railway 
promoters to the Colonial Office was also speeding up, as a greater 
number of metropolitan businessmen and engineers continued to prob~ the 
possibility of developing railways in the colony. One such proposal 
was made early in 1890 when the Lartigue Kailway Construction Company 
from Dublin sought government approval for the construction of an 
31 
unspecified network of light railways in the colony. Other proposals 
followed from Gower Sadd of the African Concessions Trust (whose 
directors included the Earl of I'layo, K.,\. Lawrence Kirk, John McCullum 
) f 1 · f Ca . 32 d f and H. Sherwin White or a lne rom pe Coast to Kumasl, an rom 
Messrs James Irvine and Cowpany of Liverpool, for a forty mile line from 
T k . 33 Sekondi to the ar wa m1nes. Then in August 1891, two proposals were 
put forward, one from Hessrs Edwards Bros. and Company of Liverpool who 
demanded a government subsidy for the construction of a line from 
1 1 d · . 34 d h Saltpond to serve the central agr~cu tura lstrlcts, an anot er 
from l"lr Breakell, Uirector of Abosso Gold Mines in the Gold Coast who 
35 
suggested a line from Sekondi to Tarkwa. 
also received from Lord Gifford36 and Henry 
finally applications were 
37 Cooper in November 1891 
and January 1892 respectively, both of which sOUgllt government assistance 
for the construction of railways to open up the Central Province. 
1~ 
The result of such pressures was that from about 1890, official 
policy moved, albeit slowly, towards the formation of a more positive 
approach to the railway question. for instance early in 1890, the 
Colonial Office despatched questionnaires to the ;:'rench and Portuguese 
Governments to obtain information regarding "the manner in which 
railways are worked in their African Colonies.,,38 In the Gold Coast 
itself, a government appointed "Committee on Economic Agriculture" 
which included commercial interest groups and colonial officials had 
submitted its report in 1889 calling for the illimediate construction of 
railways that would develop the "vegetable resources" of the country 
rather than mineral deposits. 39 Consequently, in 1890, th~ laying of a 
short line of about four and a half miles between Axim and the mouth of 
the Ankobra was seriously considered "to give an idea how a railway would 
,,40 8 fare in the colony. Then in September 1 91, a major step towards 
a full railway proposal came when Governor Griffith suggested a 300-400 
mile network, the first phase of which was to form a trunk route from the 
most central port of the colony into the interior. Such a central line 
through the agricultural districts, the Governor argued, not only offered 
some hope of financial return, but in addition, it would form a suitable 
41 basis for future railway development. Clearly, Griffith's proposal was 
influenced by the recommendations of the Committee on Economic Agriculture. 
Although the Gold Coast was by far the most popular colony for 
the British railway promoters, mainly because of its gold deposits, other 
British colonies were not entirely neglected. Indeed as Omosini points out, 
a significant number of the applicants for railway development in the 
Gold Coast also proposed simultaneous schemes for Lagos and Sierra Leone 
42 
as well. Thus it was against such a background of mounting pressure 
20 
for railway construction throughout the British West African colonies that 
the Colonial Office authorised railway surveys in the Gold Coast as part 
of a general scheme for West Africa as a whole. Commenting on the 
proposals from Lord Gifford, Gower 6add and Henry Cooper early in 1892 
the Secretary of State, Lord Knutsford declared: 
The colony has nothing to gain from the intervention of any 
of these applicants ••• But while these particular proposals 
cannot be entertained, I think that the time has come when steps 
should be taken to decide upon the policy to be adopted by the 
Government with regards to the construction of railways.43 
The first question to be resolved, the Secretary of State argued, was 
whether railways would be constructed at all, and for this reason surveys 
would be carried out in the various colonies. Subsequently, he would 
decide whether private enterprise or public funds should be used to 
build the lines. Although the decision by no means implied a definite 
commitment towards railway construction, it nevertheless marked a 
significant step because, for the first time, the Colonial Office had 
agreed to commit colonial funds towards railway surveys on a large scale. 
Even before Lord Knutsford's instructions were received in the 
Gold Coast, Governor Griffith had already recommended that Captain J.I. 
Lang of the ~oyal Engineers, who had had some experience in the colony, 
be seconded to undertake the work. In Uecember, 1892 Captain Lang arrived 
in the colony and shortly afterwards informed Griffith that he considered 
Kormatine, two and a half miles west of Saltpond "an ideal landing place" 
and that the line would go to the agricultural districts of InsJam (uda). 
It is clear that this proposal followed the "central trunk route" strategy 
advocated by Governor t..;riffith. tn fact th" (;ovclllor informed the Colonial 
uffice 
21 
wi th happy emphas is tha t = 
the district selected for the railways is through the oil 
producing countries up to Usuiam •••. It is also 
geographically the most central town of the colony and on that 
account it is suitable as a converging point for branch 
rai llvays to II-shan ti on the one hand and f.as tern Akim on the 
other hand. 44 
The final report of Captain Lang's survey, which became available 
in October 1894, included two alternative routes - one from Kormatine 
near Saltpond to Nsuiam (Uda), a distance of 65 miles, which was 
estimated to cost £296,180.00 and another from Apam, 26 miles east of 
~altpond, also to Nsuiam(Oda), a distance of 55 miles, which was 
estimated to cost £255,816.00. Lang stressed that both lines would pass 
through very fertile and thickly populated country and would therefore 
soon prove r~lunerative. This report was then referred to William 
Shelford, a Westminster railway consultant with wide experience in India 
and South East Asia, who had been appointed Consulting hngineer for all 
West African railway proposals. In llarch 1895, Shelford's recommendations 
were received in the Colonial Uffice and were notable for their highly 
optimistic views of the scheme. Shelford recommended the adoption of 
the ~pam-Nsuiam (Oda) route as it entailed a shorter route and 
consequently a more modest capital cost. While critical of Lang for 
gross underestimation of cost, and revising the estimates for the 55 mile 
Apam-Nsuiam line at £331,044.0~ Shelford was sure that the potential 
traffic would be at least 40,363 tons per annum. With an ideal rate of 
45 4d per ton mile, the line would then be remunerative. 
In spite of the glowing reports, the Colonial Office dragged 
its feet by deferring a decision on the Gold Coast proposal until all 
l.L 
the other \~est African surveys had been completed and the Consulting 
Engineer's reports on them submitted en masse. Sensing the continued 
lack of official commitment, the various West African commercial 
interest groups sent a powerful delegation to the Colonial Office in 
June 1895. The provision of railways, the delegation noted, would not 
only result in the expansion of British commerce in \~est Africa, but 
more importantly, it would create employment and stimulate British 
industry at a time of intensifying international competition. 
They also argued that railways would counteract the French and (;prmiln 
expansion in the region. However, if financial constraints rendered 
railway construction impossible throughout the whole of West Africa, 
they argued, then the Gold Coast would be a suitable starting point, 
because of its surplus revenue, population, palm oil and rubber 
resources, and above all its gold deposits. These proposals however 
were made to the Marquess of Kipon whose government had fallen the 
46 previous day. They therefore fell on the desk of the new Colonial 
Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. 
CONCLUSION 
from the 1870's onwards, and following the pattern of private railway 
construction in other parts of the world, railway promoters began to 
explore the possibilities of obtaining a Colonial Government guarantee 
to construct and operate railways in the Gold Coast. The aim was to 
provide a modern transport infrastructure that would meet the needs of 
the expanding British "imperial" and economic interests in the region. 
23 
However, the Colonial Uffice was opposed to guarantees because these were 
now seen as expensive and unreliable. lloreover, the applicants turned 
out to be men of questionable financial backgrounds whose only hope 
was to use both the prospects of government guarantee and land grants 
as security for raising capital. for these reasons, official policy 
began to favour a system of government ownership as it would also yield 
direct revenue to the Treasury as well as serving the administrative and 
military needs of the Colonial state more effectively. 
Until 1890, there was no official commitment to any railway 
project for the colony. Thereafter, the balance started to shift, partly 
as a result of continued pressure from the railway speculators and other 
West African economic interest groups, and partly too as a result of the 
growing imperial rivalry in the region. The scramble for Colonial 
territory in West Africa, with its consequent pressures on Colonial 
governments to achieve effective administration on the ground and its 
threats to existing commercial relationships between the coastal parts 
and the interior, focussed the attention of British policy-makers more 
sharply than before on the transport and communications needs of the 
West African possessions. At the same time, the local administration 
in the Gold Coast proposed a central trunk route which would serve those 
districts from which came the principal agricultural exports, because 
this seemed most viable in financial terms and would provide a suitable 
foundation for further railway development. By 1893, railway surveys 
had commenced in all the ~est African Colonies and th€ followin~ year 
a Consulting Engineer was appointed to advise on the proposed schemes. 
Nevertheless, the crucial decisions as to whether railways would be 
24 
constructed at all, and if so whether by private capital or by the 
colonial government, were to await the arrival of Joseph Chamberlain 
in the Colonial Office in July, lb95. 
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CHJUlTtt{ 2 
THf. lJt:VE.LUPH~Nr Of THE. W~Sr~KN LINE., 1895-1912 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that, although railway 
surveys had started in all the ~est African colonies in 1893 and in the 
following year a Consulting E.ngineer was appointed to advise on proposed 
schemes, the crucial decision as to whether railways would be constructed 
at all, and if so whether by private enterprise or by the Colonial 
Administrations, was to await the arrival of Joseph Chamberlain in the 
Colonial Uffice. This chapter focusses attention on three principal 
influences upon railway policy in the Gold Coast - Chamberlain and the 
notion of "tropical development", Governor Sir William Haxwell and his 
reference to a Malayan transportation model, and efforts by the various 
British West African interest groups to shape railway policy. from this 
the reasons for the construction of the "pioneer" railway line from 
Sekondi to Tarkwa, and its subsequent extension to Kumasi will be 
established. 
CHAHB~KLAIN ANu THE u~IIELUHlliNr OL" Tlit. "rKOPlGAL ~SrJ\.ft.S": 
uavid Kimble's description of the year 1895 as the formative 
year for railway policy in West Africa1 is perhaps more true of the 
Gold Coast than any of the other British colonies. J~t the metropolitan 
level, the year marked the appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. Through his efforts the various West African 
railway proposals were transformed into reality. At the Colonial 
administrative level, 1895 also witnessed the appointment of Sir william 
29 
Maxwell to the Governorship of the Gold Coast. His economic policies, 
too, were to have a lasting impact on the Gold Coast railway 
programme. 
A Birmingham metals industrialist turned politician, Chamberlain 
became the leading spokesman for "economic imperialism" among commercially 
minded British statesmen of his age. 2 He had always had a grand 
vision of empire building and regarded the entire British Colonial 
possessions as "one large estate" that was awaiting a systematic 
development. His political attitudes and philosophies particularly as 
regards the tropics, was largely the result of the international trade 
rivalry which the rise of Germany and America as industrial nations, 
(each with enormous resource bases, modern technology, concentrations 
of finance capital, aggressive overseas marketing practices) engendered 
for Britain's hitherto unrivalled supremacy in world trade. 3 According 
to Chamberlain, if Britain was to withstand the imminent competition, 
then it was imperative that it gained control over new hinterland 
markets and sources of raw materials through the construction of 
railways. Inputs for railway construction in the Colonies, he argued, 
would stimulate investment and employment in British industry. fhese 
ideas were succinctly expressed to the House of Commons as early as 
1893. Chamberlain argued: 
I firmly believe that railways (in the Colonies) will be a 
good investment, and if you spend this money the working 
classes of the country and the people in the slums will 
benefit, for the whole of the work will be done in this 
4 
country. 
As Secretary of ~tate for the Colonies therefore, Chamberlain considered 
his major task to be the promotion of the economic development of the 
30 
" " estates and sought to convince private metropolitan entrepreneurs that 
responsibility lay with them as much as with the Government if that 
goal were to be achieved. 
The new Secretary of State was convinced that government alone 
could provide the necessary infrastructure if private capital was to be 
attracted to the Colonies. Chamberlain argued: 
Individual enterprise will till the fields and cut the timber, 
and work the mines; but Government and Government alone, can 
make roads and railways. This is the true Province of 
Government in new Countries. Until it is recognised by Great 
Britain, she will not have fulfilled her obligat~on to the 
Dependencies which she now holds under her rule. 
He was particularly optimistic about the Gold Coast because of its gold 
deposits, the exploitation of which he believed would stimulate 
6 
other sectors of the economy. 
In October, 1895, the Consulting ~ngineers reports on the various 
railway surveys were received in the Colonial Office. Barely two weeks 
later, Chamberlain took the major decisions. First, the construction 
of the initial sections of the proposed railways in each colony should 
commence without further delay. Second, the Colonial Governments, rather 
than private enterprise should construct and own the lines. The standard 
Colonial guage of 3ft6 inches was approved except for the Sierra Leone 
railways which adopted the narrower guage of 2ft 6 inches. Third, the 
Oepartmental System of Const~uction would be adopted. By this system 
the governments would become their own contractors (as distinct from the 
contract system whereby the work would be entrusted to private contractors 
by tender). Under the Oepartmental System, the Crown Jlgents on the 
advice of the Consulting Engineers would appoint a Kesident Engineer 
31 
who would be responsible for the actual construction of the project. 
Both the ~esident Engineer and his construction staff would be public 
servants, answerable to the Colonial Government for administrative and 
disciplinary purposes. tor technical matters however, the Resident 
Engineer would be responsible to the Consulting Engineers who would also 
advise the governments. 
The Crown Agents were entrusted with the responsibility of 
organising and executing the United Kingdom side of the works, such as 
the purchase of materials, engagement of staff, financial administration 
etc. Perhaps more significantly, it was laid down that all stores and 
equipment, except those available locally,had to be procured from 
the United Kingdom. iinally, but in no way the least important, 
Chamberlain authorised the Crown Agents, to utilise the reserve funds 
of each of the Colonies to finance the preliminary stages of the 
7 
construction. On receipt of these instructions in the Colonies, work 
began on the Lagos and Sierra Leone projects. The Colonial Office, 
however,. instructed that construction should not commence in the Gold 
Coast until further surveys were carried out and the reports evaluated. 
It is an irony that the Gold Coast which received more attention 
than the other two colonies and where railway surveys were first started 
had to wait three more years before embarking on its pioneer line. 
And it is to the causes of this delay that we now turn. 
GOVE1{NOlt NAX\-Jt:LL AND THE ~LlLA'i AN P Al{}\.uIGH: 
As we have observed in the previous chapter, the Griffith 
administration intended the proposed j\pam-Nsuiam (uda) rail route to 
serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, it wished to promote 
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expatriate commercial and agrarian interests in the Central ~rovince; 
on the other hand, its location was a suitable foundation for further 
railway development. In spite of the glowing reports upon the scheme 
however, it soon became evident that not only would the line not reach 
the construction stage, but more importantly, the original railway 
strategy was subject to drastic revision. The main reason for this was 
that early in 1895, Governor Griffith was relieved of his appointment 
as Governor. His replacement was Sir William tlaxwell, with whose 
appointment economic policy in the Gold Coast made a volte face. 
The Colonial Office appointed Haxwell with the principal task 
of carrying out the imperial policy of territorial expansion in the 
region by bringing Ashanti and the Northern regions under British Kule. 8 
But Governor l1axwell's economic policies for the existing Gold Coast 
Colony also had serious implications for railway policy. Before his 
arrival in the Gold Coast, Sir William Maxwell had served in various 
capacities in the Malay States, first as Straits Commissioner for Lands 
and subsequently as Kesident. During this period he had worked to lay 
the basic foundation of the colonial political economy in the 
9 Settlements. the main preoccupation of the Malayan authorities was to 
create a favourable environment for private enterprise by providing 
ancilliary services such as railways and roads. In the Malay States, 
tin ore had been the principal attraction for the early colonial 
administrators who had by the early 1890's constructed short latitudinal 
lines from the Western half of the Peninsula to serve the tin mines. 
These lines linked the inland producing centres with the nearest 
coastal ports from whence the ore was shipped to either Penang or 
10 
Singapore. 
JJ 
when the new Governor arrived in the Gold Coast, he assumed 
that conditions there were similar to those in the Malay States and he 
sought to import policies as practiced in the Settlements into the 
Gold Coast. Given the contribution of tin mining to economic growth 
in the Halay States, Sir William llaxwell similarly favoured the 
promotion of gold mining in the Gold Coast as the means of attracting 
British capital. Thus his familiarisation tour of the country 
concentrated on the mining districts of the Western Province. He 
identified Wassaw, near Tarkwa as the centre of the mining industry, 
and emphasised the need to open up the district to British investors. 
Maxwell wrote: 
I am very much impressed with the capabilities of the Wassaw 
Uistrict. It is well watered, the climate is good and the 
configuration of the hills, the character of the forest and the 
nature of the soil reminded me of the Halay Peninsula ••••• 
•••• The richness of the auriferous deposits is 
remarkable and it is very desirable that this gold region 
should be better known,and by an equitable system of land 
and mining regulations,laid open to British and Colonial 
enterprise. 11 
The main reason why government policy in the past had not favoured the 
mining companies Governor ~laxwell argued, was the fact that concessions 
were acquired direct from chiefs and as a result no revenue accrued to 
the Colonial Treasury in the form of royalties. l~or did the mining 
companies pay any export tax on gold aod timber (which was also 
produced in the same districts). This situation, which he called an 
anomaly, would be rectified forthwith through new legislation on land 
tenure which would require concessionnaires to pay royalties to 
Government. Consequently, Government would become duty bound to 
12 
improve communications to the mines. 
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Equally important was the Governor's suggestion that like the 
railway network of the Malay Peninsula, several light and short 
latitudinal lines should be constructed from the coast direct to link 
the centres of production in the interior. By this means, the Colony 
would avoid the necessity of building expensive trunk routes and 
13 the related large scale harbour works. Thus, addressing representatives 
from the Accra Chamber of Commerce who had called on him in May 1895 to 
express their concern about delay concerning the central railway proposal, 
the Governor declared that railways by themselves were meaningless unless 
considered in relation to port developments and other means of inland 
transportation such as rivers and roads. (He was particularly critical 
of the type of cart roads the Germans were building in Togoland). for 
this purpose, he went on, surveys would shortly be conducted on the 
coast to determine suitable sites for the development of lighterage 
ports. Similarly, the mouths and the rapids along the rivers Ankobra 
and Volta would be surveyed with the aim of improving them for the use 
14 
of shipping traffic. These were to complement railways. 
In July 1895, Governor Haxwell submitted his comments on the 
report of the proposed central line to the Colonial Office. While 
conceding that, "the line traversed a rich palm-oil region and 
therefore the Government may accept and construct it", he nevertheless 
censured Captain Lang for placing too much emphasis on political 
• K . 15 
advantages offered by its extens10n to umaSl. Government policy, 
he went on, was to build a short line to serve the mines at Tarkwa as 
well, and therefore the proposed central route should form only one of 
several short lines to be constructed from the coast into the interior. 
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Captain Lang's scheme, he argued, ~.;as designed for "a much better and' 
expensive line", and therefore incompatible with the light and cheap 
latitudinal railway system being advocated. AS such, he argued that 
the entire report should be referred back to the Consulting Engineers 
to be reconsidered, adding that, "I hesitate to advocate the immediate 
construction of such a line.,,1 6 
Next the local administration directed its efforts to giving 
publicity to the mineral potentials of the country with the aim of luring 
private investors. lletween 1895 and 1898, official reports and public 
statements were full of sanguine, often exaggerated accounts of the 
Gold Coast's gold deposits. One such report stated that the Western 
Province alone had 13,000,000 tons of bunket reef from which no less 
than £40 million worth of gold could be extracted within ten years 
if the cynide method of refining was adopted. The operation which 
would require over 1,350 stamps would involve an initial investment 
of £2 million and the area of land would permit 40 companies to work, 
each returning a monthly profit of L30,000}1 the presumption of the 
report was that railway communication would soon be established within 
the region.' 
The various railway lobbies were not slow in reacting to these 
new developments, exerting pressure on both the local administration 
and the Colonial Office in attempts to influence policy. Already in 
May, 1895, the mercantile community in Accra had sensed the shift in 
Government attitude towards the proposed central rail route when they 
expressed concern about "total neglect" in the formulation of policy 
and cautioned the new Governor to "examine and balance very well the 
3b 
18 
conflicting interests with regard to railways." Then in July of the 
same year, when the ~ngineer's report on the central route was eventually 
published, both the Accra and Manchester Chambers of Commerce called for 
its immediate construction, though they argued that Accra rather than 
Apam should become the coastal terminal on the grounds that as the 
administrative capital, Accra already had a large concentration of 
commercial activity with heavy fixed capital. 19 Again in uecember 
1895, the West I~frican Trade Sections of the Manchester, Liverpool 
and London Chambers of Commerce reiterated their call for the 
i f h · h l" bl " 20 construct on 0 railways w lC would deve op the vegeta e resources 
of the country rather than minerals. 
In contrast to the merchants, the mining lobby was more 
restrained. Between 1895 and 1897, the main preocupation of the 
mining companies was to reorganise their concerns and to secure 
Government validation for their concessions under impending legislation. 
It was not until 1897 that two of the mining companies urged the 
Colonial office to construct the Gold Coast's first "pioneer" line in 
the Western Province to serve their mines. fhey argued that in addition 
to direct revenue to the Colonial Treasury through royalties, profits 
21 from gold mining would benefit the British investing public at large. 
In the meantime, the Colonial Office had authorised further 
railway and harbour surveys in the colony. In December 1896, the 
Consulting ~ngineers were asked to carry out two surveys - one from 
Sekondi-Takoradi on the coast to the mining districts of farkwa, and 
22 
another from /\ccra to uda ~Nsuiam). (fhe latter had become necessary 
in view of the mercantile demand for Accra rather than Apam to be 
37 
made the coastal terminal for an eastern-central rail route). J\t the 
same time, Messrs. Coode, Son and Mathews, a Westminster harbour 
construction firm, was engaged to examine the entire coast and to 
make recommendations as to the most suitable sites for the development 
of lighterage ports. 23 
The reports on the proposed railways and harbour finally became 
available early in 1898. According to Shelford'~ report a line of 3 ft. 
6 inches guage from Sekondi on the coast to 'farkwa would be 40 miles 
in length and would cost £239,339. It stressed that because of the 
traffic for the mining industry, the line would prove profitable to 
operate. The result of the Accra-Nsuiam (Uda) survey was less sanguine. 
It revealed that the line would be 77 miles in length and would cost 
£465,000 and that it would probably take some time for traffic to 
build up. As an alternative to the direct Accra-Nsuiam (Oda) route, the 
report suggested that Captain Lang's original J\.pam-Nsuiam (Oda) 
proposal could be adopted, in which case a short connecting coastal 
24 
line would be built from Accra to Apam. With regard to harbour 
facilities, Messrs. Coode Son and Mathews suggest~d the adoption of 
Sekondi, Apam and Accra as the main points of entry into the colony from 
d . h' . 25 where railway lines could be develope lnto t e lnterlor. It is clear 
that this scheme followed the Nalayan paradigm advocated by Governor 
Maxwell. 
The weight of opinion created by both l'1axwell and Shelford had 
its effect. The engineer's reports formed the subject of a Colonial 
Office Conference in July 1898, at which representatives of the west 
African commercial and mining lobbies were informed that the Sekondi-
3d 
Tarkwa line, the clearing of which had begun, was to be constructed 
first and that Sekondi rather than Takoradi would be the terminus. 
~s soon as it was completed, two lines were to be constructed from 
Accra - the first one either direct to Oda(Nsuiam) or via Apam and 
the second one to Kpong on the Volta to serve commercial and agricultural 
. 26 1nterests. 
CONSTKUCTIUN Of THE S~KONUIY fAHKWA LINE: 
The first task of the construction staff was to erect a wooden 
jetty at Sekondi for the landing of construction materials. Next they 
constructed staff quarters, workshops, running sheds and a turntable 
which transformed Sekondi, "a fishing village of few mud huts" into a 
27 base for the entire constructional workers. 
However, actual construction of the line proceeded extremely 
slowly. There were several reasons for this. .r'irstly, as a result of 
an engineering strike in Britain in 1897, orders for construction materials 
were not delivered until early 1899. Secondly, as a "pioneer" railway, 
the only means available for transporting materials and equipment inland 
was by head carriage which was extremely slow. In addition, the line 
traversed a very dense forest, which according to one observer, "rarely 
,,28 
permits a view of more than fifty yards, and this had to be 
sufficiently cleared to prevent interruptions from falling trees. for 
instance, it was reported that it took 15 men six days to fell one 
29 particular tree and that several of such types were encountered. 
furthermore, the earthwork was of soft clay and consequently involved 
greater problems of drainage and ballasting. No suitable ballast material 
was located in the area and consequently the staff h~~ to manage with 
the labour intensive method whereby boulders were collected from the 
forest and then broken into pieces. Uver 500,000 tons of these were 
requl'red for the ll'ne. 30 LI k 1 h d' d b 1 nor was a so an lcappe y abour shor~ages. 
This was further complicated by the unsettled political climate in 
Ashanti. As a consequence of Ashanti's persistent resistance to Colonial 
rule, railway workers had to be drafted from time to time as carriers 
for the British invading forces. To the Africans, working on the 
railways became synonymous with military conscription. It was only 
• 
by the deployment of armed constables on the project, ostensibly to 
guard against Ashanti attack, but in reality to prevent labourers from 
d 'h "d 31 esertlng, t at constructlon contlnue • Ashanti was finally defeated 
in tlarch, 1901 and four months later, the 40 mile Sekondi-Tarkwa line 
was completed. 
THE. TAKKWA-KUNASI EXTENSION: 
When the Colonial Uffice authorised the construction of the 
Sekondi-Tarkwa line in 1898, it did not intend that the line should 
subsequently be extended for an additional 128 miles to Kumasi, the heart 
of Ashanti. In fact, Acting Governor Hodgson had maintained in 1898 that 
for administrative and military convenience, a railway communication 
32 
with Kumasi should necessarily start from Accra, the capital town. 
However, in 1900 when the Consulting Engineers were asked to consider 
the most suitable route to adopt for a railway to Ashanti, their report 
which became reltdy in July favoured the extension of the Sekondi-Tarkwa 
line to Kumasi. 
The main reason for this is linked t~ the British annexation 
of Ashanti in 1895-6 and the resultant introduction of metropolitan 
mining capital into the region. The reasons for the British invasion 
33 
of Ashanti in 1895-96 have been examined by Agbodeka. According to 
him, traditional Gold Coast historiography, which locates the general 
expansion of British jurisdiction beyond the frontiers of tre Gold 
Coast Colony within the context of the international colonial rivalry 
34 
of the time, has tended to obscure the fact that the 1895-96 invasion 
was a direct response to new Ashanti political and economic manoeuvres 
which aimed at permanently securing the independence of the Empire. 
Agbodeka argued that a series of border arrangements between the 
European powers in 1890 had already established Ashanti as a preserve 
for the British so that by the mid nineties there was hardly any trace 
of the earlier rivalries in the region. Hence, by implication, formal 
establishment of British rule over Ashanti was only a matter of time 
and the Colonial Office sought to accomplish this through diplomacy 
rather than military confrontation. On the other hand, at this time, 
not only did Ashanti embark on diplomacy by sending deputations to 
London to lobby Members of Parliament and other foreign consuls for 
international recognition of Ashanti as an independent state, but locally 
too, Kumasi's economic and military strategies were such that, "by 
1895 there was a feeling that if Britain did not act quickly, Ashanti 
. . ,,35 
would permanently shut them off from the 1nter1or. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that by 1895, Britain had 
committed itself to the conquest of Ashanti. While the War Uffice made 
the necessary preparations for War, Governor Maxwell delivered an 
ultimatum to Kumasi to "accept" a British Kesident who would have 
power to hold courts, organise a Police force and protect British 
36 
commercial interests in the region. Failing an Ashanti response, 
by December 1895, Kumasi was sacked and the King, Prempeh I, the Queen 
Hother, Yaa J\kyaa and most of the leading divisional chiefs at the court 
were arrested and exiled first to Sierra Leone and subsequently to the 
37 Seychelles. 
The conquest of J\shanti paved the way for the penetration of 
British mining capital into the region. This process had begun in 1892 
when three African concession mongers, J.P. Brown, J.E. Biney, and 
J. Ellis had approached a certain C.A. Cade, a British merchant stationed 
at Cape Coast with an offer to sell him a 99 year lease over the Obuasi 
gold mines?,8 which they themselves had been working since 1890. 39 
However, due to the unsettled situation in Ashanti, Cade could not 
respond actively to the offer until 1895. In that year, he formed the 
Cote d'Or Company Limited and with the assistance of Biney and his 
friends, Cade acquired the property from Nana Kweku Osai of Bekwai for 
£200. 40 But for the next two years Cade's efforts to monopolise funds 
for the company succeeded in raising no more than £4,000 and his demand 
. 41 for Colonial Uffice recognition for his concession was simply 19nored. 
Consequently, in April 1897, Cade decided to sell his booty to a certain 
fred Gordon, a London hotelier and Chairman of the Gordon Hotels Company, 
who together with a group of British businessmen including four Members 
of Parliament floated a new company, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation with 
, 42 
a nominal capital of £250,000 as successors of Cote d Ur. Cade 
himself became a shareholder in the new company. /1. Crown Agent's 
enquiry into the background of the Corporation revealed the shareholders 
42 
to be "very wealthy and influencial members of the financial community" 
and l'1r Gordon in particular had had personal success in business. 43 
Thus, with the financial credibility of the new company so established, 
the Colonial Office now agreed, and on 3 June 1897, the Crown Agents 
entered into an agreement with the ,''..shanti Goldfields Corporation on 
behalf of the ~ld ~oast Government. This involved a one hundred square 
mile concession with monopoly rights to mine, cut timber and trade in 
44 Ashanti in return for a 5 per cent royalty. By October 1897, Ashanti 
Goldfields had commenced mining at Obuasi. 
The first step towards the establishment of railway communication 
with Ashanti, came in August 1898 when fred Gordon, Chairman of Ashanti 
Goldfields approached the Colonial Uffice with the proposal that the 
Sekondi-Tarkwa railway scheme should be transformed into a major trunk 
route so as to serve their 
£5,000 towards the cost of 
property at Obuasi and offered to pay up to 
45 
the survey. The-Colonial Office however 
b \I b - f h l' .. 46 turned down the offer ecause no assurance can e gIven or t e Ine. 
The following year, Gordon renewed his request for the extension of the 
Tarkwa railway to Obuasi with a new offer to guarantee traffic on the 
47 line to cover capital charges for ten years. In the meantime, the 
Colonial authorities themselves were beginning to feel an urgent need 
for a railway communication to Ashanti. Although Kumasi had been occupied 
and the King exiled since 1896, the establishment of British rule in thn 
region was far from complete. The period 1896-1900 was one of "war fever" 
48 
as troops loyal to Prempeh reorganised in the bush. Indeed, by March 
1900, when Acting Governor Hodgson delivered his message that Prempeh 
was exiled and seized the Golden Stool, another full scale war resulted. 
Under the circumstances, the Colonial office considered the immediate 
construction of railways into Ashanti to be imperative if the persistent 
49 
resistance were to be crushed. However, by this time, it had also become 
evident that Chamberlain's hopes of obtaining substantial imperial 
financial assistance for the Hest African railway projects had failed. 
Consequently, the <.;olonial Office began to take the ,I.shanti Goldfield's 
offer more seriously since it would "relieve the Government of a very 
1 f h ,,50 arge proportion 0 t e risk of construction. At this point the 
financial interest of mining capital and the strategic interest of the 
colonial administration converged upon each other. 
By this time, it had become clear that the Halayan paradigm 
was being abandoned. A series of negotiations between the Crown Agents 
and Ashanti Goldfields Corporation culminated in a contract early in 
1901. The Government undertook to extend the line from Tarkwa to Kumasi. 
In return, Ashanti Goldfields and its subsidiary, Ashanti Consuls, agreed 
to meet any losses on the railway, for 20 years from the date the line 
reached Kumasi. It would meet losses of up to £30,000 representing 
capital charges on the estimated £1 million cost of the extension. If 
the net receipts in any particular year exceeded 4~ per cent 
on the capital outlay, the company would be entitled to one-fifth of such 
profits. Ashanti Goldfields would be a party to all railway tariffs 
though the administration reserved the right to convey troops and stores 
" 11
51 I 1 h on the railways at cost of conveyance. C ear y, t e arrangement 
marked a new phase in the role of private capital in colonial railway 
development. Kather than complete government financing of railway 
construction, a private company was now providing security for the line. 
44 
The extension to Kumasi was authorised at a time when the 
uncertainties created in the South African gold mines as a result 
of the Anglo-Boer War, together with high world market prices for 
gold had led to a temporary gold boom in the Gold Coast - when more 
than 400 companies were floated in London for mineral exploration in 
52 
the country. Consequently, the mining lobby was more influential 
now than it had been a few years earlier. Companies whose properties 
lay beyond Tarkwa lobbied for a route for the proposed extension which 
would serve their mines. Un the other hand, Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation wanted the line constructed direct to its property 
without reference to the demands of the other mines. In the end, the 
Colonial Office ruled that the extension should as far as possible 
_place all promising mines on the railway route. Eventually, the Engineers 
adopted a route which served the properties of ~assau, Abosso, 
C· B' d . th .. . 53 lnnamon 1PpO an var10US 0 er m1n1ng compan1es. 
The extension which started in June 1901, had by Uecember 1902, 
reached Obuassi, 86 miles beyond Tarkwa and the permanent way was far 
advanced towards Kumasi. By Harch 1904, the erection of permanent 
bridges and ballasting were finished, thus affording a direct railway 
link between Sekondi on the coast and Kumasi, the heart of Ashanti. In 
all, there were 19 stations on the line the majority of which had 
54 
military fortifications for obvious strategic reasons. 
The total cost of the entire 168 mile route in 1904 stood at 
£1,756,031 out of which £366,501 was the cost of the Sekondi-farkwa 
section (40 miles). The remaining £1,389,530 was the cost of the 
Tarkwa -t.l1masi extension (128 miles), a figure that exceeded the original 
45 
estimate of £824,460 by more than half a million pounds. Construction 
costs were higher in the Gold Coast than in the other west African 
colonies - an average of £10,453 per mile compared with Uigeria's 
£7,064 and the Sierra Leonean narrow guage which cost a mere £4,316 
per mile to build. 55 0espite the high construction costs, it was 
evident that the Sekondi-Kumasi line contained very serious engineering 
defects including abnormally steep grades as well as very sharp curves. 
Besides this the drainage was faulty and the ballasting insufficient. JO 
Not surprisingly, the role and influence of the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation in collaborating with the Consulting Engineers over the 
planning and executing of the Kumasi railway extension, and indeed 
the suitability of the departmental system of railway construction, 
carne to be questioned. This was particularly the case after a financial 
scandal involving Ashanti Goldfields and the tngineers carne to light. 
Given the advantages of an early rail link to Obuassi, the Corporation 
had undertaken to pay £1,000 to the ~ngineers for each month that the 
line was completed ahead of schedule to their property at Obuasi. J\S 
it turned out the line was completed to Obuassi six months ahead of 
57 
schedule. 
THE KU1'1ASI RAIUJil.Y JI.UU ASHANfl FOLITICS: 
After five years of uncertainties concerning funding for the 
West J\frican railways, problems associated with pioneer projects and 
persistent Ashanti resistance to Colonial rule, a railway communication 
was established between Sekondi and Kumasi. The completion of this 
"pioneer" line marked a very significant step in the political history 
of the country. This was fully demonstrated by the grand " ce l e bratiorl' 
4b 
which accompanied the arrival of the first train in Kumasi. J~ eye 
witness account stated: 
The first train was to arrive at Kumasi on October 1st 1903. 
It was due at about 11 o'clock, and was to be driven by Mrs 
Hurst, the wife of the Chief Engineer. Sir Uonald Stewart, 
the Chief Commissioner invited all the chiefs to come in for 
the opening. I never saw such a collection of chiefs the 
whole time I was out on the coast. They all had their full 
show of gold ornaments, and their best umbrellas. There were 
thousands there. A lot of fog signals had been laid on the 
rai1 58and the chiefs had been served out with gunpowder to fire off. 
Clearly, the celebration not only symbolised the triumph of British 
Imperialism over Ashanti's determination to preserve its autonomy, 
but more importantly, it represented the ascendancy of the collaborationist 
elements within Ashanti politics. iollowing Sir Garnet Wolsely's 
military expedition against Kumasi in 1874 and the resultant civil war 
in Ashanti, British policy had aimed at encouraging secessionist 
d · .. 1 h' f 59 1V1Slona c le s. Although by the 1890's Kumasi had virtually 
restored unity within its Empire, the British influence had already left 
a permanent mark. Thus in 1895, Bekwai, one of the powerful Ashanti 
divisions defected to the British side and allowed Europeans (Cade) 
b . ld' 60 access to the rich 0 uaSl go mlnes. Not surprisingly, during the 
final outbreak of resistance in 1900, Bekwai fought side by side with 
61 the British troops whilst some other divisions remained neutral. With 
King Prempeh and 56 leading Ashanti chiefs and families in exile, the 
Golden Stool seized and taken to London, the railway which was 
originally intended to carry British troops to Kumasi, was instead used 
early in 1904 to organise an excursion for the collaborationist Ashanti 
leaders to Sekondi, so as to demonstrate to them "the true benefits 
. ,,62 
of adapting themselves to the new mode of transportatlon. 
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THE. lUNING COIHJANItS J\.HU WNSfi{UCfION OF BKANCH Llt~E.::): 
following the Ashanti Goldfields agreement, the Colonial 
Office introduced guidelines which were designed to encourage 
partnership between Government and private enterprise in railway 
building as "it is not likely government can undertake all by itself 
d · . 1 . h . ,,63 an pr1vate cap1ta m1g t come 1n. Under the terms any party 
interested in a line could approach the Government and deposit the 
required sum for the survey though the administration would have the 
right to determine how the line was to be constructed. 
It was in line with this policy that 8roomasi Mines 
Limited circulated a letter early in 1903 calling for support for the 
64 con~truction of a branch line from Tarkwa to Prestea. In April, 
Mr Percy Tarbutt took up the matter with the Colonial Office which 
included a proposal to advance a sum of £150,000 being the estimated 
cost of construction to the eolonial Government at 3 per cent interest 
to be repaid within two years. However, the Colonial Office dragged its 
65 feet, and following Tarbutt's death the negotiations fell through. 
The scheme was not revived until 1906, when Hr E.dward uavies 
of the !,'anti Consolidated Hines Limited approached the Crown Agents 
with a similar proposal. The new estimate for the 18 mile branch line 
was £120,000 and the mine-owners offered to provide £100,000 towards 
the construction cost. The guage and equipment would be the same as 
that of the existing Sekondi-Kumasi line so as to ensure uniformity. 
The fanti Consolidated IUnes would also guarantee traffic up to £600, 
66 being the annual capital charges. The Colonial Office a6reed and in 
1908, the Consulting Lngineers were authorised to undertake the project 
4b 
departmentally. The work was completed in January 1911 and the 
18 mile Tarkwa-Prestea line opened to public traffic. In addition 
to the Prestea branch line, the mine-owners themselves constructed 
private sidings and tramways from the Sekondi-Kumasi main line to 
their properties for the convergance of wood fuel, timber and general 
67 
stores. 
CONCLUSION: 
1895 marked a turning point in the history of the West African 
railways, for in that year Joseph Chamberlain, a strong believer in 
"economic imperialism", was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Through his efforts the various railway proposals were translated into 
reality. for the Gold Coast in particular 1895 was also significant 
in that in that year, Sir Hilliam Naxwell was appointed Governor and 
given the clear objective of bringing Ashanti and the Northern regions 
under British colonial rule. Hut Haxwell's economic policies for the 
existing Gold Coast colony also had far reaching consequences for railway 
development. Despite the advangages of an integrated railway system 
and promising financial return on the proposed Apam-Usuaim (Uda) 
railway in particular, the Griffith-Lang strategy was abandoned in 
favour of a Malayan model of railway development put forward by 
Naxwell, formerly a long serving official in the Straits Settlements. 
Influenced by the contribution of tin mining to economic growth in 
tlalaya, Haxwell favoured the promotion of gold mining in the Gold 
Coast as a means of attra(.i..ing metropolitan capital. Horeover, 
given the initial heavy capital requirements for an integrated railway 
system and its consp.quent need for developing the coastal terminal into 
a focal point of entry by constructing large scale port facilities, 
49 
Sir William favoured the building of light and short latitudinal lines 
from the coast to tap specific centres of production in the hinterland. 
Although such inexpensive "target" railways would ensure efficient 
exploitation of resources without much initial capital outlay, its 
implicatmn for areas that lacked mineral deposits such as the 
northern regions are far reaching: the doors of transport innovation 
would be closed to them for a long time. 
As far as the western railway was concerned, bQth Kay and Howard 
are correct in their assessment (see Ch One, p. 10-11) that the railway was 
built primarily to serve the interest of expatriate mining capital. 
Indigenous and expatriate trading and agrarian needs were afforded a 
lower priority. However, Kay and lioward fail to give enough weight 
to the strategic interests of the Colonial Government in building the 
line from Tarkwa to Kumasi, and the implication of this extension for 
Ashanti politics needs to be brought out more clearly.rhe introduction 
of railway communication with kumasi symbolised the advent of formal 
British Colonial rule over a major part of what was to become present 
day Ghana. 
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CHAP'fEL{ 3 
THE EASTEllli LINE. AND THE. uEVELOPHf.NT OF 
LIGHTEMGE POt{TS, 1904-1918 
Hardly had the Sekondi-Kumasi line been completed when 
discussion commenced on the construction of additional rail routes. Given 
Utamberlain's promise to serve mercantile needs on the completion of 
the western line, it was presumed that an eastern line would follow. 
The Colonial Administration's immediate concern, however, was to 
reorganise its finances, so as to convince both the lmperial Treasury 
and the British investing public that it could repay any future loans. 
Eventually, in 1908 the Colony succeeded in raising a loan of £1,030,000 
and in 1909 a 40 mile eastern line was commenced from Accra to Mangoase. 
This line was extended by an additional 25 miles to Tafo by 1916, 
when all railway projects were suspended as a result of war time 
restrictions. In addition to the railways, lighterage ports were 
built at Sekondi and J\ccra. 
This chapter carries the discussion forward by examining how 
decisions were arrived at as to the location of the eastern rail routes 
and the construction of the Accra and Sekondi lighterage ports. 
In 1898, when llessrs Coode, Son and llathews published their 
report on Gold Coast harbours, the Colonial Administration was particularly 
attracted to the part that dealt with the railway line from Accra to 
)) 
Kpong on the \olta. Such a line, it was argued, would tap the oil palm 
producing areas of Krobo and Eastern Akwapim, as well as stimulating cotton 
cultivation in the semi-arid Volta districts. Additionally, it would 
facilitate the movement of government stores via the Volta to the Northern 
Territories, and would bring the Government Sanatorium and Botanical 
Station at Aburi, 1400 feet above sea level, within easy access from 
Accra so that "Europeans will be able to reside in this delightful 
1 
spot, coming daily to their offices in Accra." 
Consequently, the Government authorised Shelford, the Consulting 
Engineer to carry out a survey of the proposed route. Their report which 
was ready in 1899, stated that the line would be 55 miles in length and 
would cost £5,600 per mile (far below the average cost of West African 
Railways). The gradients would not exceed 1:50, the earthworks would 
be light, and there were no major rivers to cross. Perhaps the most 
attractive aspect of the report was the fact that the line was to pass 
through one of the most densely populated areas of the country, having 
. 2 
an average populatmn density of 1423 persons per square m1le. 
Given the commercial and administrative advantages of the 
proposed railway line to Kpong, the Governor, Sir Hathew Nathan, obtained 
the Secretary of State's approval in 1902 for its construction, which 
was expected to start as soon as the \vestem line had been completed to 
Kumasi. 3 Indeed as late as 1905 when other competing routes had been 
proposed for the eastern parts of the country, the Consulting Engineers 
still held the Kpong line to be one that would pay its way without 
difficulty, adding that, "this scheme has therefore always appeared to 
b ....4 us to e promisIng. 
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By that time, however, there had been a shift in government 
attitudes towards the proposed Accra-Kpong line. The main reason for 
this was that in 1904, Sir Hathew Nathan retired as Governor of the 
Colony. His replacement was Sir John ~odger, \vith whose appointment 
the Malayan transportation paradigm was forcefully re-articulated for 
the Gold Coast. Hodger, like William Maxwell before him, had served 
for several years in the Straits Settlements prior to his arrival in 
West Africa. Not surprisingly, he was in favour of building short 
latitudinal lines from the coast into the interior as well as improving 
the waterways for heavy shipping. ~odger stated: 
~lhen dealing wi th the general ques tion 9f tra nsport in this 
Colony, we should, in my opinion consider the sea the main 
line of communication and endeavour to connect our coast 
towns 'vi th the various plan ting and mining dis tric ts a t as many 
points as possible by means of rivers, roads and railways.5 
Consequently, the new Governor called for the abandonment of the Accra-
Kpong proposal, since the Volta river route, though ineffective, would 
continue somehow to serve the eastern borders of the country. He 
suggested that the proposed line should be re-routed in a more northerly 
direction, from Accra to l1angoase, which he had identified as lithe centre 
of the cocoa industry." Besides tapping new country, this scheme would 
avoid competition with the Volta. 
This position was strongly supported by Nr Buir, agent for 
Messrs i.W. Swanzy and Company, who was also the mercantile representative 
on the Legislative Council. ilercantile interests were largely centred 
around the prospects of trade afforded by the nascent cocoa industry 
in the districts to the west of J~wapim, and accordingly wished to shift 
the centre of commercial activity from the Uodowa-Kpong districts to the 
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emergent productive areas west of the Aburi hills. 6 It must be stated 
houever, that l1uir's support for the re-routing of the Kpong line could 
not have been entirely without ulterior motives. Given that i.W. Swanzy 
owned trading stores including cotton ginneries at the river ports of 
/U<.use and Kpong as \olell as operating a boat service on the Volta, Ilr Huir 
was likely to oppose any scheme which aimed at diverting the Volta river 
traffic from its natural outlet at Ada. Indeed, already in 1902, he had 
protested to Sir Hathew Nathan against the construction of the Kpong 
line precisely for the same reasons, though without success. 7 
As well as mercantile pressures, a degree of mining interest 
also influenced the selection of the Accra-Hangoase route over the 
Accra-Kpong line. For instance, although the Consulting Engineers 
conceded that the Kpong line had enormous advantages over the Nangoase 
line in terms of population and engineering ease, they favoured the 
Accra-Nangoase route on the grounds that it might prove possible to 
extend it to, "the £astern Akim Goldfields, which had hitherto proved 
,,8 
unworkable for want of transport. 
1<'ina lly, 1 ike the or igina l Accra-I~pong proposa 1 in 1898, is sue s 
of social and administrative convenience continued to influence the 
selection of the ;\ccra-Hangoase route. The Accra Chamber of Commerce 
envisaged a possible extension of the line through Begoro to the 
Presbyterian Nission Station at J~betifi in order to provide a holiday 
9 
resort for Europeans. A similar sentiment was also expressed at the 
Government Secretariat Hhen one official argued that: 
If this raihvay is to be made, there is no use in stopping at 
Il.:mgoilse, it should ·~o not to !~orto~id1Ja, hut to the bend of the 
Uensu, where the Kentenke falls ••• there is a beautiful site 
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here for E.uropean to~mshi p, and I think it would be found that 
the power obtainable from this falls might be put to great use in 
connection with the railways.l0 
In short, given that a railway line from Accra to Mangoase was as capable 
of serving the administrative and social needs of the expatriate 
community as much as a line from Accra to Kpong, together with serving 
the emergent cocoa productive districts and the gold mines of Akyem 
more effectively, it was not surprising that Sir John Kodger's revival of 
the Nalayan railway development paradigm met the unanimous approval 
of the Gold Coast railway interests. 
In Novemrer, 1905, a team of surveyors was despatched by the 
Crown J~gents to the Gold Coast with instructions to conduct a survey 
for the proposed rail route from Accra to Nangoase. It was not until 
August 1907 that the party reported to the Colonial Office. It stated 
that the line would be forty miles long and would cost £250,000 or 
£6,250 per mile to construct. The report also expected trn t cocoa, 
palm oil and timber would constitute the bulk of the traffic.
11 
Hut a decision to invite tenders for the construction of the 
Accra - Mangoase line, made that forty mile stretch of line an exception 
to the departmental system of construction previously used in building 
railways in the Gold Coast, and indeed throughout British \jest ,\frica. 
As a consequence of disquiet over the high costs, as well as constructional 
deficiencies, in the "pioneer" western line, particularly the belief 
that allegations of financial malpractices against the I\esident tngineer 
together with problems of administrative co~trol under the departmental 
system were p,lrtly to blame for such deficiencies, members of the \~est 
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fifrican commercial lobby began to argue for the adoption of the conventional 
contract method of construction for future railway development. As 
early as i-larch, 1905 the Joint {jest i~frican Consultative Committee 
advocated the "trial" of the contract system when they argued tha t the 
departmental system had proved unsuccessful mainly in terms of cost. 12 
A similar sentiment was expressed from the Colony when the Governor 
warned the Colonial uffice about local opinion on the matter. Sir 
John Kodger wrote: 
when the question of providing funds for constructing the 
Accra railway comes before the Legislative Council for 
consideration, I do not anticipate any opposition to the 
proposal; but 1 have little doubt, from what 1 know of local 
opinion, that the construction of a new line on the same system 
as that adopted in constructing the railway from Sekondi to 
Kumasi will be strenuously opposed by the unofficial members 
of the council. 13 
K.odger himself was in favour of the departmental system. He believed 
that the engagement of inexperienced engineers and lack of local 
knowledge rather than issues of administrative control, were to blame 
for shoddy construction on the western line. He argued that like the 
Government H.ailways in Halaya, the Gold Coast Kailways uepartment should 
maintain a permanent construction staff (who would also be responsible 
for the maintenance of the open lines) so as to guard against the 
employment of temporary construction engineers who were "neither 
k 1114 concerned about economy nor real completion of the wor • 
Nevertheless, when the Loans Urdinance was later introduced 
in the Legislative Council, and the unofficial members unanimously voted 
against the second reading in 01'Position to the departmental system, 
both the Colonial lJffice and the local administration agreed to give 
the contract system a trial. Consequently, in .f\ugust 1907, the Colonial 
Office authorised the Crown Agents to invite tenders for the 
construction of the Accra-Hangoise railway. At the close of tender 
period, only three applications were received, out of which the one 
from Mr ilurphy, a Civil E.ngineer in Wblin waz the only one that was 
. d -1 II h f . d . ..15 conSl ereu wort y a conSl eratlon. The West i\frican Section of 
the London Chamber of Commerce criticised the Crown Agents for their 
16 failure to give sufficient publicity to the call for tender. 
Neve r the le s s, the I~gen ts wen t ahead to awa rd the clJn t r ac t to l1r l1u rphy 
on 18 January, 1909. The total amount of the contract was £165,614 
excluding the cost of permanent way and other specified materials which 
were to be supplied by the Colonial Government. the contract also 
included the maintenance of the line for a period of one year from the 
d f 1 · 17 ate a camp etlon. 
Ear ly in 1909, i'lurphy commence d the cons truc t ion of the J~ccra-
Mangoase line. By the end of 1909, earthworks had been completed to 
Mangoase. Ballasting had also been finished to mile 36, and all bridges 
and culverts were nearing completion. Similarly, the main stations at 
Accra, Uome, Amasema and Nsawan were nearing completion. By early 1910, 
the first locomotives and rolling stock (including 4 tank engines, 8 
passenger cars, 20 steel wagons and 10 Jaw-sided steel trucks) had been 
brought in, and the line unoficially opened to public traffic. 18 
It was not long, however, before questions began to be asked 
as to the success of i'lurphy's achievement. His engineering expertise 
was severely tested during the rainy seasons of 1910 and 1911, when 
no less than thrte-quarters of the entire line came under flood. The 
01 
place most severely affected was the five-mile stretch through 
J~chimota iorest, 10 miles from Accra. 19 In fact, the situation was 
so bad that the Colonial office appointed an independent Inspection 
~ngineer to examine the line and to make recommendations. This report 
which became· ready in 1911 censured the contractors for their shoddy 
work, particularly their desire to minimise labour costs by avoiding 
earthworks. kecommendations included re-routing in order to cut out 
the sections of the line that lay in river beds, construction of 
additional bridges with much heavier concrete foundations as we~l as 
re-ballasting the entire line. These works were to be carried out by 
Murphy for an additional sum of L57,000 or 30 per cent 01 the ori~inal 
20 
contract. Uespite the adverse report, I·lr Hurphy was never made liable 
for the constructional deficiency. The work was finally completed in 
July, 1912. 
Once again, the problem had arisen as to the most suitable 
method to be adopted for railway construction in the colony. But the 
very nature of colonial policy, authorising railway projects on a piece-
meal" basis, only when justified by the finances of the colony, made the 
reversion to the departmental system necessary. This policy would 
result in the construction of the entire 192 mile Accra - I\.umasi line 
in a telescopic fashion, involving as many as five different railheads. 
Hardly had the cons t ruc tion of the j\.ccra-l'langoase rai lway 
began, than both the Colonial authorities and the mercantile community 
realised that any "e,lstern line" \-ihich fell short of the Koforidua and 
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and Begoro districts would be failing to fulfil its original aim, 
namely the promotion of palm oil, rubber and cocoa cultivation in the 
21 
region. This had become all the more urgent in view of the fact that 
farmers on the Krobo "plantations" near Begoro were reported to have 
started stockpiling their produce, especially palm kernels and cocoa 
in anticipation of the arrival of railways.22 Consequently, Sir John 
~odger, an advocate of short latitudinal lines, was prepared to support 
the extension of the Accra - Hangoase line.l.iready in 1910, Kodger 
had suggested that llurphy's contract should be extended to include 
a thirteen mile extension from Hangoase to Koforidua, though the 
suggestion was not immediately acted upon because of the constructional 
problems in which the llurphy contract had run into. 23 
The CJlonial Office authorised this extension only in 1912. 
Construction commenced early in 1913, when 11r rower, a permanent 
constructional engineer, was transferred from the Tarkwa - Prestea branch 
iine to undertake the work departmentally. Uy January, 1915, the 
24 
extension had been completed. 
The nature of the transport demand created by the cocoa industry 
become clearer when one considers that in 1915, the year the railways 
reached Koforidua, no less than 41,000 tons of the beans were railed to 
J\ccra, out of which 16,000 was loaded from the Koforidua station alone.
25 
It was therefore not surprisit16 that even before the Koforidua extension 
had been completed, a further twe1ve mile extension had been authorised 
from Koforidua to [afo, another principal cocoa growing town. This 
extension was to be undertaken by f..W. Cozens-Hardy, a ~laintenance 
h 1 · 26 Engineer on t e open 1nes. 
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However, hardly had construction started than the iirst World 
War broke out and the British Ministry of Munitions suspended the use 
of heavy metals in the civilian sector, especially for the railway 
projects. Indeed, when the Gold Coast annual budget for 1916 made 
provision for the purchase of railway materials for the completion of 
the Tafo extension, it caused an uproar in the British press, as a 
result of which the Minister of Munitions warned the Colonial office 
that, "I am to emphasise the extreme importance at the present time. 
that every effort to be made to diminish consumption for railway 
,,27 purposes. It was only after a protracted negotiation between the 
Ninistry of Hunitions and the Colonial office that the Crown Agents 
were permitted to make purchases for the completion of the Tafo 
extension. 
Construction resumed early in 1917 when materials were 
eventually delivered. By Hay, Jumapo station, seven miles frol!l Koforidua 
was opened to public traffic. Ihis was closely followed by the opening 
of Tafo station in July, thus bringing the length of the Accra line 
to a total of 65 miles. 28 t{ailway projects now carne to a halt until 
the end of the War. 
TIll:. liuUNf £.JU.\llLiL~ BAU.{IfE. L;LPOSIL'> i~UU IlL i.'l',UtUSLurJLJ:U-KutL~I 
EXfE.NS ION: 
Despite the suspension of railway rrojects, it was not long 
before attention began to focus on the possibility of developing the 
eastern railway into another major trunk route into the 'interior, 
linking up h'ith thc westcrn line in ,\'~h8nti. :'tdministrative requirements 
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favoured such an extension of the Accra line. ror instance, in 1~13, 
the ~eneral Mana6er of the K.ailways su 6gested that the two railway 
systems should be unified so as to ensure administrative efficiency.29 
Moreover, there was a persistent interest, not only within government 
circles but also among the mercantile community, for the establishment 
of railway communication between Accra, the administrative ca~ital, 
and Kumasi, the heart of rtshanti. 30 Nevertheless, it was the war-time 
discovery of bauxite at Kwahu which became the main driving force 
behind the decision to extend the Accra-fafo railway to Kumasi. 
£arly in 1~17, ~.A. Kitson, Uirector of Geological Survey, 
located large deposits or bauxite on the top of the Ejuamena hills, 
which were situated mid way between fafo, the eastern railhead and 
Kumasi the northern terminal of the western system. Given the strategic 
importance of bauxite, particularly in view of the fact that Britain's 
traditional sources of supply had come under threat from enemy 
submarines, leading to severe metal shortages in the United Kingdom, 
the discovery created a feeling of satisfaction in imperial circles. 
While the Hinistry of Nunitions ordered immediate chemical tests on the 
samples, Kitson was instructed to suspend all other duties in the 
colony, and to prepare a report regarding the prospects of working 
31 
the ore. 
Kitson's report to the Colonial Office which was ready in April 
1917, focussed on transport needs. As a short term solution, the road 
from Tafo to Kwahu could be improved immediately to withstand heavy 
traffic. However, given the advantages of rail trans~ort, the 
eastern railway line should be extended to Kumasi and a three mile 
aerial ropeway established between the mine and the main line. Although 
OJ 
the bauxite deposits were only 110 miles from ,\ccra, Kitson suggested 
that the ore should be shipped via Kumasi to Sekondi over a distance 
of 206 miles, because of the poor lighterage facilities at Accra. 32 
The Colonial Uffice accepted the report and the local administration 
Has asked to take control of the deposits and to proceed to build the 
line, though construction did not start until after the war. 33 
TIlE. 1)1:: VE.LOPHI:.Nf 0/ LIGHrr:L0~<';£ FOtUS: 
Once the Colonial Government embarked upon a railway construction 
policy that was primarily devised to stimulate production for 
metropolitan and world markets, it was bound to undertake parallel 
harbour developments at their coastal termini so as to facilitate 
transhipment of goods. Unlike the other West African Colonies of Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria, the Gold Coast lacked a natural deep water harbour, 
where ships could berth alongside wharves for direct transhipment of 
traffic. Consequently, goods had to be trdflsported by means of surf 
boats between the shore and the ships \oJhich normally anchored up to 
34 
about one mile in the open roadstead. !Juring the two decades after 
the start of railway construction in the Gold Coast, neither the Colonial 
administration nor expatriate commercial interests in the colony favoured 
the commitment of large scale funds towards the creation of a deep 
water port - the administration because it had to guarantee that any 
such project would be able to generate adequate re~enue to cover its 
capital cost and interest charges to the British creditors, and private 
capital because it feared that any large scale harbour scheme would 
.. d . 35 
result 1n 1ncrease taxat10n. Consequently, the authorities concentrated 
bo 
on the development of lighterage ports at Sekondi and .~ccra. 
When Messrs Coode, tlathew and Son surveyed the coastline in 
1898, they drew up a plan for a lighterage port at Sekondi where 
traffic would be transported by means of lighters and other small 
craft between the shore and the steamers. This was to be similar to 
the arrangements at Port Llizabeth in South J~frica. The scheme was to 
involve construction of a breakwater, 750 feet in length, under the lee 
of which an iron jetty, 300 feet long, was to be erected. This was to 
be in direct communication with the railway. The project, which was 
estimated to cost £99,000, was expected to be able to handle up to 
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400 tons of goods per day. The Colonial Office agreed, and Coode, 
Mathew and Son were appointed Consulting Engineers with the construction 
itself, like the railways, being undertaken departmentally. 
Work began in September 1898, when a temporary wooden jetty 
was erected to assist the landing of construction materials. However 
progress was extremely slow. By 1904, only a 50 foot iron jetty had 
been built, to the north of which a small platform was established 
where timber was stacked prior to sllipment. £26,000 had so far been 
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expended. Such slow progress occurred at a time when the construction 
of the Sekondi - Tarkwa railway and its extension to Kumasi had 
transformed Sekondi into a major point of entry for the whole of the 
Western Province, Ashanti and a large part of the Northern 'ferritories. 
When large consignments of railway materials and rolling stock, as well 
as heavy machinery and stores for the mining companies started pouring 
into Sekondi from 1Y01, the result was an acute ~o~s~r~nat the port. 
Not only was delay caused to ships which had to spend long periods before 
being unloaded, but tIle cost in human life and property was heavy. 
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lor instance, in a heavy storm in J\pril 1902, three out of the four 
tugs belonging to the Sekondi Lighterage Company were totally lost, 
\I d k l' h f 1,38 an wrec s to 19 ters were requent. 
One reason for the slow progress at Sekondi was that the 
local administration's attitude to the harbour project was one of 
extreme financial caution. Given that the large importation of 
railway construction materials and mining machinery were considered 
to be a temporary phenomenon, the government insisted that, before 
construction of the breakwater commenced, the mine-owners should 
guarantee that large scale importation of coal would be forthcoming, 
in order to justify the expenditure. However, the mine-owners were 
reluctant to give such an undertaking as they realised that it was 
cheaper to use local firewood than imported coal. 39 
By 1907, the situation at Sekondi was so bad that the 
rtailways were forced to suspend the carriage of timber logs to the 
port because of lack of space to discharge the trucks. 40 .\t this point 
the local administration agreed to a proposal by the Consulting Engineers 
to review the entire harbour plan and Ur Cooke, a harbour engineer was 
sent to the Colony to report on the issue. Cooke's report, which 
became ready in 1908 recommended the immediate construction of the 
breakwater, the length of which was to be increased to 950 feet. In 
addition, four new jetties were to be constructed. fhe revised scheme 
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was now estimated to cost £150,000. Construction eventually began 
in 1911 , when 0 r de r s 'r,':... red eli ve red. l3 y 1914, w hen the wo r k was 
temporarily suspended as a result of the W;tr, the breal<.\vater had been 
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completed to 750 feet. Two of the iron jetties had also been completed. 
The next impetus to port improvement at ::lekondi c:trrlP from the 
opening of the l1anganese mines - another strategic metal - at Nsuta 
in 1916 when the export of the ore started with 4,338 tons. In 
order to facilitate transhipment at Sekondi, the mining company itself 
built a dump at the port which was capable of holding 10,000 tons of 
the ore. This was in addition to two new jetties that were constructed 
by the V t f th 1 f f . h 43 go ernmen or e so e use 0 manganese relg t. 
By 1919 when a scheme for a deep water harbour at Takoradi 
was far advanced, the Sekondi Lighterage Port consisted of a single 
breakwater, 976 feet in length, and four jetties - at a final cost of 
£189,443. 44 
In the east, plans had been put forward for the improvement of 
port facilities at Accra as early as 1884. Like the Sekondi lighterage 
port, the main step towards better lighterage facilities at Accra 
came from the publication of Coode, Son and Mathew's survey report in 
1898. The scneme, which included a breakwater, 800 feet long and a 270 
foot iron jetty was estimated to cost £98,000.l5 
Unlike the improvement of lighterage facilities at Sekondi 
which proceeded in an ad hoc fashion, as and when justified by traffic, 
the local administration was committed to the early implementation of 
the Accra lighterage plan in its entirety, mainly because it considered 
the longer term traffic expectations in tIle ~astern Province - cocoa 
and palm oil - to be more pl!rmanent and more reliable than those of 
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the western mining districts. Thus even before the Accra-Hangoase 
rail route was surveyed, the ~overnment had agreed to the appointment 
of a llesident r.ngineer to undertake the work. l:onstruction started 
early in 1906 and by .\pril, 1909 both the br~akwater and the jetty 
47 had been completed. Work on the Hangoase line had only just begun. 
Hardly had the Accra lighterage port opened however, than it 
became apparent that the breakwater was so defective that the new 
lighters could not even use it for landing rolling stock for the new 
railway. One of the basic engineering deficiencies was related to the 
method of laying the underwater structure of the breakwater. It had been 
suggested that piving operations might be undertaken for the removal of 
sand deposits which would enable the foundations of the breakwater to 
be laid direct on the sea bed. But since financial economy was the 
guiding principle, the less expensive system of "pell mell" construction 
was adopted. Under this sytem, the foundation blocks were placed on 
sand overlying the sea bed and by the aid of the "swell" washing out 
the sand underneath, the blocks were then expected to settle down 
gradually onto the· sea bed. The weights of the blocks used in laying 
the underwater structure were, however, too light to allow for easy 
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settlement. Consequently, the walls began to silt. Secondly 
the entrance of the breakwater was located approximately at right angles 
to the direction of the surf with the result that sand accumulation in 
49 
the protected water also became a perennial problem. rrom 1911 
onwards, pumping of sand out of the breakwater in order to maintain a 
minimum navigable depth of 5 feet became a regular feature of port 
improvement at Accra. J\lthough additional pumping installations were 
ordered in 1914, they were not delivered until 1916 because of the \Jar. 
~hen finally erected in 1917, the en~ines could not be worked because of 
a shortage of coal. In that year, it ,,"as reported that the "wharf and 
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jetty are left high and dry owing to the heavy influx of sand." SO 
The entire harbour had been turned into a mass of sand upon which 
traffic was loaded into surf boats. Indeed the situation was so bad, 
especially during the rough surf season between July and November 
that "on most days work has to be discontinued early in the afternoon 
owing to bad seas caused by strong winds." 51 
In 1919, Nessrs Stewart and l1cUonnel!l, Constructional t:ngineers 
for the proposed Takoradi harbour were charged with the additional task 
of devising a new scheme for the Accra Lighterage port. By that time 
total expenditure on J\.ccra had reached £294,000. 52 
WNCLUSION 
The construction of the eastern railway and the development of 
lighterage ports at Accra nnd 3ekondi followed on froln the struggles 
over the selection of railway routes which took place in the late 1890's. 
Not surprisingly, developments between 1905 and 1918 tend to have strong 
parallels with the events that preceeded it. 
first, railway policy continued to be shaped by the different 
perceptions of individual administrators. Between 1898 and 1903 both 
Acting Governor Hodgson and Sir 11athew Nathan favoured the construction 
of an Accra-Kpong railway which they intended to assist the development 
of an European township as well promoting mercantile and agrarian 
interests in the Volta districts. But, just as the appointment of 
NaX\o1ell as Governor in 1895 had the effect of diverting attention from 
the original Griffith-Lang railway strategy, so the arrival of John 
l{odger as Governor of the Colony in 1904 led to the abandonment of the 
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llodgson-Nathan Volta proposal. [he idea of a ~uropean township in 
a cooler interior location continued to have a romantic attraction 
and an element of mining influence did play some role in the adoption 
of the Accra-ilangoase route. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
western "pioneer" line, the J~ccra-Tafo railway \-.1as primarily designed 
to serve indigenous and expatriate commercial and agrarian needs, 
particularly the interests of the emergent cocoa districts of the 
Eastern Province. 
Second, ~he eastern line, like the western one, was originally 
intended to be one of several short latitudinal lines to be constructed 
from the coas t. 1!00-.1ever by the time the :~ccra-l1angoase sec tion had been 
completed, the authorities were overtaken by events, with the result 
that the eastern line, like the :>ekondi-Tarkwa railway, was transformed 
into another principal trunk route into J~shanti (though final construction 
aHa i te d the end of the \-.1 a r) • The nee os 0 f me tropo 1 i tan indus tr ie s 
for a strategic mineral - bauxite - was the main driving force behind 
the proposed Tafo-l~umasi extension. 
finally, shoddy construction and technical defects in railway 
and port projects had become a major problem. In the case of the 
Hccra lighterage port in particular, the deficiencies were causing 
severe bottlenecks in the conduct of trade, leading to a greater focus 
on .:>ekondi as the main point of entry. This particular trend was to 
3ssume significant proportions after the War. 
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LIIAt' n.,~ 4 
The post war spurt of relatively intensive infrastructural 
development marked a new phase in the History of British economic activity 
in the Gold Coast. Not only did the end of the war usher in a decade 
of rehabilitation of the existing transportation network, but more 
importantly, the period was marked by the emergence of long term Colonial 
economic planning - an innovation that found practical expression in 
the introduction of a Ten Year Uevelopment t->lan in 1<)19 by the Guggisberg 
administration. The plan, which covered the period 1920-1930, provided 
for a capital expenditure of £24.5 million, under which various public 
works were to be undertaken. Two thirds of this sum was earmarked for 
harbour and railway schemes. By 1927, when the plan was abandoned, actual 
expenditure had reached £16 million, three-quarters of which went into 
the crea tion of addi tiona 1 trans por t infras truc ture. {'he main proj ec ts 
undertaken were the building of a deep-water harbour at Takoradi, the 
construction of a Central l'rovince railway and the extension of the 
eastern line from fafo to Kumasi. 
In certain respects it can be argued that this post ~ar 
expansion was the inevitable outcome 01 the exceptional growth in the 
Gold Coast's external trade which followed two decades of railway building. 
In what follows however, we will argue that the nature of the expansion, 
both in t~rms of the projects planned and executed and those that were 
planned but never reached the construction stage, is best understood 
within the \o,lider context of the post-war reconstruction ot the metropolitan 
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economy itself. In other words, in deciding upon the kind of projects 
to undertake and where they were to be located, the Colonial administration 
was guided first and foremost by the immediate needs of the British 
economy, the needs ot the local economy were considered to be secondary. 
THL POS l'-WAK I.{£CONSTKUCTIOl~ ld tlt{I fAIN ..u'iU THE'. NOTIUl~ Of "C;OLONIAL 
l.J~ IJE:LOPrlEN r": 
The outbreak of war in 1914 exacerbated inherent problems 
within the British economy and from the process of rebuilding the post-
war economy, the notion of "Colonial development" emerged. The Colonies, 
especially those in fropical Africa, were to be called upon to assist the 
regeneration of British capitalism. 
In the first place, the war had clearly demonstrated the 
overdependence of the tlritish economy (particularly its armament industry) 
on sources outside the Empire for the supply of raw materials. 'fhis 
lesson was learned at the o~tbreak of hostilities in 1914 when the supply 
of manganese ore from the Caucausus was cut olf at a time when shipments 
from tlrazil and India w~re also becoming increasingly difficult to 
obtain because of the submarine menace. There was therefore an acute 
shortage of ferro-manganese in the United Kingdom. 1 Indeed, as previously 
noted, the llinistry ot Munitions had to curtail the use of strategic metals 
in the civilian sector in order to meet war needs. fo provide a longer 
term solution to the problem, the British ~overnment authorised general 
geological surveys throughout the Empire, especially in the relatively 
unexplored C;olonial territories 01 l'ropical Africa. The aim was to 
2 
establish Imperial control over sources of strategic metals. 
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Secondly, the war undermined British commercial supremacy. 
Not only did the United States, Japan and other industrialised nations 
capture traditional British markets, but there was also a general trend 
after the War towards economic nationalism. rtS E.A. Brett points out, 
this trend was marked in the non-colonial world by the rise of governments 
who were committed to protectionism and direct subsidies in order to 
d " 1 B"" h 3 lSP ace rltls goods. Moreover, during the war, the Imperial 
Government had conceded considerable autonomy to the self-governing 
Uominions, as well as India, over economic matters. 4 from then on the 
Crown Colonies came to be seen by some as being of crucial importance to 
the British economy. Thus, the r.mpire H.esources Uevelopment Committee 
for instance, suggested in 1917 that important Colonial assets, such as 
West African palm production, should be nationalised and operated as a 
state monopoly so that the profits could then be used to payoff Britain's 
national debt. 5 Leopold I~ery summ~rised the overall picture: 
We are in fact, no longer the sort of country that can compete 
industrially in the open market, except in certain industries 
••• It really comes to this that we can both carry out our 
social reform, and develop an immense ~rade but mainly, if 
not almost entirely \vithin the Empire. 
It was in the midst of this urgent need to create conditions 
under which trade and industry could thrive that Lord ililner was appointed 
Secretary of State for the Colonies early in 1919, an appointment which 
was to lead to Colonial policy in the twenties being in the hands of men 
h 1 ..1 h d "b d "I "1 V·· . ,,7 w om an Urummon~ as escrl e as mperla lSlonarles (Lord 
Hilner, Leo ,lmery, Jimmy Thomas, \Hlliam urmsby-Gore.) ililner had 
always regarded the Crown Colonies, especially those in l'ropical .I.frica, 
in the true "Ch~mberlainian" sense as rich imperial estates, that were 
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still awaiting systematic development. ~arly in 1913, even before the 
War broke out, he was seriously deprecating imperial financial policy 
towards the Colonies. Hilner lVrote: 
I suppose Colonial development is a question of money and 
though we are so much more liberal than we used to be, I 
do not think we are as yet anything like liberal enough 
in the conception of what is needed for the equipment of 
an underdeveloped country and in how much you must spend 
yithout immediate return if you are going to make a success 
in the long run. 8 
AS Secretary of State, Hilner's immediate task was to 
popularise his long cherished notion of liberal Golonial economic 
development. "Those people who terrify me are those who talk of a 
restriction of credit (to Colonies)",9 he told the powerful Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce when he called for a much bolder policy of railway 
and other infrastructural investments. Speaking to Crown Colony 
Officials at the Annual Corona Club uinner, l'1ilner stressed that in the 
Colonies, as in Britain, reconstruction should mean something more than 
the restoration of pre-war conditions by paying more attention to the 
problem of public health and native education because demand for self-
10 government was bound to grow. 
Hilner established a more effective Colonial Uevelopment 
Council to supercede the moribund Empire ~esources Development Committee. 
The Council was to make a systematic survey of ,ecQnomic potential in all 
parts of the Empire and submit recommendations to the Colonial Office. 
By November 1919, the Council had begun to study the most urgent harbour 
and rail\"ay projects: - the Ugandan l~ailway, the improvement of the 
Tanganyika system, the Trans-~ambesian railway to Lake Nyasa, the 
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enlargement of Kilindiri harbour, and the creation of il deep-sea port at 
Takoradi in the Gold Coast. 11 In the Colonial office programme of post-
war expansion in the Colonies, the Gold Coast was obviously placed at 
a high level of priority. I\s Amery points out, Milner appointed Sir 
Gordon Guggisberg, a Canadian born L(oyal E.ngineer, as Governor of the 
Gold Coast. Gug~sberg was given the clear objective, inter alia, of 
" t . f . tIt t 'f k d . .. 12 crea 1ng a 1rs c ass ocean por a a ora 1. 
when ~ir Gordon Guggisberg N3S appointed Governor of the Gold 
Coast at the end of the War, he was neither a stranger to the colony, nor 
to West Africa for that matter. As a young Lieutenant in the ~oyal 
Engineers, Guggisberg was seconded to the Colonial office in 1901, and 
posted to the Gold Coast as an J~ssistant Uirector of the newly created 
Nines Survey Uepartment. In 1906, he left the Hines Survey lJepartment 
to establish a new Survey iJepartment, where he remained uirector until 
the end of his contract in 1908. Two years later in 1910, Guggisberg 
returned to West Africa as Uirector of Survey in Southern Nigeria, and 
for a few months in 1914 he was Director of the Gold Coast Public Works 
13 
uepartment until recalled to the Army for active service in E.urope. 
In Guggisberg therefore, the Colonial Office found, at a time when it was 
most needed, the West African specialist, capable of carrying out the 
proposed post-war programme of expansion. 
That the main momentum for change came from London is further 
evidenced by the fact tro t barely one month after his assumption of duty 
in the Colony, Guggisberg had already presented a Ten Year Uevelopment 
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Plan to the Legislative Council - on 17 November, 1\)1-1. In this plan, 
the Governor outlined his overall development strategy covering the 
period 1920-1930. J\ detailed analysis of the plan lies outside the 
purview of this study, but several general points need to be made. 
r'irst, the plan was noted for its large financial commitments, amounting 
to no less than £24.5 million. Second, transport infrastructure, 
especially railway and harbour projects continued to be accorded the 
highest priority in Colonial development. Not only was two-thirds of 
the estimated expenditure under the plan earmarked for these works, but 
also the first four years (1920-1924) were to be devoted solely to them. 
Noreover, these projects would continue to be funded, as before, largely 
through loans raised on the London money market. Third, the plan 
contained provision for some welfare projects, such as education, water 
supply, electricity power and health, but these were to be funded from 
surplus revenue raised in the Colony because they could not generate 
direct revenue to cover their costs. finally, Guggisberg regarded 
the construction of a deep-water harbour at T&koradi as the starting 
point of his plan. 1\S he reiterated in a despatch to the Secretary of 
State during his second month in the Colony: 
So profoundly convinced am 1 of the unlimited potentialities 
of the Colony if modern transportatation facilities are provided 
that I unhesitatingly place the deep-water harbour at the 
head of my programme. 14 
iJespite the reforming zeal of ~L1ggisberg, few of his ideas 
achieved implementation. fhe constraints which dictated Colonial 
practice soon made themselves felt, so that even by the neH development 
criteria which entered posl-\;ar Colonial economic policy, the ~old 
82 
Coast fell short of target. investment levels were relatively high, but 
were applied mainly to the creation of a deep-water harbour on the western 
sea board at Takoradi and to the construction of a line through the central 
agrarian (mainly cocoa producing) districts so as to divert traffic to 
the port. This particular element in the post-war transport strategy 
was the most a~~~\;;v-()\4.r of all the administrative undertakings in the 
history of the Colony, for hardly had the line opened than there was 
talk of abandoning it because of severe motor competition. Indeed, by 
1927, the entire Ten Year Plan had been abandoned. The authorities 
retreated to the dream of ensuring sufficient traffic for the existing 
transport network rather than extending the system. rhe story of this 
retreat is a complicated one and is best understood within the context 
of the priority accorded to the deep-water port in particular and its 
associated rail routes over road and other surf-ports on the one hand, 
and contradictions within regional econofnic development in the Gold Coast 
on the other. 
l~ay' s critiqLle of the Cuggisberg transport strategy which 
focusses on the location of the deep-water harbour forms a suitable 
. . 15' d" t F start1ng p01nt. J~ccor 1ng 0 ",ay, the decision to locate the port at 
Takoradi was not simply a question of technical preference of one site 
or another, but rather one that favoured expatriate capital as opposed 
to indigenous capital. Having sited the port at the western end of the 
seaboard, to serve the mines, Kay argued, the authorities then built a 
central line across the cocoa growing districts which they intended to 
carry indigenous cocoa traffic to Takoradi so as to subsidize the expatriate 
mining sector. The location of this particular central line, he also 
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asserted, constituted a second major flank in the attack on indigenous 
capital - namely the infant road transport system which was mainly 
controlled and used by Jlfricans, and to rt limited extent certain 
expatriate firms. ~ay did not produce any evidence concerning the 
policy decisions leading to the formation of transport strategy during 
the twenties. Une must thus conclude that his analysis was simply 
based on an observation of the physical structure of the post-war transport 
network that had been established, rather than on an attempt to 
evaulate how that particular configuration came "into being. 
Nevertheless, Kay's assertaion that any meaningful evaluation 
of the Guggisberg transport strategy must begin by focussing on the role 
and influence of the fakoradi deep-water port within the ~uggisberg 
plan is accepted. There is a definate need to establish the preci3e 
role the authorities intended fakoradi to play within the proposed 
infrastructural expansion of the twenties. tor analytical purposes two 
main aspects can be identified within the deep-water harbour scheme. 
¥irst the location and capacity or size of the port and their implications 
for new rail routes, and second the inability of the Colonial Government 
to undertake and supervise large scale construction works efficiently. 
Their combined influence on transport strategy during the twenties was 
so extensive that little will remain to be said once its effects have 
been examined in detail. 
AS noted in the previous chapter, deficiencies in lighterage 
ports, especially at J\ccra were becoming a constraint on the growth of 
seaborne trade. ,\part [rom the 1ari.;e annual expenditure on dred~ing, it 
had long become evident that purely lighterage ports were in fact no 
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real substitutes for a deep-water harbour, at which ships could tie up 
and unload directly onto wharves. Not only was the lighterage system 
cumbersome in itself, but it also entailed another layer of middlemen 
with charges, and consequently increased handling costs. Thus as early 
as 1912, only one year after the construction of the ~ekondi lighterage 
port had begun, Hessrs (;00 de , Son and Mathews, suggested that a survey should 
be undertaken of the relative merits of fakoradi, Sekondi and Accra with 
a view to building a deep-water port. However, nothing immediately came 
of the proposal. 
Nevertheless, the main impetus towards the construction of a 
deep-water harbour in the Gold Coast, and the decision to locate it at 
Takoradi appears to have corne more from two wew sources, which were 
based upon the demands of the post-war British economy rather than from 
either of the "traditional" expatriate mining or mercantile interests 
operating in the colony (- both of which ~ere generally opposed to 
large scale harbour works, partly because of their fear of additional 
taxation). ~he first and perhaps the most important demand carne from 
strategic metal interests who Hanted a modern harbour to serve the newly 
opened manganese mines at Nsuta, 33 miles from Sekondi, and barely 3 
miles from the main Sekondi-K.urnasi railway. Hlthough the Government 
acquired the manganese deposits direct from the chiefs, the mining 
concession itself was granted to Ilr Ld\vard U;Jvies, whose company, fanti 
Consolidated I-tines Limited had guaranteed the construction of the farkwa-
Prestea branch railway in 1908. wvies floated a new company, the ;'\frican 
l-langanese Comp;my which OOP'lnence d minin~ ope rations a t i~su ta in 1917. The 
immediate drive towards the construction of fakoradi then followed in 
1918 when Uavies submitted a programme of expansion to the Colonial Office. 
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,~ccording to this programme, not only were the ,Jsuta mines capable of 
meeting the demands of the U.K. mark~t, but it would also earn for~ign 
exchange which was crucial for Britain's post-war rec~nstruction. for 
instance, it had already won a contract for the sale of manganese ore 
to the United States at the minimum tonnage of 100,000 per annum for 
the next five years. uavies however, stressed that the programme's 
success depended upon two factors, namely, cheap railway charges and 
efficient but cheap port facilities. lie argued that the current rates on 
ore delivered at Sekondi were as much as ten times more than ore delivered 
at Bombay using the Indian !{ailways. He therefore argued that a deep-water 
16 harbour should be built atfakoradi without delay. fhen in January 
1919, even before the Colonial Office had considered the proposal, 
Davies approached ,{ear Admiral John Parry of the H.oyal Navy, "to obtain 
an opinion as to the feasibility of constructing a deep-water harbour 
( ) ,,17 on the coast in the vicinity of the manganese mines. Not surprisingly, 
Hhen the Colonial office eventually committed itself to the proposed 
harbour scheme by engaging dessrs Stewart and IkUonnell (a Canadian 
firm of Civil l:.ngineers) to draw up the plan, 'ldmiral Parry was selected 
to head a team of eighteen to conduct the necessary surveys in the 
Colony. This team would repor~ to llessrs Stewart and HcUonnell. 
The team of surveyors arrived in the Colony in Uecember. 
They spent the first two weeks examining the coastline after which 
they held consultation with the new Governor as to the location of the 
port. It is significant to note that like the centrally located 
integrated transport strategy advocated by ~riffith and Lang three decades 
previously, the surveyors suggested that the harbour should be sited 
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at Apam, the most central surf port on the seaboard. According to Parry, 
given the "rectangular" shape of the country - an average of 200 miles 
of coastline (the width of which narrows as one moves into the hinterland) 
and an average of 400 miles between the sea and the northern borders _ 
such a centrally located deep-water port could be made to serve 90 per 
cent of the total land surface as the focal point of entry for the Colony, 
A h t · d th N h 'r . . 18 s an 1 an e ort ern err1tor1es. The scheme would require the 
construction of a new rail route from J~pam through the central agrarian 
regions to Kumasi and possibly to the North. Perhaps the most attractive 
aspect of a centrally located sea port was that it would serve the needs 
of the cocoa industry more effectively - an industry which had become the 
backbone of the Gold Coast's exports and imports trade. Nevertheless, 
the weight of opinion created by the manganese lobby" had already had its 
effects. The issue of location of the harbour had already been made a 
part of the Ten Year Plan. The main task of the Surveyors, Guggisberg 
stressed was to concentrate on the hydrological survey of the Sekondi-
'fakoradi area so as to enable outline plans to be designed, and costs 
estimated. Not surprisingly, when Stewart and HciJonnell published their 
report in 1920, they recommended in favour of fakoradi by emphasising its 
technical superiority over all other surf and lighterage ports. In 
short, the interests of the manganese industry was the decisive factor in 
the location of the deep-water port. 
The other important influence on Takoradi, was connected with 
the demands of British commercial interests for the promotion of new 
export crops in the Northern ferritories, in conjunction with ~uggisber~'s 
personal commitment to the economic development of the region. ;\ 
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preliminary survey for a railway line to the North had been conducted 
as early as 1900, as a consequence of the mining boom of that time, 
and the hopes of tl-E ~ritish Cotton Crowing Association for the 
promotion of cotton production in the territory. But serious 
consideration of the region's economic potential only occurred in the 
post-war years, when a number of the expatri3te trading firms, including 
Lever Brothers and later the United J~frica Company, made several 
representations to the Government callinci for the construction of a 
'1 h' 19 ral way to open up t e terrltory. The main commodities of intez:est 
to British commerce and industry were cotton, groundnuts and shea-butter. 
In addition, Guggisberg himself appeared to have a special sympathy for 
the region (during the war he had applied for the position of Chief 
Commissioner for the Northern Territories) and he believed that it 
had significant agricultural potential. ~2rly in his administration he 
announced that: 
••• the whole future of the Gold Coast is bound up with 
the development of the groundnut and shea-butter industrie~ 
of the Northern Territories ••• with a railway there, and 
a deep-water harbour at the end of it, we should have 300 
miles less of sea transport than (Northern) Nigeria to the 
markets of the world. 20 
Thus, Guggisberg intended the Takoradi deep-water port to become the 
focal point of entry upon which an 'entirely new imports and exports trades 
of the Northern Territories would be based. ,loS part of the programme, 
the "pioneer" western line would be reconstructed to withstand heavy 
traffic, and from the Kumasi railhead, an additional 250 mile track would 
be laid to Tamale. Of course, fakoradi was also intended to be the 
"central terminal base of the (~old Coast) Colony's railway system, and 
,,21 from this all railways were to be based. In other words, the 
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authorities did envisage that relatively cheap rail transport, together 
with more efficient harbour facilities at rakoradi, would naturally-
result in a diversion of part of the existing imports and exports trades 
of the central districts to the new port. fhe aim was to ensure a maximum 
utilisation of the port, and hopefully the demands of the manganese 
mines for low rates could also be met through the advantage of 
economy of scale. Nonetheless, during the formative years of the 
Guggisberg plan, it was the traffic expectations from the Northern 
Territories along with manganese ore rather than existing traffic from 
the central cocoa growing districts which was the more important 
determining factor regarding tre location and scale of the proposed 
harbour. '[}'HS, this"Northern Territories factor", which was so crucial 
to the understanding of the subsequent failure of the Guggisberg transport 
strategy was not brought out by Kay. 
Given the high traffic expectations,and in view of Guggisberg's 
policy of making the port the principal point of entry, Stewart and 
Hcuonnell went ahead to design Takoradi on a massive scale in order to 
meet those expectations.fakoradi, when completed, would cost £5 
million including a townstlip and connecting railways and roads to Sekondi. 
The harbour itself would involve the construction of an artificially 
protected sea area about one mile long containing tidal basins, piers, 
quay sp.:1ces and no less than 10 brrths as follows: 
2 mail steamer berths, 
2 general cargo berths, 
2 manganese ore export berths 
1 coal berth 
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1 timber export ~nd building materi~l import berth 
1 coastal branch boat service berth 
1 railway material and machinery unloading berth22 
Clearly, the proposed deep-water port was an ambitious scheme and its 
success would make or break the post-war transport strategy. 
One of the problems that faced the Takoradi harbour project was 
related to the inability of the Colonial government to undertake, and 
properly supervise, large scale construction works. hlthough the scale 
of harbour accommodation at Takoradi was eventually reduced to six 
berthsi and estimated to cost £1.6 million, the implementation of this 
"interim scheme" was not without severe construction problems, involving 
delays, the withdrawal of Jtcwart and IlclJonnell from the project, and 
the eventual doubling of estimated cost. J'~lthough work started in 1921 
(and was estimated to be complete by 1Jecember 1924), by 1923 only the 
provisio~ of support services (construction workers'living quarters, 
water supply, a hospital, a coastal railway line to connect Sekondi, as 
well as the construction of a granite quarry) had been completed. Work 
on the breakwater itself had just begun. At this point, a three month 
extension was granted, but when in January 1924 the completion date 
was aeain extended by one year to June 1926, and the cost to £1.9 million, 
both the Colonial Office and ~uggisberg agreed that an independent 
investigation should be made, and in J\.pril 1924, Hr Palmer, of j(,endel, 
Palmer and lrriton a ~~estlr1inster harbour colsultancy firm, trisited the 
site. Palmer's .report, which became ready in September, estimated that 
the harbour would now cost £2.5 million, and suggested that the work be 
put out to c~ntract. Following the publication of this report, Stewart 
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and t1cDonnell withdrew from the project and Rendel, Palmer and lrriton 
were appointed Consulting Engineers. The work itself was tendered and 
was won by Sir dobert MacAlpine and Son. 23 
The causes of the delays, especially the events leading to the 
withdrawal of Stewart and McDonnell from Takoradi, cannot be explained 
simply in terms of Colonial Office and mercantile opposition to the 
deep-water harbour scheme as Wraith, Guggisberg's biographer would want 
b 1 · 24 us to e 1eve. J\.S lleredith points out, there was certainly opposition 
from the expatriate merchants, but the Colonial Office was by no means 
d h . 25 oppose to t e proJect. Indeed, it is doubtful if mercantile pressures 
constituted sufficient force to alter official commitment to Takoradi. 
for instance, when, as a result of the post-war trade slump, the 
unofficial members of the Legislative Council tabled a motion in 
iebruary 1922, calling for the postponement of work on the harbour, 
Guggisberg simply brushed it aside, and asserted that the real solutio~ 
26 
to a trade slump would be to expand rather than retrench. On the other 
hand, to say that, lithe real failing of the 191<)-1924 period of 
construction was the adoption of a departmental method of construction with 
the supervision of Engineers, whose exact position was never clearly 
d f · d,,27 e 1ne is also to be telling only half the story. 
certainly felt within the Colonial Office and the administration over 
Stewart and l1aciJonnell's pcsition as both Consulting J:.ngineers and 
Construction j~ngineers, and the possible conflict of interest which arose. 
llowever, the principal setback, which was entir~ly beyond the controlof 
the Engineers, was the post-war labour unrest in Uritain which prevented 
the delivery of construction materials until 1923. 'fhis was complicateJ 
by the Colonial Uffice policy of favouring British manufacturers which 
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prevented Stewart and llacUonnell from placing orders for materials and 
28 
equipment outside the U.K. In this regard, it must be noted that 
given the experiences of war-time disruption of trade between the ~old 
Coast and the mother country, leading to a greater reliance on North 
American markets for the Colony's imports and exports, the ~uggisberg 
administration came to regard the promotion of trade with Canada and 
th U <...' f tt . . . 1 29 e .~. as a means 0 a ract1ng 1nvestment cap1ta. Indeed, the 
Governor, (himself a Canadian) had insisted on the appointment of 
Stewart and lIaclJonnell to undertake the work because lias Canadians their 
. 1 d . l· . d· ,,30 app01ntment wou st1mu ate 1nterest 1n Cana a 1n the Gold Coast. 
Clearly, one perceives a conflict of interests between the metropolitan 
economy on the one hand and the Colonial economy on the other. fhis 
important factor which mitigated against the smooth conduct of the work 
has not been brought out by Meredith who has placed too much emphasis 
on the inexperience of Stewart and HcUonnell together with the 
unsuitability of the Uepartmental System of Construction. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that some of the most 
serious construction problems, especially shoddy works, emerged after 
the project was entrusted to some of the top harbour engineers in t~ 
U.K. As soon as MacAlpine took over the work in September 1925, he 
proposed that by "intensive working" he could finish the harbour ahead 
of schedule, and so a bonus system was agreed between the r.ngineers and 
the Crowl: .~gents whereby lici\.lpine would receive .l1,500 for each week 
that the project was completed before uecember, 1930. The work continued 
with vigour so that by Hpril 1928, the harbour was opened, i.e. some 
twenty months ahead of schedule. Ho\\'ever, hardly had the "completion 
certificate" entitling i'lc:l.lpine to the bonus been granted than it beC,I::1C 
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apparent that a number of the cylinders on which the wharves rested were 
sericusly defective, "being filled with rubble instead of concrete, and 
cracking at water-level over a distance of 190 feet. ,,31 j\lthough a 
Colonial Office enquiry attributed the defects to "hurried work" and 
.. h to It h s arp prac l.ce on t e part of the Contractors, IlcAlpine was never 
made to forfeit the bonus payments. It took up until Uecember 1930, 
to rectify the defects at a final cost of £3.5 million. 32 Thus, once 
again, the perennial problem of shoddy construction and technical 
defects in railway and harbour projects came into a sharper focus. More 
importantly, the failure of the authorities to implement the harbour 
scheme more promptly and efficiently meant the diversion of attention 
from other elements in the transport strategy. 
The provisiul of additional railway mileage was the second 
major flank in Colonial transport policy during the twenties. uf the 
£24.5 million estimated cost of the Ten Year Plan, more than half had 
been earmarked for railways. ~oad transport continued to be assigned 
a secondary role, as a feeder system to the railways. Un the construction 
and maintenance of motor roads Guggisberg wrote: '1indirect revenue there 
° ° 11 33 may be, but, directly, money is all going out and none comlng In. 
J~ well as generating revenues for the local administration, railways had 
the additional advantage of stimulating metropolitan heavy metals and 
engineering industries. 0f the 600 miles of new railway lines that had 
been proposed and surveyed however, only 230 miles was eventually 
built. 
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The first railway project embarked upon after the war was the 
reconstruction of the Sekondi-Kumasi "pioneer" line, which was in a 
poor state of repair. This line, originally started as a short light 
railway to serve the Tarkwa mines, became, when it was extended to Kumasi, 
the principal trunk route in the country. The heavy traffic which was 
carried could not cope with the steep gradients and sharp curves on a 
line which had been designed for light traffic. The nature of the line 
hampered the speed of trains and caused frequent derailments, but more 
importantly it resulted in serious problems of track maintenance. The 
situation was particularly bad on the section between ~ekondi and Nsuta 
because of the heavy manganese traffic. Consequently, in 1919 it was 
decided to reconstruct the entire 168 ~ekondi-Kumasi lire and also 
to absorb the Hanganese station at Nsuta (previously connected by a 
2~ mile branch line) into the new line. The reconstruction was also 
expected to meet the needs of the Northern Territories. Hy the time 
the work was completed to Kumasi in 1925, nearly £2 million had been 
34 
spent. 
J\.s we 11 as the Sekondi -~umas i recons truc tion, the extens ion 
of the Accra railway form fafo to Kumasi attracted the Government's 
attention immediately after the l-1ar. i\S previously noted, the construction 
of this extension was intended to place the ~juamena Bauxite deposits on 
a rail route. i\. team of construction engineers arrived in the (.;alony 
ear ly in 1920. ,d though arrangemen ts were made to carry ou t the work 
simultaneously, from both the fafo railhead and the l"umasi terminus 
towards the ilauxite deposits, work co~ld not begin on the Ac~ra section 
until April, 1921 because conditions at the port were so bad that 
construction material~ could not be landed. Thereafter, work progressed 
'14 
from both directions until on 3 September 1923, when the stations 
at Bompata, ~rahso and Akwaseso were opened thus linking the two lines. 35 
A through railway communication from Accra via Kumasi to Sekondi, 
360 miles, had now been established. 
The construction of the proposed railway. from Kumasi to famale 
to open up the Northern Territories was the next important railway-
building scheme. Although a survey conducted on the 250-mile route in 
1922 had established the feasibility of the proposed northern line, 
it soon became evident that the scheme would not come to fruition. 36 
The main reason was that the continued development of the ~olony and 
Ashanti was incompatible with the simultaneous"development of the 
Northern Territories. Given that there were local labour shortages in 
the south, leading government public works, the mining companies and 
indigenous cocoa farmers to depend on external sources of labour supply, 
the authorities came to re~ard the underdevelopment of the north as a 
means of securing a cheap labour reserve for the south. A decision not 
to proceed with the northern railway was taken in 1922. Guggisberg 
later wrote: 
To encourage agricultural production in the Northern Territories 
by constructing a railway before tbe development of communications 
in the south would result in the greater part of this labour 
being lost. ~or the above reasons, I have deliberately sacrificed 
for the mo~,nt the development or the agricultural products of 
the North. 
Thus it is an irony that the abandonment of the line into the Northern 
Territories was decreed by the very Governor whose commitment to the 
development ot: the region had earned him the nickname "faddist". 
However, the decision was to have important repercussions on the general 
transport strategy. 
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The deep-water port at Takoradi was designed on a large scale 
partly with the view of handling traffic from the north. Having abandoned 
the proposed railway to the north, attention switched to the alternative 
of a railway through the central cocoa producing districts, conveying 
traffic to Takoradi which would help make the port viable. In the 
aftermath of the decision not to build the northern line, Stewart and 
l'1clJonnell suggested that a central belt railway should be built parallel 
to, and some distance back from the coast to connect with the western 
1. 38 lne. The proposal was taken seriously and a sum of £30,000 was 
allocated towards a survey of a central rail route. The surveyors' 
report, which was ready early in 1923, occupied ninety pages and contained 
detailed topographical maps and traffic estimates. [he proposed line, 
the report sU8gested, should commence from lIunl_ Jalley, 53 miles north 
on the Sekondi- Kumasi line, should run ac~oss the Central Province for 
a distance of a hundred miles, and should connect the newly located 
diamond mines at Kade. it would cost £1.6 million. The line would serve 
an area of 5,582 square miles having a population of nearly half a million. 
The main produce of the region, cocoa, amounted to 32,000 tons in 1921 
(22 per cent of which remained unmarketed due to lack of tansport) and 
this figure was expected to rise to over 54,000 ton~ by 1930. The line 
would also rejuvenate the palm oil industry and encourage the production 
of Kola and timber. The motor roads that served the area, the report 
further argued, were of inferior quality, suitable only for the c)nveyance 
of light traffic, and besides Guggisbers and the surveyors believed that 
lorry traffic could not operate profitably beyond 30 miles from the coast. 
Events would however prove them wrong. finally, the proposed railway 
would earn ,[136,000 per annum on goods traffic alone, and at a workinc; 
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cost of £63,000, it wouW then be profitable to operate. 39 
Uespite the glowing report, there was strong opposition to 
the construction of the line. The West ,i..frican .:Jection of the London 
Chamber of Commerce, for instance, objected to the construction of the 
line on the grounds that there were favourable prospects of the infant 
1 t t d 1 . t h' 1 ,) . 40 orry ranspor eve op1ng 0 serve t e Centra ~rOV1nce. tor the 
first time indigenous opinion was also consulted regarding railway projects 
when the Governor held a series of conferences between June and September 
1923 at Accra, Cape Coast, Saltpond and Winneba to publicise the scheme. 
Like the expatriate mercantile community, the spokesmen for the African 
communities were also opposed to the project. Some said money should 
be spent instead on welfare services. Uthers feared that such a central 
belt railway would destroy the commercial importance of the central 
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coastal towns. The Omenhene of ,\.ssin for instance, called for the line 
to be constructed to Cape Coast since his "people have never been to 
T k d · .. 42 . h t t d h d f 1 d· t t a ora 1 - mean1ng t a Ea e a never owe 1n an eas -wes 
axiso Nevertheless, the Colonial Office gave approval for the construction 
of the Central Province i{ailway in 1924 because, "the choice of this route 
for the railway would enable the maximum of produce to be brought to the 
,,43 harbour and so reduce the charges to be imposed at the port. 
Even before the Secretary of .:Jtate's approval was received, 
construction had begun in September 1923 with the clearing of forest 
and earthworks at Huni VCllley. un the whole, the line experienced fewer 
construction problems than any of the previous railway and harbour 
works. No extensive rock cutting was needed and suitable ballast material 
was located alongside the route in large quantities. Construction 
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proceeded fairly rapidly so that by 1925 the line was completed to Nsuaim 
(Uda) 80 miles. The only obstacle was a 260 foot span bridge over the 
Birim Kiver, the orders for which could not be delivered until !lay 1927 
due to the coal strike in Britain. By AUgust the bridge was eventually 
erected which enabled the permanent way materials to be laid on the 
remaining eighteen mile section. 44 In all fourteen stations were opened 
along the line, the principal one being at the Kade railhead where an 
extensive locomotive depot was constructed. iour miles of sidings were 
also laiJ there to connect the diamond mines. The total cost of this 
line including locomotives and rolling stock was £1.6 million - a figure 
that fell short of the original estimates by some £50,000. 45 
However, no sooner had the line opened than it became apparent 
that the official expectations of the railway, especially the belief in 
the general superiority of railways over lorries, had been based on a gross 
underestimation of the potential of road transport. HS the General 
Manager of the t~ailways reported in 1927: 
J\t present time the traffic of the principal towns along the 
route •••• is carried by lorry at the rate of 1s per ton 
mile, the reduction in cost being due to better roads, cheaper 
petrol, better and more powerful lorries And better transport 
organisation of the motor transport companies. 46 
Consequently, he concluded that the Central Province dailway was "up 
against established competition" and traffic would continue to be carried 
by motor lorries so long as the roads remain. J\S a consequence of the 
incidence of motor competition on the new central line, together with 
the difficulties whicll had surrounded the construction of thefakoradi 
deep-water port itself (particularly the escalation in the cost of the 
project), the Colonial Uffice suspended the Guggisberg plan in 1927. 47 
jo 
Thus the completion of both the Ueep-Water Harbour and the Central 
Province dailway marked the completion of the Gold Coast's basic 
railway network and associated ports and harbours. 
CONCLUSION 
The post-war infrastructural expansion in the Gold Coast can 
be viewed as a new phase in the British pressure, consequent upon the 
first World War, for greater overseas markets and better sources of 
raw materials, particularly strategic metals. Unlike the pre-war 
strategy under which construction of railway lines took priority over 
port and harbour development, during the twenties, within the Guggisberg 
programme, and because of the pressure of metropolitan strategic 
metal interests, the Takoradi deep-water harbour took precedence. 
Despite the obvious advantages of a centrally located harbour and its 
associated railway lines, particularly the prospects of serving the 
needs of what had become the Gold ~oast's leading export commodity -
cocoa - more effectively, the authorities decided in favour of the 
western end of the seaboard at 'fakoradi. Thus Kay is generally 
correct in arguing that the location of the port at fakoradi favoured 
expatriate capital as opposed ~ indigenous capital. Nevertheless, 
the pressures exerted by the metropolitan economy in its search for strategic 
metals - manganese - in conjunction with llritish mining capital as 
distinct from British capital in general, needs to be highlighted. 
~xpatriate mercantile needs in the central and e:lstern districts would 
have been served better had the port been located differently. 
Takoradi can be regarded as something of a "cuckoo-in-the -
nest" - not only because of the substantial amounts of funding it required, 
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diverting revenues and re sources away from alternative patterns of 
expenditure, including possible railway and road construction in areas 
still deficient in modern transport, but also in the way it influenced 
further railway development. the aim of both the fafo-Kumasi extension 
and the Central ~rovince line was to bring traffic westwards or south-
westwards to takoradi • . the authorities, having committed themselves 
to . a harbour with such a large capacity, the whole centre of gravity 
of the Gold Co ast's imports and export s trades had to be shifted 
westwards to focus on Takoradi. But the appearance of a newer, and more 
flexible form of transport - motor lorries, threatened to undermine that 
policy even before it was fully operational. fhe need for a central 
belt railway line conveying traffic to Takoradi in particular arose 
as a consequence of the decision not to construct the northern railway -
a decision which highlights the contradiction between the demand for 
northern labour by metropolitan and indigenous economic interests 
operating in the Colony and ,I.shanti and the expansion of commodity 
production into the Northern Territories. The operation of these diverse 
and complex social and economic interests were intertwined not only with 
decisions as to where railway lines and harbours were to be built but also 
with the mobilisation of resources for construction and the operation of 
the transport system. It is to the discussion of these latter elements 
we now turn in Part 2 of the thesis. 
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THE. i{f.l:l~UI'fHE.Nl' Of WNSl'l{UCfIUN WU(\K~l~S ANi) WWNIAL LAllOUL{ PULICY 
The construction of railways normally requires a very large 
labour force and this was all the more true when, as in the ~old Coast, 
railways were being built in difficult environmental conditions. The 
most basic demand was for the mass of unskilled workers needed at all 
stages of the construction process. Ouring surveying, manual labourers 
were involved in cutting the forest so as to locate proposed routes; 
thereafter even greater numbers were needed to clear the entire route, 
fell and uproot the stumps of trees, cut these into pieces and remove 
them from the construction sites. Construction itself involved digging 
and moving large amounts of earth so as to level the ground for the 
laying of the permanent way. nt a time when head porterage was the only 
available means of transport, large numbers of carriers were also required 
to carry such construction materials'as rails, sleepers, timber and 
cement to the sites.fhe permanent way when laid, needed to be ballasted 
in order to prevent erosion and to secure the stability of the line. this 
required either the construction of quarries by mechanical means or the 
collection of boulders and stones by harld, which would then be broken 
into pieces for ballasting. In addition, there were rivers to be 
bridged, tunnels to be constructed, anel workshops, offices and staff 
accommodation to be erected at principal railway stations. All such 
work needed large amounts of unskilled manual labour. 
But r~ilway construction also required a relatively small number 
of men with technical skills and semi-skills: surveyors and draughtsmen 
were needed to record the survey and to draw the relevant maps, engineers 
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to design and supervise the work, and carpenters, masons, fitters, steel 
benders and platelayers to undertake construction. However, given that 
such skills were normally recruited from abroad while manual labour 
was obtained locally, the chapter will focus principally on recruitment 
of unskilled workers. 
THE LATE 19TH <LHTUi{Y LABOUl{ PiillBLE.H - AN E.XPL/u~ATIUN 
The problem that occupied the minds of Colonial officials was 
how to obtain the unskilled labour that was needed for the Gold Coast 
~ailways. Governor Griffith, for instance, had stressed during the 1880's 
th t h 1 b 1 d h l · d 1 a suc a our wou ave to >e 1mporte • ",fter all, the Colonial 
authorities were witnesses to the failure of early corporate mining in 
the western districts as a result of their inability to attract 
2 
sufficient labour. l'ioreover, the Government itself had been confronted 
directly by the labour problem on several occasions: a hasty attempt to 
lay a light railway to Kumasi during Sir Garnet Wolsely's military 
3 
expedition in 1874 was given up on account of labour problems. Again, 
in 1897, 1,120 Mende carriers had to be recruited from Sierre Leone to 
transport military stores to Ashanti and the Northern Territories, but 
many of them deserted shortly after arrival while the rest were sent 
back as "destitutes". The whole cost of this episode amounted to 
£10,480 excluding rations. 4 
The inability of both the Colonial state and private capital to 
attract sufficient labour at this time can be explained by several 
factors not least because of the continued existence of slavery. In 
pre-colonial ~old Coast, as in other parts of I~frica, enslavetLnt of 
man by man was a common means of mobilising labour. uomestic slavery 
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and pawning (which was the pledging of one's rel~tive to a creditor as 
collateral) were said to be so widespread in the nineteenth century 
Gold Coast that even the ~hristian missions made use of them: they 
paid full wages for the slaves while pawns received only a portion of 
the pay because the rest went to pay for the debt for which they had 
5 been pawned. Indeed, as Wilks points out, slaves were of such crucial 
importance to the J~shanti economy that the society could hardly exist 
without the institution. 6 l~ot surprisingly, when the British took over 
in 1874, one of their first actions was to outlaw slavery which they 
regarded as the primary obstacle to the development of a wage labour 
7 force. freed slaves were expected to become the future proletariat of 
the country. However, as OUmmett points out, the authorities' desire 
to abolish slavery was curtailed not only by the lack of any difinitive 
forms of the institution in. practice, but also because of the possible 
high cost of compensation to owners as well as the social consequences 
f .. 8 o mass emanc1pat1on. Thus, actual enforcement of anti-slavery 
legislation was mainly limited to the prevention of slnve raids for 
export purposes. Uomestic or internal slavery remained largely 
untouched. 
Secondly, the conditions of wage labour were also highly 
unattractive. ,\s Jeff Crisp has stated, wages were 10\07 and the tasks 
assigned to workers in the mines for instance, were arduous, dirty 
9 
and dangerous. In addition, the results of recruitment of workers from 
West I~frica to the Belgian Congo and the Islands of Sao Thome and 
Fernando Po needs to be stressed. AS a consequence of the atrocities 
committed on such labourers, by the 1890's certain terms, for example 
"Abrofodzuma" that is to say whitemans job, and " Ubandzuma" or 
106 
Government's work,had been devised by the Gold Coast population to 
10 describe the dangers of wage employment in general. An additional 
problem then was the poor reputation of wage employment which was 
unlikely to attract, for example, established cultivators. Finally, 
the early days of Colonialism were also days of enlarged labour demands 
not least because of the expansion in palm oil and rubber production, 
as well as the nascent cocoa industry. 
Thus, it is against this background of the continued existence 
of domestic slavery, an enlarged labour demand, together with a growing 
unattractiveness of wage labour, that one must set the Government's 
strategies, its successes, and its failures to satisfy its railway 
labour requirement. 
iiliWWITilElrr r'Ll~{ THE. .st.kUiH)I-KU!·L~Sl Ll!~E., 1898-1903: 
As soon as the construction of the Sekondi-farkwa line was set 
in motion in 1898, the Colonial administration simply advertised for 
labour. uistrict ~ommissioners were asked to recruit workers and give 
them 3d subsistence for each day of their journey to the railway site. 
On arrival, the worker ~JaS to be allowed one day to construct his hut 
while wages were to be paid at the rate of 1/- per day for men, and 
between 6d and 9d for boys and women "depending on their value as 
workers".ll These discriminatory wage levels were not only lower than 
the ~overnment official rate of l/Jd, but more importantly, the mining 
companies continued to pay their workers at the official rate. ~learly, 
the ~overnment was looking for a cheap labour force to built its 
railways. However, in view of the conditions discussed aLove, it is not 
surprising that this labour force did not materialise. By June, 1899, 
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12 there were only 600 labourers on the site. 
An added factor in the unpopularity of raih::ly work at the time 
was the ill-treatment of the labourers. Sub-contractors mainly South 
nfricans, Italians and Greeks were engaged to undertake clearing, 
excavations and other petty contracts. Punishment by flogging and 
forfeiture of wages was common-place. As the Consulting Engineers 
reported, the excesses of the sub-contractors was such that many 
labourers left their employment and, "the railway project as a whole got 
. ,,13 
a bad name amongst the nat1ves. 
Significantly, these sub-contractors were the first to complain 
to the authorities about the labour shortage. They wanted permission to 
recruit labour themselves, if necessary by force. The administration, 
however, was dubious about t~ demand. It argued that it was precisely 
because of mistreatment of workers by the contractors that working for 
the railways was unpopular. However, by uecember, 1899, when there 
was still no sign of improvement in the labour supply situation, the 
entire European construction staff went on strike, and demanded that 
14 Government should intervene positively in the labour problem. 
The immediate offical response to these problems can be explained 
in terms of the racial prejudice that existed at the time. ~fricans 
,"ere said to be unwilling to work, or lazy and therefore Chinese coolies 
were to be brought in to teach tiE m the virtue of work. liThe lanti and 
other tribes", the l{esident ~ngineer reported, "Here indolent, slow, 
and possessed but little energy",15 adding that nothing short of large 
scale importation of labour from China or India '''ould ensure the success 
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of the railways. The case for I'eastern" indentured labour was not new. 
Governor Haxwell had stated in 1897 that: "no real progress will be 
made in the development of this ~olony, until a more energetic race than 
h 
,,16 
t at which now inhabits it is at work here. J\lthough llaxwell 
secured Colonial Office approval for the i...portation of 800 indentured 
workers from the Straits Settlement, the scheme was dropped because 
of the lack of regular steamship service between West Africa and the 
~ast. But the failures of the railways to attract labour, together with 
the recent authorisation of an additional 124 miles from Tarkwa to 
Kumasi, meant that official interest in Chinese labour revived. Thus, 
A.cting Governor, ilodgson, after visiting the construction site in 
January 1900, asked the Colonial Office to reconsider the proposal to 
import Chinese coolies. However, the proposal \vas turned down by the 
Crmvtl Agents on the grounds that they \vere as susceptible to tropical 
<Iiseases as L- 17 t:.uropeans. 
In default of imported Chinese labour, the Colonial Government 
turned to the traditional Chiefs as agents for the recruitment of 
indigenous labour. Since the establishment of ~olonial rule in the 
1870's, the authorities had increasingly relied on the traditional 
rulers to supply their labour needs. t\.dminis trati ve and trade roads, 
for instance, were constructed by communal labour, in return for which 
the Chiefs were paid stipends. The earliest attempts to recruit 
railway labour through the Chiefs appears however, to have been confined 
to the sou th-eas tern pa rts of the Go 1 d Coa s t Co lony. .:) i r lIa thew Na than 
(the ~overnor) launched the scheme in rebruary 1900, by personally 
appealing to the Kings of t;robo, ,U<.wapim and .~ccra to provide labouro 18 
10l) 
Thereafter, circulars were sent to all uistrict Commissioners authorising 
th t 5/ h d t h I'h· f f h k th 1· d 19 em 0 pay - per ea 0 t e ~ le s or eac wor er ey supp le , 
and a Special Travelling Commissioner was appointed to the E.astern 
U • t d· . 20 ~rOVlnce 0 co-or lnate recrultment. On this occasion, it was 
obvious that the authorities were prepared to tolerate a degree of 
coercion. Une official suggested that a mere circular would produce 
limited response and therefore specific quotas should be given to each 
Uistrict Commissioner on the basis of population. Cape Coast, the 
Headquarters of the Transport lJepartment, which recruited carriers for 
21 government stores, was to be exempted. 
Although there was some response, it soon became evident that 
this source of supply was still far from adequate. My the end of 1901, 
only 1,995 of the estimated 4,000 target had been realised as follows:-
~hief Ahabio of ,\ccra 972 
King Tackie ot J\.ccra 360 
Lt. ~.B. Henderson, u.~. Volta 315 
u.c. Keta 322 
i).C. Ada 20 
Chief Vanderpuye, Accra 6 
199522 
Nearly one-half of the recruits were supplied by Chief Ababio alone. 
That these workers should come mainly from the south-eastern coastal 
districts of the Colony is not surprising. The conquest of J\.shanti 
and the Northern Territories was far from complete and therefore any 
organised recruitment from there was out of the question. .\t the same 
time, the western J..)rovincc, \vhcre the railway was being built was also 
the centre of the mining industry <lnd as such the region where demand 
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from other sources of employment was most acute. Un the other hand, 
the E.astern Province, particularly the grassland districts of Accra and 
the Volta, had relatively low levels of commercial activity, and 
consequently labour was likely to be obtained much more easily there. 
Horeover, in the absence of well-constructed roads, sea communication 
offered the most feasible means of tran?porting labour on a large scale 
from one part of the country to another. Thus these workers, who were 
mainly recruited along the coastal strip were first sent to the nearest 
coastal uistrict uffices at l(etta, Hdd.ih and ;·.ccra where they entered 
into indentured service. This included a six month contract for which 
the Chiefs were paid 5/- for each labourer supplied and a promise of 
a further 5/- for each worker who stayed on for an extra six months. 
The ,yorkers themselves ,yere organised into "gangs" of 20-30 men, each 
group consisting of people from the same village or supplied by the 
same Chiefs. The Chiefs appointed their own "headmen" for the gangs 
who were responsible for discipline and these were promised between 
" ,,23 1/6 and 2/6 per day d~pendi~g on good work. irom the coastal 
uistrict Offices, the labourers were then despatched to Sekondi by sea, 
from where they were marched to the construction sites. 
Unfortunately, railway records provide little insight into the 
social background of these early recruits, so that it is impossible to 
perceive the extent to which there may have been elements of slavery 
or other forms of "unfree" labour among the workers. This is probably 
not surprising because, as ;nne Phillips points out, the use of slave 
labour on public works in West Africa was SUC}1 a politically-sensitive 
issue that the Colonial Uffice preferred to keep a "judicious silence" 
24 
over such matters. Indeed, the Lagos administration resolved its 
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railway labour problem earlier on in 1895-97 by simply going to the slave 
markets to "redeem" slaves - it payed the market price of £1 to £2 for 
the slaves, kept them on the construction works, and deducted the 
redemption fee from their wages and subsequently freed them. 25 But 
because of Anti-Slavery Societies' accusations that Colonial Governments 
were openly participating in slavery, ~overnors who wrote to London for 
advice on the use of slave labour were often reprimanded for bringing 
such matters to the notice of the Colonial Office, one official remarking 
that, "it is not an issue on which it is advisable to say much.,,26 In 
short, the attitude of the Gold Coast administration may have been to 
pursue a middle course: to make the maximum use of the existing labour 
force whether free or unfree, so long as it was not seen to be involved 
directly in the recruitment process. The powers of the traditional 
Chiefs would therefore be strengthened to enable thelll to supply labour 
to the Government railways. 
In addition to recruitment through the Chiefs, the administration 
experimented with another type of organised recruitment. Under the 
scheme, introduced in 1901, the Transport Uepartment, which had hitherto 
recruited carriers for the conveyance of government stores, was 
converted into a Labour Bureau with monopsonistic powers; the department 
was to recruit labour which would in turn be supplied to both public and 
private employers at a commission. Although the main aim was to ensure 
a cheap and uniform wage rate, the mining companies opposed the scheme 
on the grounds that the government could turn it to its future advantage 
by becoming the sole supplier 01 labour. 27 Although the Bureau succeeded 
in obtaining 700 workers mainly from the central districts for the 
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railways by early 1()02, the ordinanc(' backing it never became a law due 
t . t' f h' 28 o OppOS1 10n rom t e mlnes. Thus, the attempt to establish a 
Labour Bureau, like recruitment through the Chiefs, failed to meet the 
demands of the rai hvay s. 
The failure to obtain adequate labour for the Sekondi-Tarkwa line 
is evidenced by the slow progress of construction. As at tlarch 1901 -
that is, 2~ years after construction had commenced, - only 25 miles of 
line had been constructed. By this time, the proposed extension to 
Kumasi had so increased the scale of the project trot the government was 
compelled to look further afield for labour - to the other West African 
Colonies. J\. rudimentary "wage labour" force had existed in all the 
~~es t African coas tal towns since the mid-nine teen th cen tury. \Jhereas 
relatively intense economic activity, especially in mining and cocoa 
farming, had led to labour shortages in the Gold Coast by the turn of the 
century, labour continued to be fairly abundant in Sierra Leone and 
Lagos partly because by 1901, both Colonies had completed the first sections 
of their railway projects. In the case of Lagos where the authorities 
relied on "redeemcd" slaves for railway construction, for instance, such 
wo~kers must have been thrown onto the labour market. The Gold Coast 
administration therefore turned to these other T.~est ,\'frican Colonies fol:' 
recruitment. In June 1901, the CrO\oJn .. s;ents appointed llr Christopher Hill, 
a railh'ay engineer, as Special L~ccruitlDent ,lgent, to be stationed at 
Lagos for six months. I.lthough the LaEos administration Has to procure 
the workers, lIill was responsible for the rcbistration and transport of 
the labourers to the Gold Coasto Each \·:urker entered into <:In indentured 
contract for 1 year plus return passaz,c, Hhile the L3:;OS ad'~inistration 
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charged £1 per each person so recruited. ~ similar approach to the 
Sierra Leone administration was initially rebuffed. It was argued that 
recruitment would adversely affect the recently instituted Hut fax whose 
d d d 1 "1 d" d" 30 success epen e upon pa m 01 an r1ce pro uct10n. It was only with 
the intervention of the Secretary of 3tate, Joseph Chamberlain that the 
31 Sierra Leonean authorities agreed to supply 1,000 workers. Along the 
Kruu coast of Liberia which lay outside the British sphere of influence 
a pri va t!e German shipping firm, i~alchers-He 1m was al so commissioned 
to recruit workers for the railways.32 
The efforts at external recruitment, together with the collapse 
of Ashanti resistance, brought about a dramatic change in the labour 
situation. In lJecember 1')01, there were 4,500 workers on the project. 
By March 1902, the figure had reached 8,584, and in May it attained a 
peak of 16,000. 33 Jlt that date, organised recruitment stopped and 
labour supply ceased to be a problem until the work was finished the 
following year. Une significant point about the labour on the Sekondi-
farkwa-Kumasi line was the widespread use of indentured workers. Out 
of the 16,000 workers on the project in May 1902, as many as 11,626, or 
72 per cent of the total, were indentured for varying periods of between 
6 and 12 months. This included 7,000 froln Lagos, 1,000 from Sierra 
Leone, 271 from Liberia and 3,355 [rom ~old Coast recruited mainly from 
the south-eastern districts. Un the other hand, 4,374 or 28 per cent 
of the work force, were volunteers who were recruited mainly from the 
vicini ty of the rai lway. ,~ll forms of recrui tment now produced more 
workers, though the main group comprised immigrants from Lagos. 
Through the use of administrative powers, alliances with 
traditional Chiefs, and particularly indentured recruitment of foreign 
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workers, the authorities seemed, thl2n, to have overcome the labour supply 
problem. However, the labour force was far from "stable". There was a 
rapid turn over due to frequent desertions mainly among the Gold Coast 
workers. As the Chief Accountant reported: "it is always difficult to 
state the exact number of men at work as there is always considerable 
f luctua tion going on ... 34 The J\ccra and Ketta "boys" proved the most 
difficult to control.rhese workers were given an advance of 20/-
(later changed to a "gratuity" of 7/6) on arrival, but in many cases the 
workers either changed their names or simply disappeared from the work 
and "scarcely 10 per cent of them carry out the term of their contracts.,,35 
The persistant i\shanti uprisings particularly between 1899 and 
1901 was partly responsible for the high turn-over in labour as this 
necessitated railway workers being drafted from time to time as carriers 
for troops. Nevertheless, the poor conditions of railway work appears 
to be the main cause of the high turn-over. wages were very low. In 
fact, when Governor Nathan approached the Accra Chiefs in 1<)00 about the 
labour problem, the Chiefs pointed out that their peojle were unwilling 
to travel so far CHvay [rom home only to be paid 1/- per day, Hhich was 
36 less than the market rate. Instead of raising wages, however, the ~ 
Government decided to "bribe" the Chiefs by offering them "headmoneys" 
for each worker supplied, an offer which the Chiefs not surprisingly 
accepted with alacrity. 
imother reason for the instability in the work force was the 
lack of adequate logistic and administrative organisation. fhis was 
complicated by the fact that railway construction involved constant 
transfer of work camps from one place to another as the work progressed. 
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t .... or instance, the one d"y period allowed to neH recruits to erect their 
huts was simply inadequate for the provision of a safe place of 
habitation. Conversely, mining work, although generally considered 
to be dangerous, offered permanent settlement and therefore had an 
advantage in attracting a work force. doreover, there were problems 
about the food supply for the railway work camps. Hlthough the Crown 
Agents procured rations - mainly rice and tinned fish - supplies were 
sporadic and distribution highly inefficient. Some workers complained 
about the unfamiliarity of the food. tinally, the workers resented 
the system of delayed payment of wages. other than monthly rations, 
wages were never paid until the expiry of workers' contracts and gangs 
were collectively penalised by forfeiture of wages for individual 
desertions of their members. 37 All these control measures were 
designed to ensure a stable work force, but ironically they only 
worsened the already deplorable conditions of railway labour and lessened 
its potential attractiveness. 
illiC1WITHE.NT fOR L{J\.IL\~ .. \.YS AihJ LIGHr1:.L~l~i:. POdIS, 1905-1918: 
AS far as the supply of manual workers for railway and port 
construction was concerned, the period 1905 to 1918 was relatively easier 
than the preceding years. fhe expansion of British jurisdiction over 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories, together with the collapse of the 
gold boom, both eased and expanded the Gold Coast labour market. 
Moreover, there were no large scale construction works during this 
period: the eastern line which started in 1908 was built in a piecemeal 
way, so that by the time construction was suspended in 1915, only 65 miles 
had been laid.fhis was in addition to the 18 mile rarkwa-~restea branch 
line (1908-1911) and the development of lighterage ports at Accra and 
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Sekondi. Such a reduced level of demand for railway and harbour 
construction, however, occurred at a time when the overall requirements 
of the Colony for labour was increasing, due principally to the expansion 
in the established mines and the cocoa industry. Consequently, renewed 
Government intervention in the labour market was inevitable. 
Significantly, the renewed intervention came at the instigation 
of the mining companies, which approached the authorities in 1905 for 
permission to recruit indentured 38 workers from the Northern Territories. 
Watherston, the Chief Commissioner of the region, was enthusiastic about 
the scheme as it offered prospects of cash earnings frof'! the south 
being invested in "commercial agriculture" in the north. 39 fhe 
Government however, was still committed to official control of the 
recruitment process - first, because direct recruitment by the mines was 
likely to result in competitive wages which was contrary to the policy 
of keeping wages down, and second, because uncontrolled movement of 
labour on a large scale was considered likely to undermine the position 
40 
of the traditional Chiefs and hence the basis of Colonial rule. Thus, 
the labour system was increasingly reSarded as a means of boosting the 
Chiefs' authority. Under the northern recruitment scheme therefore, 
the mines made their requests to the Government, quotas of which were 
then allocated to the various uistrict COPlmissioners in the region, 
who in turn approached the Chiefs for labour. J\S usual, headmoney was 
paid for each worker supplied. ~ecruitment started in 1907, when the 
. 41 
first group of 271 Horthern labourers arrived at the Tarkwa 111nes. 
J~lthough the scheme had to be temporarily suspended in 1910 due to 
organisational problems, migrant labourers from the North, including the 
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French territories, soon came to form a significant element in the 
mines (especially in underground work);2 and in cocoa farming. 43 
As Crisp points out, such workers constituted the largest regional 
44 group in the mine labour force by the War years. 
But how did the authorities obtain workers for railway and 
port development at this time? \~hen llr ~l. 'COlver was appointed Resident 
Engineer in 1908 to oversee the construction of the Tark'va-Prestea branch 
line, he visited the Colony and described the labour problem as "acute". 
The CrOlvn Agents then instructed llr 11igeod, the Transport Officer to 
recruit 300-400 workers from Sierra Leone for the project. 45 By 
october the same year, these Ilendi labourers who were indentured for 
12 months plus return pass~ge had begun to arrive. 46 ouch workers, 
however, were to form only a small proportion of the overall work-force. 
Out of a total of 1,500 workers on the Tarkwa-Prestea line in June, 
1909, only 300 or 20 per cent were indentured labourers (from Sierra Leone) 
47 
while 1,200 or 80 per cent "1ere voluntary labourers recruited locally. 
There were no northern recruits at all on the project. j\.lthough exact 
figures are not available, subsequent reports indicate that labour was 
generally available. In fact, by the time construction was completed in 
1911, large numbers of workers from the Pres tea branch line were said 
to have migrated on their own accord to the eastern line, the construction 
48 
of which was proceeding simultaneously. 
~learly, there was a favourable response to railway labour 
opportunities, despite the general manpower shortages in the country. 
This was mainly because of changes in mining conditions, not least 
because of a move from surface to deep-level mining at this time. The 
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established mines, which survived the speculative gold rush of the 
turn of the century, took advantage of the availability of rail transport 
to install the heavy machinery required for deep-level mining. 
Consequently the bulk of mine work now available consisted of the 
underground wo'rk which was wide ly dreaded by local men. 49 110reover, 
to offset the extra labour costs in respect of "headmoneys" charged on 
northern recruits and thereby minimise working costs, the majority of 
the mines slashed their wages from 1/3 official rate to 1/- per day 
"for full sized natives. IISO This meant that the rates for railway labour 
which now stood at 1/- to 1/3 "depending on one's value as a worker" 
became more attractive than those in the mines. Not surprisingly, the 
railways attracted labour from the mines. lor instance, in 1909, the 
Prestea Hine accused the railway of "poachingll their Horkers and demanded 
that there should be an embargo on recruitment for railway construction 
within a radius of forty miles of all mines and that a maximum wage 
of 9d a day should be paid for railway labour. 51 Clearly, the frustration 
of the Prestea Hine illustrates the extent to which mine labour was now 
considered to be less attractive than that of the railways. 
On the eastern line, the authorities did recruit Northern 
indentured workers for construction work. AS soon as Mr Murphy was 
awarded the 40 mile Accra-Mangoase contract in 1908, he approached the 
Government for 300 men from the Northern Territories. By April 1909, 
400 such workers, who were indentured for 12 months, had arrived on the 
52 project. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Prestea branch line, 
voluntary, non-contract workers constituted the majority of the labour 
force on the project. Of the 3,000 labourers on the ,\ccra-flangoase 
section in June 1909, only 360 or 12 per cent were indentured (from the 
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53 Northern Territories) while 2,640 or sa per cent were voluntary workers. 
A "market" response to railway labour opportunities was perhaps most 
pronounced on this section of the railway system. Here, constroction 
was undertaken by a private contractor who was more sensitive to market 
conditions than was government. Higher wages - 1/3d - 1/6d - than the 
official rate were offered for voluntary labour, though recruits from the 
North received 1/_. 54 Not surprisingly Murphy's project experienced 
little labour problems. 'rhroughout the construction of this section, 
large numbers of migrants, especially from Togoland, who were in search 
of employment were regularly intercepted near ~ccra and employed for the 
01 55 ra~ ways. J\lthough these migrants, particularly from the German side 
of the border, were said to have been either escaping from forced labour, 
or in search of wages to pay taxes, the obvious financial incentives on 
the railways also accounted for the success of labour recruitment. This 
is further illustrated by the fact that there was a higher incidence 
of desertion among the northern indentured workers. Of the 400 
recruited in 1908, only "fewll \.;ere reckoned to have completed their 
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contracts. These northern workers \olho \-Jere in fact "conscripts" 
found themselves not only working side by side with southern voluntary 
labourers who were paid at a higher rate, but in addition the southern 
labourer received his \vages on the spot, whereas the northern counterpart 
was merely fed and received his accumulated wages on his return home. 
Un the 25 mile llancoase-fafo extension (1912-1915), labour 
supply continued to be favourable to the raih.;ays. tJhen the work started 
under llr Cozens-Hardy, labour \,'.'IS simply transferred from the previous 
section to the ne\ol project so that "there is no demand for organised 
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recruitment of labour ,,57 J\t the same time the deve lopmen t of • • • 
lighterage ports at ~ccra and Sekondi were undertaken mainly in an ad 
hoc fashion with the result that the need for a very large labour force 
never arose. In 1909 for instance, only 230 labourers \vere employed on 
the Accra harbour works with another 350 at Sekondi, none of whom were 
. d d 58 1n enture • Thus by the time railway and port construction works were 
suspended in 1914 due to the War, indentured labour no longer constituted 
a significant proportion of employees. ~\.s the Governor reported in 
that year, "many workers now find railway construction best suited to 
their convenience or inclination" 59 - indicating the relative attractiveness 
of railway labour by this time. 
Clearly, by the I.lar years, a regional division of employment 
had emerged: northern contract workers were channelled mainly into the 
mines, \vhile southern voluntary labourers \vere employed on the railways. 
How far this regional division of labour, particularly the emerging 
"free" labour market in the south, could survive the post-war economic 
reconstruction is the issue to which \·:e now turn. 
The armistice of 1918 ushered in not only the rehabilitation 
of the existing railway system, but also a general economic expansion, 
with the result that the question of labour once a;~ ... lin came into sharper 
focus in official discussions. When Governor GuggisberG introduced his 
Ten Year Uevelopment Plan in 1919, he estimated that 27,000 \'lOrkers 
60 
would be required ir1mediately for the proposed public works alone. 
l~ports emanating from the railway projects already underway, however, 
were grim. Un the Sekondi-Kumasi realignment, it ~as reported that 
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"1 ocal labour could not be induced to take Ul
' 
the work on any terms 
at all",61 and on the Tafo-Kumasi extension, the engineers were unable 
to commence work because no more than 150 labourers were available at 
th . 62 1 e s~te. Clearly, at a time of new expansionary pans, there was 
an imminent labour crisis. 
The influenza epidemic of 1918, which claimed more than 
100,000 lives in the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories,63 
partly accounts for the general post-war labour shortages. Nevertheless, 
it was equally true that the railways were unable to attract labour 
because of the competition from cocoa farming. The rapid expansion 
of cocoa cultivation, together with prevailing high Horld market prices, 
enabled cocoa farmers to outbid both ,;overnment and the mining companies 
in the labour market. Guggisberg later admitted that some cocoa 
labourers \vere earning up to 10/- per day, plus food and accommodation, 
as against the official rate which remained pegged at 1/3. 64 Clearly, 
wage levels on the railway were no longer realistic, more especially 
in view of war-time and post-war inflationary pressures. The problem 
was further complicated by the shortage of metal coins as a result of 
the conversion of the i{oyal I1int to armament production during the 
War. Although bank notes were issued throughout the war, they were 
highly unpopular among J~fricanso Consequently, Hith the availability 
of coins after the \var, the issue of notes was abandoned in favour of 
a gradual redemption of all paper money at a discount. Both the 
Government and mining firrns disposed of their reserve notes through the 
payment of wages to their workers and such labourers often had to change 
these notes for coins from "brokers" at between 50-75 per cent of their 
12~ 
65 face value. On the other hand, cocoa farmers who had avoided the 
paper money from the start had large reserves of silver coins in savings 
and this was more attractive for labour. 
How then did the authorities respond to the post-war labour 
crisis? The immediate response was to reassert the powers of the Chiefs 
in the mobilisation of labour. In November, 1919, the Governor called 
a Labour Conference of public work officials at which he announced new 
proposals for labour recruitment. Of the 27,000 workers required, 
13,000 were to be provided by the (;alony and Ashanti through unpaid 
1 1 b ° " h °1 ° °11 b fO ,,66 communa a our, S1nce t e ra1 way projects W1 ene 1t them most. 
Communal forced labour, by which all abled bodied people provided unpaid 
work on public projects, was nothing new in the Colony. What was new 
in the 1920's was that for the first time the system was being used 
for railway construction. The aim was to enable the Government to 
overcome the labour supply problem while placing the onus of recruitment 
on the Chiefs. Presumably, it was considered that a few days unpaid 
work on the railways could easily be fitted into an individuals normal 
routine of subs is tence farr:1inr; and/or cash-cropping of cocoa. The 
scheme had the added ~ttraction of not requiring railway work camps and 
the need for rationing. 
In the Horthern Territories and the Volta (including the 
net.]ly acquired mandated districts) the Government remained committed 
to official control over the labour market. /,ttempts by the tlines to 
recruit indentured workers directly from those regions were to be turned 
dom1. These were years of concern about the high denth rates in the 
mines, and the ~overnment seized upon this issue to counter the perrenial 
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demands of the mining companies for freedom of recruitment. 67 
AS there was still no professional labour recruiting agency in 
the country, the Governor proposed to establish a Central Labour 
Bureau which would co-ordinate all labour recruiting activities. J~t 
the Provincial and local levels, the Chiefs, District Commissioners and 
Public ~lorks Department officials Hould form sub-commi ttees to which 
applicants for labour would direct their requests. The functions 
of these sub--committees were: 
I 
1. To organise systematic prop~ganda campaigns to explain to the people 
the importance of government works to the country; 
2. to obtain information regarding the number of labourers each Chief 
could obtain for work both in his stool and outside; 
3. to ensure that markets for sale of f06d stuffs to workers were 
provided; and 
4. to determine the length of engagement for each g3ng, and to inspect 
68 
the livin~ conditions in all work camps. 
Despite these elaborate arrangements, the scheme floundered. 
Mobilisation of labour for railways and harbours was conditioned by_ 
the availability of alternative, more lucrative forms of employment, 
and the ability of the Chiefs to influence their subjects. Because 
of the availability of mining and cocoa work, it became virtually 
impossible for the Qliefs to recruit labour in the western districts to 
\-lork on the Sekondi-Kumasi reconstruction, "and those recruited and put 
to work deserted nfter a few days ••• practically all the work had to 
( ) . 1 b ,,6<) be carried out by northern Indentured a our. 
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~lthough communal labour was used more widely on the fafo-
Kumasi extension, it met with limited success. Despite the appointment 
of a Special Travelling Commissioner to oversee labour recruitment in 
Ashanti, by 1922 the scheme succeeded in producing no more than an 
average of 450 workers per day, "who showed little aptitude for labour 
on construction.,,70 They were described as being "mostly local and 
very poor quality... being available during the non-farming season, 
h 'l h ,,71 W 1 st scarce at t e cocoa season. Clearly, Ashanti's entry into 
large scale cocoa production at this time, partly explaines the failure 
of the communal labour system on the railways. 
In addition to this problem, the Chiefs in the Colony and Ashanti 
generally found themselves increasingly loosing political control over 
their subjects. This was caused not only by the greater number of 
people entering the money economy, but also by the democracy inherent 
in JUrican political institutions. Although the Chiefs in the southern 
Gold Coast were mainly hereditary, they could be thrown out of office by 
72 the "commoners", "'ho had a defined role in the political process. 
J\S Jarle Simensen points out, the growth 01 the ",\safos" (to which the 
commoners belonged) from 1913 onwards resulted in "the loss 01 prestige 
, f ,,73 for Chle s. As a consequence of the Asafos' political power to 
initiate the de-stoolment of unpopular Chiefs, no Chief could afford 
to force his people to enlist fer government work. Chus in 1~20, the 
uistrict Commissioner of Addah reported that, in spite 01 his efforts to 
mobilise labour for railway construction, he had found no Chief willing 
because of the political crisis - there was no permanent Chief in the 
town and the actin~ Chief was not popular. [he people were in the 
process of selectin~ a new Chief, and the sub-Chiefs were reluctant to 
" 
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associate themselves with the new labour policy.74 In the Kwahu districts 
(through which the Tafo-Kumasi extension passed) recruitment of workers 
for the railways had even resulted in an open conflict between the 
i\safos and the Paramount Chiefs. II.S a t"wahu correspondent of the "Gold 
Coast Leader" reported: "all the permanent Chiefs hold their posts 
mechanically, fearing the populace, and expecting de-stoolment, so that 
, t " , d ,,75 ar1S ocracy 1S g1v1ng way to emocracy. 
In the districts where the J\safo organisations were weak the 
Chiefs were more successful in mobilising communal labour. In J~yem 
~buakwa for instance, Sir Nana Ufori J~ttah (who was also a member of the 
Legislative Council), promised 3,000 men on the average per day, and 
within a month had already supplied 1,000. 76 Ofori ,\.ttah's success was 
due to the weakness of the Asafo in Akyem. Already in 1918 the·- J\safo 
movement had attempted to de-stool him (mainly as a result of his role 
in conscription during the War) but with the help of the Government, this 
attempt was fOiled,77 thus leaving the movement in a demoralised position. 
In short, the spread of the cash economy in the south together with the 
growth of mass political consciousness seemed to tip the balance of power 
away from the Chiefs, and as we shall see later, their leadership role, 
at least in the mobilisation of labour, was to be superceded by the new 
African educated elite. Hmvever, before examining the role of the would-
be African cnpitniists in the recruitmn.nt of workers for the central 
railway construction (1924-27) we shall first of all consider the nature 
of the Takoradi harbour labour force. 
fhe recruitment of workers for the construction offakoradi Harbour 
presented different problems. Unlike railways, the harbour project was 
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located in one particular spot and it \·;as therefore not fe:J.sible to 
adopt the communal labour system. Hot surprisingly, construction depended 
exclusively on wage/indentured labour. ,~lthough 7,000 unskilled labourers 
were originally earmarked for the scheme, the scaling-down of the project, 
together with the introduction of labour-saving machinery meant that 
only an average of 5,000 workers were to be required. 78 Despite this, 
hardly more than half that number were available at one time. In 
Uecember 1922, there were 2,604 unskilled workers,79 by Barch 1923, 
there were 2,90880 and in .\pril 1924 there were 1,860. 81 Indeed, it 
was partly the difficulty of obtaining labour for the fakoradi project 
that led Guggisberg to abandon the idea of a railway link to the North. 
Table 1 indicates the regional break-down of the labour force 
on the Takoradi Harbour \~orks in liarch 1923. Several significant points 
are revealed. oi the 2,908 workers, 910 or 31 per cent were recruited 
from outside the ~old Coast (40 from Sierra Leone, 440 from Lagos, and 
60 from Liberia); 840 or 29 per cent were from the Northern ferritories, 
while the remaining 1,158 or 39 per cent were from the Colony and Ashanti. 
Source of Labour 
II ,'ore ign" i. e. Lagos, Sie rra 
Leone etc. 
Colony & Ashanti 
Northern rerritories 
Total 
Lillu~ 5.1 
.Unskilled 
910 
1158 .. 
840 
2908 
Indentured as 
of unskilled 
89/0 
54/. 
96,. 
77/. 
* Includes large numbers of children and women. 
10 Skilled 
labour 
111 
761 
60 
932 
Source: Governor to Secretary of State, 26 Hay, 1923, P.K.O: c.o. 96/638 
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However, unlike the pre-w;}r pattern, the "southern" Hork force was now 
predominantly recruited from the western districts and ,~shanti, rather 
than the south-eastern corner of the Gold Coast Colony. 'rhus 371 were 
from j\.shanti, 450 r'anti, 265 J\.hanta, as against 30 from Ketta and 20 
82 
from Accra. il.lthough no definitive explanation for this trend is 
possible it is highly plausible that the Sekondi-Kumasi rail link may 
have facilitated the movement of labour from the western districts to 
Takoradi, whereas a prospective labourer travelling by foot from the 
south-eastern districts may well have been absorbed by the growing cocoa 
industry. 
It also becomes clear that the majority of unskilled workers 
at Takoradi were indentured:- 54 per cent of workers recruited from 
the Colony and Ashanti, 89 per cent of the "foreign" recruits, and as 
much as 96 per cent of those from the Northern Ter~~tories. But despite 
the relatively low level of indentured workers from the Colony and 
Ashanti, the pattern clearly shows a significant reversal of the 
pre-war trend towards a growing free labour market in the south. Thus, 
the renewed government intervention in the labour market after the war 
seems to have had a negative impact on the emergent voluntary labour 
employed on public work projects. 
finally, Table 5.1 provides, for the first time, evidence of the 
presence of skilled African construction workers. These were employed 
predominantly as carpenters and masons and the majority came from the 
Colony and ;\.shanti. Of the 932 skilled workers on the Takoradi project 
in 1923, 761 were from the southern Gold Coast (120 from , .. cera, 22 from 
d 23 h .) 111 "f'" Ahanta, 40 from Ketta, 340 iantis an 9 As antls • were orelgn 
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employees (72 from ~ierra Leone, 31 from Lagos and 8 from Liberia). Un 
the other hand, only 60 of the ,~frican skilled workers were from the 
Northern rerritories. This is hardly surprising, in view of the fact 
that the limited opportunities for skills acquisition that existed for 
Africans tvere confined to the Colony and J\sh:'lnti, whereas the Northern 
Territories were regarded as a "backward" region suitable for supplying 
manual labour. 
The final project to be undertaken during the twenties was the 
construction of the Central Province line, and here too entirely new 
labour arrangements were adopted. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful 
communal labour experiment on the rafo-l~urnasi extension, the authori ties 
turned to indigenous capitalists,or would be capitalists for the 
recruitment and supervision of labour. Under the new scheme, known as 
the "contract" system, Africans who could read and write, had had long 
experience of work on the railways, and were able to raise a " " gang of 
workers of between 20 and 30 men on their own accord,were awarded 
83 
contracts. The l~.1.ilways had used the petty contract system since 
1898 but only for minor works such as clearing and excavation, the 
amount of individual contracts for Africans ran~ing [rom £1 to £30. 84 
\Jhat was new about the contract system during the twenties was that 
other than the construction of the brid~e over the Birim l~iver which was 
awarded to a British sub-contractor, all the other major works on the 
central line from station building, turntables, pLlte-laying and 
ballasting '.Jere il\varded to I.frican "contractors'l on a piece-meal basis. 
Thus, the system sllifted the responsibility of recruiting labour away 
from the Chiefs to the new .. frican elite who turned l.1.r~ely to the 
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Uorthern i'erritories for recr'Jiti!'cnt "~"jth a sll1.11l ~'ercent;1::;r: of 
voluntary labour comin~ 
u 
r •• • ,,85 trom ,a:;erla. The nel' [:ethod \.;as ~aid to 
have been so successful that it resulted in a 20 per cent reduction 
in the estimated cost of eartIH.'orks. 1!rl'.'c"J/er, Since t1H:re are no 
statistics regarrliTl& the compos i tiOll of the labo1lr force on the Central 
Province l~ailway, the precise role of this novel arrangement cannot be 
properly established. 
CONCLUSION 
The construction of the railway and harbours constituted a 
major, large scale demand for manual labour in the Gold Coast. Throughout 
the three decades before 1919, the determining influences on aggregate 
labour supply to the railways were wage levels and the existence of 
alternative avenues for cash earnings. 
During the earliest phase of construction (1898-1903), the 
railways lost out to the mining companies because labour conditions 
were considered to be more attractive in the mines. The authorities 
cast around for a solution to the labour supply problem, and various 
proposals emerged - from the classical solution of the importation of 
Chinese and Indian cOQlies, to turning liberated domestic slaves into 
a wage earning labour force. At the end of the day, it was the 
recruitment of indentured workers from other parts of West Africa and 
the use of Chiefs as local recruitment agents which ensured the success 
of the Sekondi-Kumasi constructiono 
During the second constructional phase (1905-1918), the 
balance shifted in favour of the railways. As a consequence of 
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technological changes in the mines, particularly underground or deep-level 
mining, working in the mines was now considered by local men to be more 
lid " . angerous than ra11way construction work. While the mining companies 
began to look increasingly towards the "remote" north for the 
recruitment of indentured mine workers, the needs of the railways by 
contrast, were largely met from emergent free or voluntary wage labourers 
in the Gold Coast Colony itself. 
Uuring the twenties, cocoa farming became a major competitor 
for labour, at a time of static wage levels on both the railways and 
the mines. Consequently, the Colonial Authorities could no longer rely 
on voluntary labour for public work projects. Instead of improving 
wages and employment conditions on the railways, the Government gave 
a new boost to the powers of the Chiefs, so as to mobilise their subjects 
for forced communal labour. As for the Chiefs this particular period 
was to mark a significant turning point in their traditional leadership 
role. The spread of the cash econonomy - the availability of mass 
imported European goods and knowledge of more lucrative employment 
opportunities - resulted in mass resistance to the forced labour policy 
at the local level, which threatened to undermine the traditional position 
of the Chiefs. But whether this is to be taken as evidence of the fact 
that the "era of Chiefs" was coming to a close in the Gold Coast is 
still open to question. What can be said is that two decades of 
railway construction and its attendant changes had led to the emergence 
of a new African elite or would-be capitalists, close on the heels of 
the Chiefs, and it was to this group that the authorities turned for 
the recruitment and supervision of manual labour during the final phase 
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of the railway project. 
As to the overall effect on internal labour markets, it 
certainly amounted to a major "shock" to African communities with 
virtually no previous experience of industrial labour. Nevertheless, 
other than a small number of construction workers who joined the 
permanent labour force on the open lines, railway construction by its 
nature required casual workers. Consequently, people worked only for 
short periods and then returned to the village. Railway construction 
did not directly create a wage earning labour force, or proletariat. 
Nonetheless, the experience of railway construction work may have been 
for some a small stepping stone towards wage employment outside the 
agricultural sector, as some construction workers may subsequently have 
taken up employment elsewhere (such as with the mining companies or 
imports-exports trading firms). 
Finally, because the railway technology was developed, planned 
and introduced wholesale from Britain into the Gold Coast, all the 
construction skills had to be imported. Thus, the tasks performed by 
the ordinary African was basically simple - carrying, felling trees, 
excavation, etc. - which were very little different from their normal 
duties at home. Consequently, any technical transfer from railway 
construction would have been at relatively low level. But again, one 
cannot be certain that workers did not experience a broadening of their 
technical skills. The introduction of the handling of new tools and 
materials, for example, may have widened some workers' horizons. 
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Writing about the i~erican railways, John Stover noted that few 
of the lines were projected or constructed without opposition from 
a variety of landed interest groups.1 This observation does not apply 
to i~merica alone, for it is true of railway construction allover the 
world. fel\7 raill\7ays, '\7hether state-milled or privately-owned, were 
constructed without some sort of state intervention to secure land 
for the schemes. ;' .. s transport agents, railways operated over very 
long distances and influenced property values on a wide front. This 
made the acquisition of land for such transport projects more 
problematic than most ordinary industrial or agricultural enterprises. 
The construction of permanent ways, for instance, requiring strips of 
land of about 20 yards in width over very long distances brings in its 
wake the disruption of virgin land, forests, farms, waterways and 
townships. Jl.t principal rai hvay s ta tions and harbour sites, especia lly 
when located in villages, towns or cities, the additional space needed 
for the construction of stations, warehouses, depots, workshops, 
sidings and marshalling yards necessarily involved a further interference 
with property and general community life. Un the other hand, by lowering 
transportation costs, railways and harbours generally bestow an enhanced 
value on land and property. In the Lritish case, it is true, railways, 
by virtue of their incessant noise and the physical danger they posed 
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to both human life and property, apparently had the tendency to depress 
2 
urban (mainly residential) property values. ~~evertheless, when 
as in the case of the Gold Coast, railways were bein~ constructed through 
a relatively undeveloped territory, land values were more likely to 
rise. ,\os Chisholm has argued, admittedly with some exaggeration, 
"if you drive a road or railway through a cultivable area you 
t t " 11 "1 " d 1 .. 3 au oma 1ca y st1mu ate econom1C eve opment. Consequently an 
additional problem arises as to who benefits from the enhanced value 
of land which follows from railway investment: should the gains accrue 
to the owners of the railways or should the owners of the land through 
whose property the lines were constructed reap such benefits? for the 
above reasons railway schemes inevitably affect several vested 
property interests. A major prerequisite for th~ resolution of such 
problems would appear to lie in the existence of cle~rly defined land 
laws and conditions of alienation to railway enterprises. 
In firi tain, \vhere rai lway promotion sometimes experienced long 
de lays through oppos i tion from lnndo'mer s, Par 1 iamen t in tervened by 
granting statutory powers to railway companies to acquire any property 
which lay on their chosen routes by compulsory purchase. [he law which 
also provided for a generous band of land on either side of the track, 
called Ilrhe Limits of ueviation ll , afforded the raihvay companies excess 
land which they disposed of to the public, and thereby recouped some 
4 
of their promotional expenditures. In the United ~tates, government 
intervened through the Land Grant ::>ystem under which raibvay companies 
were allocated large tracks of l~nd alongside their routes. 'fhis made 
the comp<lnies not only transportation <lgents but also si~nificant 
d 
. 5 
owners of l<ln most of YJhich \Vas e~~ernpteu from taxatlon. In addition 
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to providing e~sy access to land for construction, the land grants also 
provided ready credit to the railway companies during the gestation 
periods of their projects. "!jost railroads obtaining grants", Stover-
note d, "mortgaged their land long before they completed final certification 
with the government, obtained the patents to their l~nd, or sold it on 
long term credit to settlers.,,6 
In Colonial 1l.frica, the question of land titles was equally 
important for railway construction. "Land", Edmund Horel observed, 
"ll1as the key problem of E.uropean rule in tropical il.frica. ,,7 Horel 
defined the options facing the British administration as two: It could 
adopt either a policy of dispossessing Africans of their lands in the 
interest of European capitalism, or a policy of preserving African 
land rights "lhich wou Id increase the J\.fr icans productive capaci ty. In 
E.ast and Central J~frica, where the British pursued the former option 
by declaring CroHn ltights over the most fertile and arable parts of 
the land,8 railways, whether state constructed or privately owned, were 
simply pushed through "public" land. The result Has that opposition to 
raihl1ay construction from landed interests was minimal. Iloreover, 
through a policy of encouraging white settlements in these areas, the 
Colonial governments allocated large tracts of land alongside the 
railways to Europeans for large scale commercial enterprises, which in 
turn provided additional incentives for railway investment. In \-lest 
Africa, however, a radically different situation obtained. Here the 
failure of the British authorities to formulate clearly defined land 
laws, and especially to distinghish between "public" land and private 
land meant that railways in the Gold Coast, and indeed the whole of 
British West Africa, could not be built by allocating public land to 
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railway companies - as in American Land Grant System - nor could 
government assign large areas of public land alongside railways to new 
enterprises - as happened in ~ast and Central JUrica. Hence in the 
Gold Coast the perennial problem of land acquisition assumed particular 
significance. This chapter examines the nature of Colonial land policy 
and its implications for the acquisition of land for railway and 
harbour works. 
THE GOLD W/.S l' ,. LAl~D Ql)~~f IUN": 
In the Gold Coast, the "problem" of land first appeared as a 
problem of guaranteeing rights for private capital. \Jith rumours of 
gold, and prospects for rich rubber and timber developments in the 
aftermath of Sir Garnet i-Jolsely's expedition to l'~shanti, British firms 
soon began to push beyond the trading stations throu;h which pre-
colonial trade operated, and purchased land for mining,and to a lesser 
9 
extent, agruculture. In the absence of private o'~lership, under 
customary law, prospective investors found it hard to establish secure 
rights over the land. Not surprisin~ly, litigation and disputes over 
. 1 b 10 land tlt es ecame rampant. 
Une Hidely favoured solution in the early 1890's was for the 
state to appropriate the land, and set itself up as landlord to new 
investors. In addition to guaranteeing security of tenure to ~uropean 
firms, the government would also benefit from land revenues. Thus in 
1899, Governor Griffith proposed that Cro~~ .~ights be established over 
all unoccupied la nd in t:1C Colony, "preserving existing individual rights 
for the lifetime of their holders and devotin6 revenue arising from the 
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sale or lease to the adminis tra tion of the country." ,1.1 though 
Lord l~nutsford, the Secretary of State, was enthusiastic about the 
proposal, he·favoured a policy of "cautious consideration" as the 
h Id " . 1 1· ,,12 c anges "lOU amoun t to a SOCl.a revo u tl.on. 
Consequently, it was not until 1894 that a version of the 
proposed land reforms \vas put forward in the CrQ\m Lands Bill (1894) 
which would have vested all so-called waste lands in the British 
Crown. 13 The Bill, however, triGgered off stiff opposition, which 
\-1as to earn the Gold Coast the reputation of the "storm centre of the 
. h t . 1 ,,14 fir i tl.S les t r.frl.can and problem. an all iance of eh iefs and 
.il.frican Imvyers (who also enjoyed some of the "irregular profits" 
f 1 d t t ·) f d . 1 1 . 1 . 15 -rom an ransac 10ns Has -orne to reSl.st t le egl.s at10n. 
lioreover, t.uropean mine Q\·mcrs and merchant houses whose interests the 
legislation sou~ht to protect also objected to the liill because of 
their fears of excessive control by officialdom, more eS[lecially 
the sec tion lVhich required them to pay roya 1 ties. l~ot surprisingly, 
nothing immediately came of the CrQ\m Lands Bill. 
The revival of the land issue awaited the arrival of Sir 
William Naxwell as new Governor in 1895. As previously noted, 
l1axwell, who had served in the Halay States prior to his appointment 
to the Gold Coast, was a strong advocate of state appropriation of 
land, both as a means of securing revenue for the government and as 
a way of attracting British investment (see chapter 2) •. lfter an 
interim announcement in 1895 that no concessions would be valid 
without the Governor's approval, iiax\vell dre\v up a iublic Lands Bill, 
1897, in \vhich the question of "CrQ\-m l\ights" was dropped. !IQ\-1ever, 
• 
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as with the abortive legislation of 1894, the basis on which land was 
declared "publl" c" "las y e::tens i ve. ior instance, only land which could 
be clearly shO\·m to have :m indi vidual m·mor t.;,1S e~:cluded from the 
d f " "t" 16 I h e lnl lone t is t erefore not surprising that like the Crown 
Land Bill, the 1897 legislation \Vas eventually dropped as a consequence 
of combined opposition from advocates of the status quo - the 
e~:patriate concessioners, Chiefs, and .,frican laHyers. 
Lventually in 1900, the authorities succeeded in passing a 
Concessions Orrlinance, 1900, which superceded lhe 1897 Bill. The 
objective of the 1900 Urdinance was stateci as being to enable the 
government to supervise land alienation in order to prevent fraud and 
to guard against effects prejudicial to the public interest.!7 It 
provided for the establishment of a Concessions Court \~ith the duty 
of validating all registered and undisputed concessions. It also 
limited mining concessions to 5 square miles each, and those for 
timber and rubber \Vere not to exceed 20 square miles •. 1. royalty of 
5 per cent (later reduced to 2'2 per cent) was imposed on all profits 
made by concession holders • 
• 
Clearly, the 1900 Concessions Ordinance marked an abandonment 
of the radical policy of CrO\m/~overnment o\~nership of land advocated 
by Griffith and Maxwell in that it confirmed .ifrican ownership of land. 
There appears to be several reasons for this capitulation not least' 
because of the security dangers of the policy. The late 1890's was a 
turbulent time for British imperialism in ilfrica: a war was brewing 
in South }\frica and Sierra Leone had just experienced a hut tax revolt. 
In the Gold Coast Colony itself, not only was opposition to the land 
... 
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question nearing the point of insurrection and Luropeans beginning to 
consider the area unsafe for investment, but the conquest of l~shanti 
and the i'Jorth was also far from cOlllplete. rhus, the unstable political 
situation in Africa at the time gave the Colonial uffice the feeling 
that it was biting more than it could chew. Un the other hand, it was 
also becoming evident at the time that even with a system of African 
proprietorship, the colony was producinG the goods needed for the world 
market, so that the establishment of plantations was considered 
unnecessary. cinally, the Colonial Uffice also feared that the loss 
of land would affect the powers of the Chiefs which were crucial to the 
f h 1 · f' d' 1 18 success 0 t e po lCY 0 ln lrect ru e. fhe failure of the Colonial 
administration to establish government control over any significant 
portion of land would have far reaching consequences for the acquisition 
of land for railway and harbour works. 
However, some legislative attempt had already been made to 
deal with the particular conditions relating to public works. Une of 
the first pieces of legislation passed by the British Parliament after 
the proclamation of Colonial rule over the Gold Coast colony in the 
1870's related to the acquisition of land for public work projects. 
Under this Public Lands Act, 1876, the Colonial Government was 
enpowered, subject to the enactment of appropriate Urdinance, to 
acquire any land, whether occupied or unoccupied for public use. 
Article 6 of the Act provided that compensation should be paid only 
for occupied/developed land, i.e. property holdings, while "waste" or 
unoccupied land was to be taken free of charge. It also provided that 
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any land acquired under the l\ct which remained unutilised for a period 
of ten years - either because the proposed project for which it was 
originally acquired had fallen through, or because land became 
superfluous on the completion of the project - should revert to their 
original owners subject to the approval of the Governor. 19 
In the late 1870's the new administration acquired several 
plots of land especially in the immediate vicinity of the coastal 
castles and forts, for the erection of public buildings to cater for 
its expanding civil and military establishment. When titzgerald 
and Uercer submitted their application for railway concession to the 
Colonial Office in 1879, in which they requested land grants under the 
HCt, the Colonial Secretary, Sir Hichael Hicks turned down the proposal 
b .. h f d d' • ..20 ecause t e ,\.ct re erre to Government an not prlvate enterpr1se. 
These were, of course, the years when officials optimistically expected 
a major piece of Crown Land legislation whicll it was hoped would 
satisfy the demands of the private sector. However, events were to 
prove them wrong. As we have observed, successive attempts in the 
1890's failed to establish government control over unoccupied land. 
The result was that officials began to perceive the t'ublic Lands ,\ct, 
1876 as a means of achieving some of the aims of their abortive land 
reform proposals by the back door. It might permit the establishment 
of government control over lar~e tracts of land, sorne of \-lhich would 
eventually be allocated to private enterprise. The acquisition of 
land for railway construction frO!'l the late 1890' s provided the ideal 
opportunity for such a ploy. 
'By January 1898, the publication of the Consulting ~ngineers 
report had resulted in the Colonial l'ffice' s decision to construct 
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the pioneer line from Sekondi on the coast to fflrkwa minin:?, districts. 
The same month the ~old Coast Legislative Council passed a ~ilway 
Ordinance, No. 7 of 1898 which authorised the commencement of the 
. 21 h proJect. 'f e urdinance also provided for the acquisition of land 
for railway construction under the 1876 Land Act. The actual mechanism 
was straight-forward. The Colonial Government passed an Ordinance 
authorising railway engineers and surveyors to enter the land to 
prepare the necessary plans and maps, which were then publicised in the 
Government Gazettes. Claims for compensation then were to be submitted 
within 21 days, after which the land automatically became the property 
of the Government. The implications of this procedure were that land 
acquisition or the settlement of claims for compensation should be no 
hinderance to the commencement of proposed railway schemes: 
1.1hether or not any dispute or doubt shall arise as to the 
mvnership of or compensation properly payable for such lands 
it shall be lawful for the Government through its servants 
to enter upon such lands 21 days after service of such notice, 
and pending the decision of the courts, to deal with all such 
lands in all respects as if they had been conveyed to and 
became vested in the Colonial Secretary in trust for Her 
Hajesty.22 
The wide powers bestowed on the government by the !~ilway Land 
Ordinance were too obvious to be ignored, especially at a time when 
attempts at land reforms were being frustr:ltedo The Crown 11gents were 
the first to suggest that a half mile strip of land on each side of 
the proposed track should be acquired by the Government with a view to 
• . 23 
leasing it subsequently to mining, timber and plantation conceSSlonalres. 
The Secretary oi State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain seized upon 
this idea and went further to instruct tll<lt the width should be increased 
to one mile on each side of the line. He also stressed that very large 
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acquisitions should be m,lde in the area of main stations along the 
route, part of which would be leased to merchants for commercial and 
. d . I 24 / reS1 ent1a purposes. rhe aim of the Crown Agents Chamberlain 
proposal was that Government would acquire land far in excess of the 
actual needs of the railways and that much of this would be then leased 
to private enterprise. Obviously financial objectives rather than 
government control over land per se lay behind such proposals: at 
this time it became evident that Chamberlain's efforts to obtain 
imperial financial assistance for the railways had met with limited 
success, and the Colonial uffice was desperately seeking all sorts 
of financ!.:.!l aid including assistance from the mining companies. 
(see Chapter 17 on i''1nance). L~evenue generated by excess railway land 
allocated to private companies was therefore envisaged as an additional 
means of making the lines pay for themselves. 
However, officials on the spot knew that such ambitions were 
unrealistic. In January 1899, ,\cting Governor Hodgson "Irote a 
lengthy despatch to the Colonial Uffice in which he stated the 
disadvantages of Chamberlain's ambitious proposal: 
1. He anticipated i'.frican opposition, especially by the l~borigines 
~ights Protection Society; 
2. The policy would provide added fuel for the ,~shanti resistance 
movement; 
3. Host of the territory between Sekondi and farkwa (the mining districts) 
had already been placed under notice of concession to expatriate 
business interests; any large scale acquisition of land would 
therefore lead to the payment of large sums in compensation to 
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h . 25 suc companl.es. 
Consequently a uniform width of 66ft., which was increased 
to accommodate large cuttings and banks, was eventually acquired for 
the Sekondi-Tarkwa-Kumasi line (1898-1903).26 Clearly, the limited 
amount of land acquired - hardly more than the bare minimum needed for 
the construction of tracks - amounted to a total abandonment of the 
Chamberlain proposal. 
One of the earliest probleills to attract the government's 
attention after the completion of the Sekondi-Kumasi line related to 
the incidence of falling trees on the raihvay track and the tesultant 
need to acquire further land in order to cut down all dangerous trees. 
~ver since the Sekondi-Kumasi line hfld been opened in 1904, falling 
trees became a perennial problem for the ne\y lC:lih1ay tJepartment. 
Between 1904 and '~Ol, for instance, no less than ~92 trees had to be 
removed from the tracks. fhe problem seemed to be a persistent one: 
in 1907, 273 trees fell, making that year the second worst year. 
Some of the fallen trees had caused fatal accidents. 27 ,\.lthough part 
of the problem was due to the fact that trees had not been properly 
28 
cleared from the track during construction, it was equally true 
that the narrowness of the railway "strip" 'vas also responsible. 
When, as in the Gold Coast, railways were being constructed through a 
tropical rain forest consisting of an upper canopy of up to 150 feet 
above ground level, a 66ft. strip of land was simply too narrow to 
clear all potentially dangerous trees. Thus in 1906, the Government 
considered acquiring a further strip of 200 feet on both sides of the 
track which \vould then be cleared of trees. However both the Chiefs, 
and the mining companies Hhose lands adjoined the Sekondi-Kumasi line, 
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laid claims to timber and fire\,'ood rights. rhe l:"ilway Jepartment 
suggested that the Governtnent abandon the decision to acquire the 
land, and th;lt instead landowners should fell their own trees which 
would then be transported free of charge on the railways. But the 
suggestion was never adopted because of the expected costs to the 
t',ailways. In the end the lJepartment decided to fell the trees itself 
(although the land itself was never acquired), compensation being 
29 paid to the landowners. It must be noted however, that these disputes 
were not centred around outright opposition to land acquisitioIl per se, 
but rather raised the question as to who should benefit from the 
increased value of land alongside the railways. The ~overnment, being 
the owners of the lines, wanted such benefits to accrue directly to the 
Treasury, "Jhereas the Ol-mers of the land (to Hhom no compensa tion W3S 
paid for the land itself in the first place) disputed the administration's 
claim. This conflict was to become a recurring one throughout the 
period under consideration. 
l~S a consequence of its difficulties over trees adjoining the 
Sekondi-Kumasi Line, the Government began to consider revising its 
railway land acquisition policy. The Consulting Engineers explained: 
In view of the aHakened activities of the native lawyer it 
seemed to us to be desirable that Government should acquire 
ample land before its value were enhanced by the construction 
of the line to enabls all dangerous trees to be felled 
within railway 13nd. 0 
from now onwards, a strip of land of 200 feet on both sides of the 
track was to be acquired for all future railway projects. ~lthough thid 
decision emerGed from the need to secure .1mple land hoth for the immediate 
and the future needs of the rai h:ays, the amount of 13nd the (]overnment 
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actually acquired Hould seem to suggest a revival of the Chamberlain 
land-acquisi ti ve pro~ramme. for ins t.:mce, by i iarch 1908 when the 
acquisition of lcmd for the 40 mi Ie ,\ccra-Langoase line (1908-1lJll) 
was completed, the width of such land varied from 200 feet to as much 
as 800 feet on either side of the track. 31 Un the 18 mile Tarkwa-
Prestea branch line (1908-1911) widths varied from 150 feet to 300 feet 
on either side of the track. 32 J~ll these strips of land were acquired 
in bits and pieces ranging from just over a few scores of yards to 
about a mile long, the widths of which were extremely uneven. But the 
haphazardness of these strips, it must be noted, was not the result of 
resistance to Government acquisition on the part of landowners, but 
instead was due to the administration's own policy of by-passing such 
landed properties as mining concessions, tovms and cocoa farms. The 
aim was to minimise the incidence of claims and counter claims for 
compensation for property. 
Consequently, by the time the nearly 500 mile network had been 
completed in the 1920's the strips of land acquired for the permanent 
way had assumed a peculiar shape, to be explained largely by variations 
in the level of economic activity in different parts of tiE country. 
Thus the Sekondi-Kumasi line which passed through the centre of the 
mining regions had the lowest level of alienation - a uniform of 66 feet, 
follo\ved by the 18 mile TnrkYla-i'restea branch line, - between 150 and 
300 feet on either side of the track. The Accra-l1angoase-Kumasi line 
had widths varying from 20U feet to 800 feet on both sides of the track, 
\\Ihile the Central Province line had an average Hidth of 400 feet on 
both sides of the track. 
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lience, the Government had thus secured lanrl for the permanent 
way \-lith minimum resistance from landowners. Hmvever, in ,~shanti 
a different situation existed: here all government title to land for 
railway construction was rather ambiguous because of the fact that 
the 1876 Act under which land was obtained applied to the Colony 
alone. i~S a result, in fact, only acquisitions in the Colony appeared 
in the Government Gazettes. As l~shanti was conquered by force of arms 
the Colonial Government simply seized the land it needed for 
railway construction without the formal legislative procedures that 
had taken place in the Colony. The fact that land was taken without 
legality \-las a matter for concern, especially in view of the fact 
that on the defeat of the Ashanti, the Governor, Sir l'1athew Nathan 
categorically stated that the land holdings and pmvers of the Chiefs 
wou1d not be interfered with as long as they remained loyal to the 
Government. Nathan had instructed: 
They should be told that the Kings Order does not interfere 
with the rights in land nor with any other rights of the 
Chiefs and people so long as they do not work against the 
Government. 33 
Hence, no sooner had the railways been completed than Ashanti Chiefs 
began to lay claim to land adjoining the line - land which supposedly 
belonged to the Government, but for which the Government had no legal 
proof of mvnership. Consequently in 1908, the Chief Commissioner of 
Ashanti was requested to investigate the Government's position in respect 
of land ownership in the territory. The results of the enquiries 
revealed the Government's weak position which led the Commissioner to 
conclude that: "it \vould possibly now be inadvisable to reopen the 
151 
question of titlc.,,34 J'Lccordingly, the issue ,~as shelved. 
Hm'lever, the question of land titles in J~shanti proved a continued 
recurring sore. ~or instance, in 1916 the Chief of Bekwai brought action 
against the ,~aihmy Department for diGging ballast material from his 
land adjoining the railway track. Un that occasion the ~2ilway 
Uepartment awarded compensation to the Chief and the case was discontinued. 
But the issue embarrassed the Government, prompting the Governor, .:>ir 
[{uGh Clifford to declare in 1918 that: "I also want the position of 
the Government \-lith regard to land in hshanti to be defined as clearly 
,,35 , 
as possible. ~pparently nothing came out of the Governor s 
instruction. Uhcn, in 1924, John UaxHell, the new Commissioner of 
iLshanti raised the matter again, it was decided to let sleeping dogs 
lie because of Uc fear that "any inquiry into these questions may 
. ,,36 
raise further questIons. /~s a consequence of this policy of 
concealment, no information on Government ownership of land in Ashanti 
is available. 
f'.lthough the Colonial administration had generally rejected 
using the 1876 J\.ct as a means of acquiring large amounts of land alongside 
the railways, to be used for private purposes, nevertheless when it came 
to the immediate developmental needs of the railways then officials 
came to realise that some degree of alienation to private needs was 
necessary. This \·ms in p;lrticul.lr to assist COlllmercial developments 
at stations and h<lrbour sites \·;hi.ch had become the focal points for 
urban development (see Chapter 10). Consequently, they were prepared 
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under the l'..Ct to lease land acquired for public works to private 
interests. 
Sekondi, the site for the proposed lighterage port and the 
raih-DY terminal \'::1S the first to be acrluired. :jince :3ekondi was only 
" 11 fO hO °11 .. 37 a sma 1S 1ng V1 age consisting of a few mud houses, it might 
be assumed that acquisitim would be easy. 11evertheless, even here there 
\\lere hidden problems. l~S soon as the si te '\las se lec ted for the proposed 
ter:ninal port, !..:.uropean mining and trading fi rms rushed to acquire plots 
3b in the vilL1ge. Thus, instead of Go-.'ernment acquiring the whole area 
in bulk, it had to be taken over in hits and pieces, so as to avoi5i 
39 
such expatriate concessions. By .. u;l!st, 1898, 53 plots of varying 
sizes had been acquired and a 5, 000 squ:1re y:nd plan drmVT1 up for the 
t+O 
railway station and the lightera~e harbour. 
At T,rkwa an area of half a mile by one qunrter of a mile 
carefully marked out to exclude the properties of the mining companies 
Has acquired in 1899. 41 ,I.t Kumasi, the capital of .l.sh.1.nti \vhere 
Government lo.nd policy operated out,vith the formal legal procedure 
adopted in the Colony, the area of land obtained was even greater. r~r 
instance, after the defeat of the .\shanti in 1900, the Governor simply 
declared tha t the mile of land surrounding the fort in l~umasi Has from 
then on the property of the Governl'lent. J'art of this 1:1I1d was allocated 
f °1° ° 42 to the railways for station aC1 1tles. In other raihvay stations 
in I'~shanti land acquisition [olloHed the same pattern. Because these 
aquisitions (in .~shanti) were not backed by any law, no information on 
them ,.;as gathered. 
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~hnt was the reaction of landowners to Government acquisition 
of land for these railway stations? There was no evidence of outright 
opposition although other signs of discontent were discernible. iirst, 
the chiefs in the western districts complained that ~uropean companies 
were receiving preferential treatment over compensation for land acquired 
by the Government. Thus as early as 1899, the Stool of Sekondi 
petitioned the Government against the denial of compensation on the 
grounds that its land was not "beneficially occupied" uhereas 
~uropean companies which held land in similar conditions were well 
compensated.fhe petition agued that the land could not be regarded 
.. "lIb . b h f h as overgrown an( ecause lt WdS Y t e orders 0 t e Government 
43 that farms on the land were left unattended. 
Secondly there was disagreement over the disposal of excess 
railway land. JUly land that was not actually needed by the railways was 
leased to ~uropean mining and trading companies. by 1902 50 plots of 
varying sizes with annual rent rangin~ from ~12 to ~24 had been leased 
'1' k 44 at ar wa. lit Se~ondi, ~~um;lsi and other principal railway stations, 
45 
similar procedures occurred. The .~borigines ~ights Protection Society 
expressed concern about the ~overnment disposal of excess railway land 
at stations. It stated its support for the Government in the laying 
out of towns and public health schemes, but objected to the fact that 
the Government, as opposed to the original J~frican landowners, was 
profiting from the leasing of such lands. They suggested that either 
such lands should revert to the original owners, and town planning 
remain under Government control, or that the administration should continue 
to dem~rcate and lease the lands but all proceeds should accrue to the 
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('h" f 46 ~ 1e s. However, such pressures appeared to have no immediate 
impact on Government policy and so the public auction of surplus 
railway land at new railway stations became common during the next two 
decades. 
Meanwhile, policy was becoming more planned and organised. As 
soon as the construction of the Accra-iiangoase line was authorised in 
1907, the C;overnment placed a ban upon new building works at .\.ccra and 
47 principal railway stations along the proposed route. fhe aim was to 
secure sufficient land for the rail~ays before its market values 
increased. J\t the same time a l{ailway Station site Board was established 
under the Chairmanship of the })1orector of Public \Jorks, to select 
suitable sites for railway stations. .I.t "cera for instance, it was 
initially proposed to acquire land aroun() Impomn vill~ge at the spur 
just outside the ,\.ccra central market but this ~as abandoned in favour 
of a 500 square yard located on the west end of ~~yebi ,;'oad because the 
site was immediately belO\-l the ridge on which quarters for Luropean 
1 b b '1 48 railway employees wou d e Ul t. In addition to the railway station, 
the (Jovernment had by lJarch 1908 acquired no less than 127 plots of 
varying sizes in .~ccra alone. This included "I.dabraka, which was described 
at the time as a "'~ongo", ~,"orle (Jone, where korle bus hospital was 
eventually to be sited; large parts of Christianborg, Usu and James 
Town as well as the ld~e and Cantonments Luropean l~esidential .. \reas. 49 
Une common feature of the railway stations was that these were 
normally located at the outskirts of towns and villages along the 
routes. This ,,,as because the permanent way itself was pushed through 
t!le fringes of settlements in order to minimise :',terference to property. 
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Thus all <llong their routes the railway lines spawned new townships 
such as ";:>ekontli New Town", It fa rkwa ~~ew fown", "llangoase i~ew Town" 
and "Tafo New Town." In these New Towns lay the railway stations. 
Immediately adjoining the station platforms ~ere to be found the 
"l'lerchan ts l)lots'" 1.1 11 d f . 1 d d' 
, I: 1.. e. anu a oca te or commerC1.a an tra 1.ng 
purposes. Beyond these were Government buildings and Luropean 
residences. In all these new railway townships land values rose 
rapidly. lor instance in 1902 the highest ground ren t per acre of land 
in the country was £24 and this \-Jas at Tarb.Ja. By 1921 an acre of land 
costing £60 at the Kurnasi railwav st3tion, 50 while was ne\.J a t ;~ccra 
.-
it cost much £86 51 as as per annum. 
lIowever, as land values rose in these new townships, so did 
African landowners' demand for a share in the increased proceeds. 
Although Government had ignored such demands in the past, the stool of 
Sekondi was remarkable for its perseverance in pursuit of its claims. 
Ever since Nketsia II petitioned the Government in 1898 against the 
denial of compensation for his land acquired at Sekondi, successors 
to the Stool of Jekondi had raised the issue yearly until court action 
against the Government \oJ3S threatened in 1919. The reaction at the 
Government ;:;ecretariat at this time ,las hi;;hly conciliatory, one official 
suggesting "a p3yment of a lump sum to silence the Stool.,,52 The 
administration accordingly aW3rded a grant of £1,000 to the Stool of 
;:>ekondi "as an act of grace made solely in consideration of the past 
d d h b tile ~tool.,,53 services ren ere to t e Covernment y J Clearly this 
action reveals the weak legal position of the Covernment in respect of 
the practice of allocating land acquired ostensibly for railways to 
15b 
private enterprise. Such conflicts r~ached a peak during the 
construction of Takoradi Harbour arrl new to,.;rnship in the 1920' s. 
J~part from the obvious economic and technical considerations 
favouring the location of the Ueep \~ater HaI;bour at fakoradi, the 
Consulting r.ngineers, Ste,.;>art and l1cuonnell also advanced several 
arguments re~arding the suitability of the site for a township: 
1. The selection of Takoradi would neither involve the distruction 
of any existing buildings except the native mud-built villages 
of ,~manful and Takoradi, nor the acquisition of any considerable 
amount of improved real property at high rates; 
2. the site provided a good layout for the Luropean settlement to the 
west, (the best from a medical point of view); 
3. There was plenty of room for the expansion of the business 
community in close proximity to trackage, warehouses and the 
harbour reclaimed area; 
4. The native town located at the northern and eastern end of the 
site would forln the western extension of the existing native town 
54 
at ::>ekondi. 
;:;tewart and licuonnell's report also contained a comprehensive layout 
plan for the harbour and a new tmolnship capable of accommodating 
100,000 people. Clearly, the situation at T,'koradi, which ~u:;gisberg 
intended as a "model town" in tropicll ... trica, was on a very different 
scale from ordinary railway stations: a much lart;er amount of land was 
required. 
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.. s soon as the decision had been lIIade tl) locate the harbour 
at Takoradi, the ~overnmcnt beg:m to ;lcquire land for the works. rhus 
in January 1<)2U, 1'lr l"urley, ;:;ecretary for (Jative ,\ffairs, met with 
the Chiefs of Takoradi, Amanful and ,)ekondi \vho owned the land. j~S 
a result of the meeting it \vas agreed that the lanu required for the 
harbour and related government services would be provided free of 
charge; compensation was to be paid for property, mainly buildings 
at fakoradi and .umnful villages and farms. i~S regards the proposed 
township, the ~overnment was to layout plans, and demarcate plots 
which were to be leased to the public for commercial and residential 
purposes. fhe rents were to accrue directly to the Chiefs. Hut 
t,;overnrnent, and not the landO\,yners, would benefit from any land 
55 
reclaimed [rom the sea lor lease to traders. 
Hardly had the deed been dra\m up, than Luropean concession 
mon~ers beGan layinb claillls to tfle LlI1u in question. j'or instance, 
a certain rom Bovey Harrett had already acquired building plots at 
Takoradi. However, the cl~liln that r-(nharr,lssed the ~overnment most 
was that of llr eitz-fownsend for 2U square miles, which covered 
practically the Hhole of the proposed harbour site, the to\vnship and 
a grea t dea 1 more. .\,s soon as the l~overnmen t announced the harbour 
pro po sal sin 1 t) 1 9 , Town sen d (w h 0 \oJ a s 1 ate r des c rib e d a s 1 i vi n S a han d 
to mouth existence at .:>ekoncJi) approached the l'akoradi Stool for certain 
concessions. this he later disposed of to a certain Sidney lIenderson 
of the Ci ty of Lon don. ;.[ te r pa s s lng through " coup 1 e of othe r hands 
the concession finally ended lip ,,'ith tlr ,;,:'Iuel John Clark, also of the 
City of London who put in a cLdm for compensation of l25,UOO. l'here 
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was an immediate official response to the clairn. ilr \1 [, Colone t~owe, 
Commissioner of the \iestern Province \-'as instructed to proceed to Takoradi, 
to point out to the ~hiefs the implications of the fownsend concession 
and to seek their support in opposin:; its validity. dot surprisingly, 
the <;hiefs co-operated. file terms of the lease they argued were never 
explained to them in full: the document they signed \-las in pencil and 
therefore could have been altered, and the only land they intended granting 
fownsend was a plot in the Takoradi village for the construction of a 
56 \-larehouse. Townsend and the other Luropean concession holders were 
therefore unnble to pursue their cases bec3use the government and chiefs 
were united against them. Clearly, the fownsend episode was reminiscent 
. 
of the late l<Jth century "jungle boom" in the Colony Hhen many fraudulent 
concessions \,7ere sold in the City or London. 
1l0\.Jever, once the threa t from f.uropean concess ion monger shad 
been overcome J\.frican land and property owners bei;an to submit claims 
for compensa tion. In 1921 c la ims from the peop le of J~manf u l vi llage 
for their farms amounted to £500,000. By 1922, total claims had 
h . f' 57 reached £1,300,000 sOllie of whic \,'ere unspecl lC. 
Lven before these claims could be examined, another problem 
arose.fhis was the publication of the Takoradi Harbour Committee 
lteport in 1921 \.Jhich stated that unless the ~overnment reaped the full 
b d f · . 5t) benefits of revenue from land the llarbour would e running at a e lClt. 
However, it had already been agreed in 1\)20 that such revenue would 
accrue to the Cheifs. The report clused a reversal in ~';overnment 
policy. r'irst, the 1920 agreement \.Jith the Chiefs was abrogated. 
Next dr John Ilax\.;ell, Colonial Secretary was instructed to start fresh 
negotiations \-1ith the <.;hiefs. The new terms were to be unfavourable 
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to the Chiefs. i'or instance, only 10;~ frot1 ground rents \-Jere now to 
accrue to them. This Provision was embodied in the Takoradi Harbour 
Lands Urdinance of 1921 which purported to give legal authority for 
.. h 1 59 acqu1r1ng t e and. 
Jdded by African lawyers, however, the Chiefs rejected the 
~overnment offer and instead resorted to the courts. Th~ issue at 
stake now was that of the legality of Government action. The 1876 
Land J\oct under which the Government passed the urdinance authorising 
land acquisition at Takoradi it was argued, applied to land required 
strictly for public works. A township in which land was to be leased 
to the public for private use, could not be acquired under the same 
terms as those of the harbour and railways. The Takoradi Harbour 
Lands Ordinance, 1921, Counsel submitted was therefore ultra vires. 
The case came up for hearing in June 1923 at Sekondi. ~ven 
before the evidence for the Government had been completed, the judge, 
Hr Justice Hall recommended that there should be an "amicable settlement" 
d f 1 . 60 between Government an A rican c a1mants. Clearly, the legality of 
the Government's allocation to the members of the public,of land which 
was supposedly for harbour construction was dubious. In fact, the 
judge confided to the <.;rown Counsel, ilr Aitken at the time that he was 
not favourably impressed with the Government negotiations and that he 
had some doubts whether the Harbour Lands urdinance and for that matter 
previous railHay land ordinances were not ultra vires. He therefore 
suggested the payment of 50/0 from ground rents to the ,\frican Chiefs. 
In vie\o1 of this .\itken telepraphed the Governor that: "in the special 
circumstances of the case and in Vie\ol of the felet that the other side 
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are able to prove (their case) this is probably the best I can do for 
h ' ,,61 t e Governmen t. 
However, ~uggisberg agreed only with reluctance. He insisted 
that the negotiations had been made in good faith, but conceded that 
even if the courts ruled in the Government's favour it was likely 
that the Chiefs would appeal to the Privy Council with some prospect 
of success. At a special Lxecutive Council meeting on 23 June 1924, 
therefore it Has agreed to accept the judge's recornrnendations. Un 
30 June a settlement \.;as reached a~ follO\'7s: a lump sum of £10,000 \vas 
to be paid to the Chiefs to meet all claims for compensation for 
property excluding buildings at l'akoradi and ,.I!Janful villages; 50 per 
cent of all ground rents ',7as to ~o to the Chiefs; and ';overnment was to 
layout and lease plots in the new township for which all Expenses were 
to be derived, from the portion of the rents that .... 'as due to the Chiefs. 62 
In addition to these problens there were tHO other issues that 
needed resolution. The first related to the rehousing of those people 
dispossessed by the harbour scheme. It was at first proposed that 
harbour engineers shou ld conS truc t tempora ry homes for those \vhose 
houses required early demolition. l3ut this policy ',las eventually 
abandoned in favour of the permanent resettlement of the people in 
the proposed townsllip. In addition, 10 per cent of the values of the 
demolished houses were to be paid to the owners ~s a disturbance allowance. 
However, the plans for two-roomed houses .... 'ere rejected by the 
villngers, who insisted upon three rooms and lar~er compounds. 'fhe 
Government baulked at this proposal because it \.]ould entail a further 
161 
5:47,000 on top of the £53,000 aJloucrl for in their plan. The eventual 
outcome of this conflict was an agreement th~t full compensation should 
be paid and the peoplL :-vould build their own houses. This outcome was 
particularly welcomed by the Government as it involved expenditure of 
only £17,000, a saving of as much as £36,000 on their original two 
bedroom scheme. 63 
The second issue centred around the question of racial 
segregation in Government town planning schemes. .I.S lye have noted 
elsewhere, the raih'lays \"ere normally pushed through the outskirts 
rather than through the tOHns and villages themselves Hith the result 
that entirely new settlements emerged alongside the older ones. .~lthough 
the origin.1l aim of l;overnlflent appearerl to be the establishment of 
state control over such lands \-:hich by lease to Luropean traders would 
generate revenue for the Treasury, the system soon c1egenerated into the 
institutionalisation of racial segregation in Government town planning. 
The first official move had already occurred in 1919 when the Government 
published a guideline entitled ''tiesidence in the Segregation J\.reas of 
the Gold Coast." This forbade the transfer of plots in E.uropean 
segregated areas to ,~fricans. It also made the presence of native 
children in these areas an offence, whilst servants and their wives were 
allolVed in such areas only ,dthin the hours of 9.00 am and 6.00 pm. 64 
Nevertheless, it \;as with the [,ublicntion of the Tal~oradi township plans 
in 1921 that the issue c~'me into a sharper focus. The plan included an 
E.uropean residential area located at the '<estern end of the town, then 
industrial and cOlllmercial areas close to the harbour, and Covernment 
offices and hospitals, as Hell as recreational ~rounds and parks located 
at the centre of the township. 1'0 the extreme east of these, in the 
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direction of Sekondi, the ,,[rican topnship was to be located. 
The people of .ill1anful were the first to raise objections to a 
scheme which required them to move froln their original homes to more 
swampy areas in order to make room for the ~uropean settlement. fhey 
demanded an assurance that half of their total land surface should be 
reserved for them for farming, fishing and d\velling purposes. Hore 
organised opposition came from the "frican educated elite.who once again 
rallied under the umbrella of the previously moribund ll.borigines taghts 
Protection Society. They arGued that segregation was a "selfish 
precaution" in as far as it purported to protect the health of only one 
section of the community. In all the principal railway stations and 
tmmships the ,\borigines argued, L~UrOpe:1ns had tal-:en the best sites 
with the result that there was a "tendency to squeese the people out of 
every congested area f ,,65 le-t to them. Ironically, the demands of the 
,'.Erican elite \vere that Government should allo,,", them "the educated and 
better classes of the j\frican community" to settle on the neutral zone 
adjoining the recreation grounds, adding that such a scheme would not 
66 interfere with the health of Luropeans. Clearly the demands of the 
il.frican elite \vere limited: they neither opposed the principle of 
racial segregation nor did they demand the right to live in the ~uropean 
areas. On the contrary, they wanted to be treated differently from 
the rest of the IIneducated ,\[rican population. ilot surprisingly, the 
Government granted their request by allocating land between the Hospital 
and recreation grounds, and the African township for an ",\frican 
Kesidential Area." 
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Uid the Gold Coast ~ailway and Harbours, and for that matter 
the Government become significant owners of landi In 1931-32, the 
Government compiled a statement showing the extent of .:>tate ownership 
of land in the country.67 The statement was conspicuous for its lack 
of information about the situation in "shanti. This was because 
Gov~nment acquisition in that part of the country was not underpinned 
by any legislative procedures and therefore no such data was gathered. 
However, the publication shO'ved that in the Colony, i.e. the Southern 
Territories, state ownership of land amounted to a mere 52.28 square 
miles or approximately 0.20 per cent of the 23,937 square mile total 
land surface of the Colony. l)ut while the public domain \-1as thus 
minimal, it was significantly located at key railway stations and growin; 
urban cen tres. 1.' or ins tance, Government o\vnership at ... ccra and its 
environs \vas 12.07 sq miles; l~oforidua and i~e\v Juabeng uistrict - 4.63 
square miles; Ucla (terminal of the Central Province (\.ailway)- 1.319 square 
miles; Sekondi-Takoradi - 8.597 square miles and Tarkl,·?a - 5.29 square 
miles. 
Uid the Colonial ~overnment have to pay substanti~lly for these 
lands'? This question can only be tackled \.;ith a limited degree of accuracy 
because the available d~lta largely reprpscnts estimates rather than actual 
expenditures. This is because most claims [or compens<.>tion were never 
really settled for a long time after tIle projects had heen completed • 
. \ case in point \-ms the claim [or compensation at Sekondi by the Stool 
of that to\oln h'hich dras:;ecl on for lh'O dec'-1 ues (1899-191')). The estimate 
104 
for the 168 mile western line was L3,410 including stations (or £20 per 
mile)b8while that of the Prestea branch line was ~180 (or £10 per mile).69 
~stimates for the 40 mile Accra-Hanguase line was £4,782 or £11~ per 
70 
mile. More comprehensive data however emerged during the 1920's. 
for the 82 mile Tafo-Kumasi extension (1~20-23), actual expenditure 
on completion amounted to £25,000, including a sum ot £11,000 paid 
in compensation for property acquired at the new railway station at 
Kumasi.
71 
At Takoradi, total expenditure for the acquisition of land 
72 both for the harbour and the township was £28,500. There is 
however, no information regarding the 100 mile Central Province 
Kailway. The grand total of these figures, both estimates and actual 
expenditure for the various projects, amounted to £62,000. ~ven 
allowing for underestimation and the lack of data on the Central 
Province line, it remains evident that expenditure on land did not 
constitute any significant portion of railway and harbour ca~ital 
costs. If this fugure (£02,000), is set against the £13 million 
invested in railway and harbour works, expenditure on land represents 
a mere 0.47 per cent of total expenditure. But while expenditure on 
land was thus ne 6ligible, nevertheless it accrued principally to a tiny 
elite of the African population - Chiefs and lawyers. 
CONCLUSluh 
Land allocation in the Gold Coast was constrained by the 
ambiguities of land ownership; land titles were never properly clarified 
and this affected the railways as well as all other forms of investment. 
In the formative years 01 Colonial rule, the authorities envisaged 
state appropriation of land, through which rlritish capital would 
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operate, but there was such an a~itation from 1894 over proposed l~nd 
laws that the Government was forced to retreat to becomin~ an ajudicator 
in land transactions rather than an outribht owner of land. Consequently, 
the administration was obliged to rely on the 1876 Land Act to acquire 
land for railway development. 
Not surprisingly, railway development acted as a focal point for 
broader debates, not only over Crown Land but also about urban land use 
and/or ownership. The 1876 Land Act gave enough power to the Government 
to acquire land for public work projects and therefore these debates 
or political problems did not seriously constrain the construction of 
railways and harbours. In certain districts, such as the ~astern 
~rovince, the Government took more land than in other districts, while 
in certain places, particularly at railway stations and townships, it 
actually took more land than was needed. What the 1876 Act did not 
allow was the allocation of land acquired under the Act for private 
enterprise. Thus, to the extent that t,;overIURent wanted to use the Land 
Act to assist the natural urban developments following from railway 
construction, its ability to do so was uncertain. The ill-defined legal 
situation rather tied the t,;overnment's hands in stimulating or planning 
urban development. But because of the politically sensitive nature of 
land issues in the Gold Coast, the administration was unwilling to 
introduce new legislation to give itself the necessary powers to allocate 
public land to private use. Consequently, policy had to operate 
sureptitiously: to advance Government claims and hope that nobody would 
object. When ttEy did as was the case at fakoradi, the Government had 
to compromise. 
1b6 
The 1876 Land Act did not apply outside the Colony. In Ashanti 
land for railway and urban development was acquired simply through 
force, without legislative power. ~onsequently, in Ashanti there was 
no legal backing for Government ownership of railway land - a situation 
which could conceivably create future troubles for the Kailway 
Uepartment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RAILWAY INVESTMENT AND COLONIAL FINANCIAL POLICY 
An English Ruler, who looks upon 
himself as the minister of the 
race he rules, is bound to take 
care that ••• he engages in 
nothing that will not produce 
an income sufficient to defray 
the interest on its cost. 
'The Times', July 30, 1874. 1 
The fact that railway projects are highly capital intensive 
cannot be over stressed. Until the advent of electric power, no other 
industry required such a large quantity of fixed capital per unit 
2 
of output. In addition, railways make their most useful contribution 
when hauling over long distances, which in turn means that lines need 
to be built and operated in large segments, which inevitably increases 
the initial capital outlay. Thus in the U.S.A., for instance, it is 
suggested that by 1880 the accumulated volume of capital funds invested 
in railways alone was of the same order of magnitude as that invested 
in all manufacturing industry.3 Even in the Gold Coast, the railway 
system was the most highly capitalised individual enterprise to be 
undertaken throughout the Colonial era. Thus, of the £35.3 million 
total foreign capital (both public and private) invested in the Colony 
as a whole by 1936, £13.4 million or 38 per cent was invested in 
railway and harbour projects. 4 Such a ~assive requirement for capital 
poses a problem in the mobilisation of finance. This is especially so 
because a country's first railways are likely to be built when its 
capital markets are still poorly developed. for these reasons, it is 
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assumed, that the problem of railway finance has three distinct strands: 
1. It can stimulate the development of local capital markets; or 
2. It can require the sale of railway securities abroad; or 
3. It can involve governments as sources of loans or guarantors of a 
rate of return on capital outlay. 5 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the funding of the Gold 
Coast railways and associated ports and harbours, and the implications 
for the overall financial administration of the Colony. 
In order to understand the pattern of the Gold Coast railway 
finance, it is important to appreciate the Gold Coast's Colonial 
dependence upon Britain. In other words, there is a need to locate 
the issue of railway finance within the general context of the British 
Government's attitude towards public finance in the Crown Colonies. 
Earl Gray's dictum of 1853 that, "the surest test of the soundness 
of measures for the improvement of an uncivilised people is that they 
should be self-sufficing,,,6 succinctly illustrates the crux of 
imperial financial policy towards Colonial dependencies. This was that 
money should never flow from the British Treasury into the Crown 
Colonies. This policy constituted one of the greatest contradictions 
of late nineteenth century British Imperialism. On the one hand, 
the Crown Colonies were supposed to play a dual role as both sources 
of raw materials, and markets for metropolitan manufactured goods. 
On the other hand, if they were to undertake public work projects, 
such as railways and roads, which were crucial for the fulfilment of 
these tasks, the funds were not to come from the British Government, 
but were to be raised in the market place. It is true that a Colonial 
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Loans and Stock Act, 1877 permitted Crown Colonies to issue stocks on 
the open market. Nevertheless, unlike the White Settler Dominions, 
whose stocks were admitted as Trustee Securities of the British 
Parliament, the Crown Colonies were unable to ~ompete with sovereign 
countries unless they issued their stock at a higher rate of interest. 7 
Such a situation spelt an inescapable debt trap. As Kesner points out, 
the Crown Colonies were "caught between high interest rates and 
stagnant growth and their only rational choice was to abstain from 
d .. 8 evelopment programmes. 
It was this dilemma that faced Joseph Chamberlain when he 
bacame Colonial Secretary in 1895, especially in respect of the 
finances of the West African railway proposals. One of his immediate 
actions was to attempt to divert dividends from the Suez Canal shares 
towards the establishment of a central pool from which Crown Colonies 
could borrow money for public work projects. However, the British 
Treasury was opposed to any such direct imperial assistance, because 
"any new departures in financial arrangements inevitably lead to 
. ,,9 
complications and upset compar1sons. 
But while the Treasury was unwilling to depart from its financial 
orthodoxy, broader opinion was changing. The view was now developing 
in official circles that, given the substantial capital costs 
involved in railway building, funding of the West African railway 
scheme, should be seen as activities as much for the Imperial Government 
. 10 
as for the individual Colon1es. It is however,interesting to note 
that this particular development was partly due to the special 
circumstances of surplus capital in the mid 1890's: economic recovery 
after the so-called Great Uepression (1873-1895) led to surplus capital 
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not only in the market place, but also in the Post Office Savings Bank 
and the Local Loans Funds (- both of which were administered by the 
Treasury). As Hicks Beach put it: 
••• would it not be possible to direct existing local loans 
stock to loans for Crown Colony projects and raise fresh 
stock for home loans at a lower rate of interest ••• 
Chamberlain is certain to want accommodation of this kind 
and they (Colonies) could pay good interest as compared to 
what we get here. 11 
Clearly, the Treasury wanted to kill two birds with one stone: to 
ensure the success of the proposed railway schemes, and at the same time 
resolve its domestic financial difficulties. 
It was not until 1899 that negotiations between the Treasury 
and the Colonial Office resulted in a Colonial Loans Act (1899), 
authorising the Treasury to lend money to Crown Colonies from the 
Local Loans Fund for specified public works. The Act, which was 
based on the Local Public Works Loans Law of the United Kingdom, 
provided for a lump sum of £3.3 million. That the Gold Coast was to 
be an important beneficiary from the start is demonstrated by the fact 
that £676,000 or 20 per cent of the authorised loan capital was 
k '1 l' 12 earmarked for the Sekondi-Tar wa ral way lne. 
Hardly had the Act been passed however, than the outbreak of 
the Anglo-Boer War began to hit Britain hard. Capital became much more 
difficult to obtain. The British Government now found itself issuin& 
large stocks towards the war effort, and the entire capital market 
was thrown into disarray. Not surprisingly, the Treasury announced 
that it was raising the interest rate on money borrowed under the 1899 
Act by 1 per cent, to reflect the current market rates. In addition, 
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it also stated that debt charges would constitute "first charge 
li b ' 1'" h 13 a 1 1ty on t e general revenue of the Colonies. In other words, 
capital charges under the 1899 Act were to be met directly out of Colonial 
revenues, rather than being met from revenue generated from the 
specific project on which the money was spent. 
Consequently, the Gold Coast administration decided not to 
borrow under the 1899 Act. One reason was that the decision to extend 
the Tarkwa railway by an additional 124 miles to Kumasi meant that the 
Colony would require funds far in excess of the £0.6 million provided 
for under the Loans Act. The only realistic possibility of raising the 
extra money that was needed was to go to the open market. But since 
money borrowed from the Treasury would constitute a first charge 
liability on Colonial revenues, it follows that the overall picture of 
the Colony's financial position would not be attractive to stockholders 
at the market place. For these reasons the Crown Agents' advice prevailed 
and the Gold Coast abstained from borrowing from the Treasury.14 
In the meantime, the Senior Crown Agent, Montague Ommaney had 
transferred to the Colonial Office early in 1900, to become the head 
of the West African Section. He immediately re-opened negotiations with 
the Treasury over the issue of Crown Colony finance, especially the 
finance of the West African railway projects. He now insisted upon 
obtaining some sort of British Parliamentary Guarantee for Crown Colony 
stocks, as was the case with the White Settler Dominions. Eventually 
in July 1900, this demand resulted in new legislation, the Colonial 
Stock Act (1900) (which superseded the Colonial Loans and Stock 
Act, 1877), under which Crown Colony stocks would now be admitted as 
Trustee Securities of the British Parliament. 1S Clearly, the 1900 
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legislation marked a turning point in the history of West African railway 
projects, in that the Colonies could now issue stock on the open 
market under Imperial Guarantee at the normal rate of interest, and 
still attract investors. 
How then did the Gold Coast make use of the 1900 Act to 
finance its railway and harbour works? Kay's meticulous collection of 
documents and statistics on Colonial Ghana16 must provide a convenient 
starting point for answering this question. Tables 7.1. and 7.2. give 
summaries of the trade and financial returns of the Gold Coast between 
1900 and 1930. From these statistics, Kay argued that total expenditure 
during the period under consideration amounted to over £60 million, of 
which nearly £33 million, or about 55 per cent was allocated to non-
recurrent items, including the administrative, social and economic 
infrastructure of the Colony. The last, which affected the development 
of the economy most directly consisted mainly of expenditure on 
railways and harbours and accounted for just over £13 million,or about 
20 per cent of total expenditure during the three decades of 1899-1929. 
During the same 30 years, Kay further argued, the Colonial government 
borrowed almost the same amount in London which was largely spent on 
the railway and harbour projects. 
Kay's observation that the Colonial government financed its 
railway and harbour projects differently from other items (i.e. by 
borrowing rather than out of general revenue), and his explanation 
that the policy ensured the safety of British financial interests is 
apt, but as Table 3 below suggests, the methods of financing the Gold 
Coast railway projects were much more complex than he had observed. 
Table 7.1 
~xternal Trade and Colonial Government Revenue and Expenditure 1900-29 (5 year averages) (£OOQ) 
Year Value Colonial 1. of d.evenue Colonial Recurrent 
of Trade Revenue from indirect Government Expenditure 
, taxes on trade Expenditure as i. of total i 
I Expenditure 
I 
11900-04 3,202 530 67 878 46 
11905-09 4,289 702 59 629 78 
11910-14 8,382 1,197 60 1,093 65 , 
11,702 1,173 59 1,262 78 11915-19 
11920-25 18,796 3,392 I 
59 3,986 56 
1925-29 23,993 3,983 66 4,331 58 
I i I i 
Source: Kay, Political Economy of Colonialism, 27 
Table 7.2 
LQan Works Expenditure, 1900-30 (£OOOs) (5 year averages). 
\ i{ailways I Harbours I Water Works 
11900-04 362 - -
11905-09 60 30 -
1910-14 74 51 77 
i1915-19 56 24 17 
I 
:1920-24 835 249 -
\1925-29 264 413 - I 
I 
Source: Kay, Political Economy of Colonialism, 
375. 
Development 
Expenditure 
as a 7. of· total 
Expenditure 
I 41 
, 14 
I 
! 18 
8 
32 
: 28 I I 
! 
I 
..... 
-....I 
-....I 
Table 7.3., which shows the statement of the Gold Coast 
Public Debt between 1900 and 1930, conspicuously indicates that 
although the administration financed its railway and harbour works 
through loans raised on the London market, in practice, such loans 
were never raised until the project for which they were originally 
authorised was either completed or nearing completion. For instance, 
the construction of the Sekondi-Tarkwa-Kumasi railway which started in 
1898. was completed by 1903, but it was not until 1902-3 that loans 
were raised to pay for their cost. Similarly, the Accra-Mangpase railway 
project and the lighterage harbour schemes were authorised as early as 
1905, and work started on them in 1906: yet it was not until 1909, that 
stocks were issued to cover their costs, (i.e. only a year prior to 
the completion of the line to Mangoase). Furthermore, between 1910 
and 1915, the Accra Railway was extended from Mangoase for an 
additional 30 miles to Tafo, and large scale harbour improvements 
carried out at Accra and Sekondi. However, loans to cover these works 
which were authorised as early as 1910 were never raised until 
1914, at a time when the projects had been completed. Finally, in 
1919, a loan of £6 million was approved as part of the Guggisberg Ten 
Year Development Programme, £4 million of which was raised in 1920. The 
1919 Ordinance was superceded by another one in 1922, which also 
provided for raising a further loan of £4.5 million to be expended on 
the on-going projects. However, it was not until 1925, (i.e. two 
years prior to the completion of the works) that the loan was actually 
raised. The question therefore re-emerges as to how exactly the Gold 
Coast administration paid for its railway and harbour projects, at 
least during the gestation periods of such worksi 
Table 7.3 
Statement of Public Debts, 1900-1930 
Public To whom Mte of Ordinance under which and Project Date of Date of 
Debt Due Interest for which expenditure Commencement Completion 
originally authorised of Project of Project 
'i 607,716 Imperial Nil 1896-1900 on account of Ashanti 1896 1900 
Government Wars. 
:t.l,035,000 Stoc:":10lder~ 31. Ordinance No 6 of 1898 and No 10 1898 1903 
I 
",/ 
of 1900 for Sekondi-Tarkwa-Kumasi 
I line. 
~ 63,000 
" J I. Ordinance No 14 of 1902 for / 
'" 
Kumasi extension. 1)00 
£.1,030,000 I V 3~'l. 1 Ordinance No 4 of 1905 for Accra 1906 1911 , 
\ 
I Railway. 
I 
~1,035,000 I / 4" Ordinance No 6 of 1910 for Tafo 1910 1914 I. 
I \ Extension and harbour Works. 
F4,QQQ.QQQ I V 61. urdinance No 21 of 1919 for 1919 1927 I I 
I Milway and Takoradi t1..Hoour 
~4,628,000 J 4/. Ordinance of 1922 for Milway and / / Takoradi darbour 
-
Sources: Government Gazettes and Treasury Reportso 
Notes: There were no public debts prior to the commencement of railway construction. 
Date Loan 
Actually 
Raised 
1896-1900 
1902 
1903 
1909 
1914 
1920 
1925 I I 
I 
~ 
........ 
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One of the earliest sources of finance for railway projects was 
short term advances from Lending Banks. fhis was mainly made possible 
through the financial expertise of the Crown Agents. As Uumett points 
out, the Crown Agents functioned as part of the City's system, and 
besides they maintained large deposit accounts with the major lending 
17 banks. Thus, pending the outcome of the freasury-Colonial Office 
negotiations (1895-1900) the Agents approached two of their financiers, 
the Bank of England and the London and Westminster Bank, for short 
term advances, so as to ensure the continuity of the railway projects. 
By the time the "pioneer" western line was completed to Kumasi in 1903, 
such advances had totalled £754,00018 or 43 per cent of the total 
cost of construction (- ~1.7 million). 
Another important source of finance at this time was the Colony's 
own accumulated surplus funds. fhe maintenance of accumulated reserve 
funds by the Colonial dependencies in London had always been a cardinal 
part of the Colonial Office's fiscal administration of the Colonies. 
By 1895, the Gold Coast' s reserve funds held by the Crown l\gents totalled 
£152,000. 19 Indeed, when Chamberlain first authorised the West African 
railway projects in 1895, it was from such surplus balances that he 
asked the Colonial administrations to advance funds towards the preliminary 
works. By 1903 expenditure from the Colonial surplus fund upon the Sekondi-
d to L'702,33320 40 f th '1 • Kumasi railway had amounte ~ or per cent 0 e ral way s 
total capital outlay. Both the surplus fund and the Bank advances were 
then repaid immediately after the issue of the first vold Coast stocks 
in 1902-3. 
Despite the essentially ad hoc nature of railway finance during 
this initial period, the practice ot advancing money from surplus Colonial 
funds towards railway construction soon became the norm. One reason 
was that the 1900 Loans Act, like the ill-fated Treasury legislation 
of 1899, stipulated that capital charges were to constitute first charge 
liability on general Colonial revenues. The implication was clear: 
loans would not be raised unless the Colony's financial position was 
such that it could discharge the debt obligations irrespective of the 
outcome of the investment. Thus in 1904 when Governor Rodger submitted 
proposals for further loans for the building of the eastern line, 
London's reaction was to remind him of his Colony's financial 
responsibilitieso 
First, he was reminded that the Colony owed the Imperial 
Government a sum of £607,716 as a result of the recent Ashanti wars 
and this was expected to be redeemed in full at the earliest sign of 
improved revenues. Second, the Colony had for the first time incurred 
public debts amounting to £It million as a result of the Sekondi-
Kumasi line, the debt charges of which were to be provided out of 
annual revenue. Finally, the Governor was reminded that Colonial 
budgets should consistently show surplus revenue over expenditure in 
21 
addition to rebuilding accumulated surplus funds. 
In response the local administration had to curtain 
expenditure on other sectors of the economy. For instance, it 
relinquished responsibility for the experimental cotton farms at 
Labolabo and Tamale - despite protests from the Empire Cotton Growing 
Association. 22 In addition, it raised customs duties on consumer 
items such as kerosene.cotton goods, spirits, tobacco, etc. Thus 
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Africans, who were the principal consumers of such imported goods, 
were the first to feel the pinch caused by the pressures of railway 
finance. 
Consequently, the Gold Coast was able to maintain a "balanced 
budget" between 1906 through to the 1920's, and thereby contributed 
substantially towards the costs of its railway and harbour works. 
(Table 7.4 provides data on the Colonial Government's annual 
revenue and expenditure accounts as well as contributions from surplus 
funds towards railway and harbour works, while Table 7.5 indicates 
Government expenditure on such projects). Out of the total of £13.7 
million invested in the Gold Coast railways and associated ports and 
harbours, (including Water works, which formed an integral part of the 
railway system), by 1927, no less than £5.8 million or 49.8 per cent 
had been advanced out of accumulated surplus balance - (though these 
were ~'P~~ once loans were raised on the capital market).{l'able 7.4 l.ol.U). 
In addition to the advances from surplus funds the Gold Coast 
Treasury also made annual expenditures from current revenue towards 
the capital improvement of the railways and harbours. These were not 
repaid from capital market loans but were consolidated into "Government 
Loans", as distinct from "Foreign Loans". (Table 7.5.). As noted in 
Part I of the thesis, shoddy construction and defective works were 
commonplace. The railways and ports were constructed by British 
Engineers who were more interested in making handsome fortunes than in 
good workmanship. tloreover, under the departmental system of construction 
and indeed, the Murphy and McAlpine contracts, the engineers had no 
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Year 
~901 
~902 
11903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
Total 
A 
£ 
B 
£ 
Annual Annual 
Revenue Expenditure 
693,893 469,459 
511,502 547,607 
577,552 593,956 
6820193 622,376 
586,221 616,118 
683,101 628,906 
708,718 617,124 
752,141 687,292 
778,552 734,637 
1,006,633 924,862 
1,111,632 914,500 
1,230,850 1,157,091 
1,301,566 1,353,291 
1,331,713 1,755,830 
1,456,130 1,627,015 
1,835,989 1,465,946 
1,624,124 1,424,297 
1,298,674 1,369,486 
2,601,360 1,78~170 
3,721,772 2,856,347 
3,016,520 3,285,290 
3,357,196 2,934,994 
3,472,834 4,105,938 
3,971,187 4,632,633 
5,871,556 5,871,556 
4,365,321 4,365,321 
C 
£ 
Accumulated 
Surplus 
Balance 
307,265 
328,314 
302,162 
355,380 
na 
386,277 
477,871 
542.721 
586,906 
668,677 
865,809 
939,568 
887,843 
463,707 
292,822 
662,865 
na 
na 
1,612,087 
2,477,512 
1,901,786 
na 
1,877,237 
2,493,668 
2,026,634 
2,287,869 
D 
£ 
Advances Made 
from surplus 
balance for 
Loan Work 
(Repaid on raising 
of loans) 
142,001 
292,149 
-
268,183 
na 
-
382,248 
442,875 
. 318,117 
590,117 
734,440 
-
-
-
-
-
na 
na 
-
471,692 
473,232 
na 
950,814 
804,300 
-
-
£5,872,046 
Sources: Gold Coast, Treasury ~eports, 1901-1926-27. 
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fable 7.5 
Government Expenditure on Loan Works 
£ £ £ 
Project "F . Loan" "Government Loan , Total orel.gn 
Railways 8,349,321 1,201,327 9,550,559 
Takoradi Harbour 3,090,399 588 3,090,987 
pthers (Water works) 351,280 776,185 1,127,465 
l'Oft\L 11,7)1, UUO 1,978,100 13,769,011 
Source: Gold Coast, Treasury keports, 1901-1929 
responsibility for costs, particularly materials. Consequently, they 
had little incentive to economise. Thus, building proceeded carelessly, 
and where works were defective they were merely repaired and nobody was 
made accountable. It is therefore not surprising that the Kailways 
Department made endless demands on the local Treasury for capital 
improvements as distinct from maintenance. Indeed, "capital improvements" 
were still being carried out on the "pioneer" western line during the 
First World War23 - that is, more than a decade after it had been 
opened to the public. By 1929, this "extra-ordinary capital expenditure" 
on railways and harbours had totalled £1.9 million or 14.3 per cent 
of the gross capital outlay.(lable 7.J) 
If the 49 per cent advanced from surplus funds is added to the 
14 per cent capital improvements, then it becomes clear that up to 
65 per cent of the capital cost of the Gold Coast railways and harbours 
was provided from the Colony's own resources - (though the former 
was ~c1). 
One significant result of funding a substantial portion of 
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the transportation system, (especially during their gestation periods), 
from the Colony's own resources was to mitigate against the possibility 
of heavy external debt charges. As noted, the Colonial Stock Act 
(1900) obliged the Colonial Administration to make capital charge 
payments - interest and sinking fvnd (the latter for the amortization 
of the loan) - directly out of general revenue. In fact, it was to be 
a first charge liability. In an economy like that of the Gold Coast 
whose backbone - raw material exports - was subject to considerable 
fluctuations in world markets, heavy external debt burdens can exert 
strains, especially during periods of recession. In the Gold Coast 
this was not the case - at least not before 1929. Hailway and harbour 
investment did create acute balance of payments problems during periods 
of relatively intensive construction (Table 7.6. Column C). Nevertheless, 
external debt charges remained relatively low. By 1929, The Gold Coast's 
total annual external debt payments (both interest and sinking fund) had 
amounted to nearly £0.7 million. When this figure is set against the 
£13.8 million which was the value of the Gold Coast's gross domestic 
exports for that year, it becomes clear that external debt charges 
amounted to less than 6 per cent of domestic exports in 1929. Indeed, 
other than the year 1925-6 when the proportion was 6.37 per cent, 
they had always been below or around 5 per cent. (Table 7.6. Column E). 
Furthermore, only one of the railway lines - (the Central Province line) 
_ failed to pay its way from the beginning. All the others yielded 
handsome profits (See Chapter 9). In short, the ~chnique of advancing 
money from surplus funds towards railway and harbour projects during 
their gestation periods, together with the general profitability of the 
railways themselves, meant that British capital investment in the Gold 
1/:)0 
Table 7.6 
Imports, Exports and the Balance of Visible Trade, 1892-1929 (£OOOs) 
A B C D E. 
Year Imports Exports Balance of visible External U as i. of 
trade l)ebt Charges B 
1892 597 665 ·68 nil nil 
1894 812 850 38 nil nil 
1896 910 792 -118 nil nil 
1898 1,101 992 -109 nil nil 
1900 1,283 885 -398 nil nil 
1901 1,795 560 -1,235 nil nil 
1902 2,120 774 -1,346 nil nil 
1903 2,082 980 -1,102 43 4.48 
1904 2,001 1,340 - 661 43 3.21 
1905 1,486 1,646 160 43 2.61 
1906 2,058 1,996 -62 43 2.15 
1907 2,366 2,641 275 43 1.63 
1908 2,029 2,525 496 43 1.71 
1909 2,394 2,655 261 90 3.38 
1910 3,439 2,697 -742 90 3.34 
1911 3,874 3,792 -82 90 2.37 
1912 4,023 4,307 284 90 2.08 
1913 4,952 5,427 475 90 1.66 
1914 4,456 4,942 486 142 2.87 
1915 4,509 5,943 1434 142 2.39 
1916 5,999 5,816 -183 142 2.44 
1917 3,386 6,364 2,978 142 2.23 
1918 3,256 4,472 1,216 142 3.17 
1919 7,946 10,814 2,868 142 1.31 
1920 15,152 12,352 -2,800 407 3.29 
1921-22 7,661 6,942 -719 407 5.86 
1922-23 7,900 8,335 435 407 4.88 
1923-24 8,448 8,959 511 407 4.54 
1924-25 8,315 9,914 1,599 407 4.11 
1925-26 9,782 10,890 1,108 694 6.37 
1926-27 10,285 12,104 1,819 694 5.73 
1927-28 13,770 14,350 580 694 4.87 
1928-29 12,200 13,824 1,624 694 5.02 
Sources: 1892-1900: Gold Coast, Blue Books for relevant years; 1901-1928-
29: Gold Coast Treasury Keports for the for the various years. 
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Coast railways and harbours did not place heavy external burdens upon the 
financial resources of the Colony. 
However, dependence on surplus revenue for railway finance 
was not without its negative impact on general public finance. In the 
first place it could be argued that the stringent financial caution may 
have deprived the Colony of additional railway investment in areas still 
deficient in modern forms of transport - (though general labour shortages 
were also to blame for this). (See Chapter 4). Much more important 
however, is the Colonial administration's low levels of expenditure on 
other sectors of the economy. Table 7.7 shows that apart from the relatively 
high level of expenditure on "Law and Order" (which was crucial to the 
survival of the Colonial State itself) "social" or "welfare" spending 
for example, was very low. Thus in 1920, it was estimated that about 
28,000 pupils or 1.1 per cent of the Gold Coast's population were in 
primary schools, while 58,000 patients or 1 per cent of the total 
. l' b . d' h . 1 24 popu at10n were e1ng treate 1n osp1ta s. The low priority accorded 
to education and public health at this time was probably unavoidable 
given that in developing an economy, expenditure on economic sectors 
should take first priority - to create the income and wealth which can 
then be used for welfare purposes. Nevertheless, the priority given to 
railway and harbour investment failed to be accompanied by a corresponding 
promotion of other economic sectors, more especially agriculture. In 
an essentially agrarian economy, one might have expected considerable 
official attention to "rural development" - but the Gold Coast administration 
spent relatively little on this. Expenditure on agriculture and forestry 
protection for instance, amounted to a mere 1.5 per cent of the total 
annual government spending on the average, during the three decades 
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Table 7.7. 
Gove rnment Expendi ture 0 n "Law and Order", "Welfare" and Agricul ture 
and Forestry Protection (5 year averages) (£OOOs) 
A B C D 
Year Total Exp. on B as /. E.xp. on C as Exp. on 1) as 
Expenditure Uefence of A Social '/. of Agric. & 'I. of 
Police Services A Forestry A 
& Law (Health 
<5 Education) 
1900-04 874 291 33 35 4 3 1 
1905-09 629 268 43 49 8 7 1 
1910-14 1094 369 34 103 9 17 2 
1915-19 1263 456 36 142~ 11 33 3 
1920-24 3985 463 12 138 3 58 1 
1925-29 4331 626 14 279 6 40 1 
Source: Gold Coast, Treasury Keports, 1900-1929. 
before 1929. Indeed, as previously noted, the authorities had to 
abandon their cotton experimental farms in 1905 in order to maintain an 
excess of revenue over expenditure. As Green and Hymer point out, the 
administrati~n's efforts to promote technical progress and increased 
productivity in agriculture were few, hesitant and mainly misdirected. 25 
Not surprisingly, when cocoa farms in the easteun districts for instance 
were severely struck by swollen-shoot disease in the late 1930's 
the authorities had nothing to suggest but cutting out infected trees. 26 
But if railway investment acted as a constraint on overall 
public finance, could the Colony have raised alternative resources to 
provide these facilities? This then brings us to the question of 
taxation. Ever since Governor Hill's abortive Poll Tax of 1852, Gold 
Coast administrators had always considered direct taxation as a politically 
. i' 27 sens1t ve 1ssue. This was more so because Colonial rule, by its 
very nature lacked "legitimacy" in the eyes of the colonised. In the 
lb9 
Gold Coast, spokesmen for the African communities (chiefs and 
lawyers) upon whom the Colonial authorities relied for the implementation 
of policy, were always quick to point out the contradiction of "taxation 
. h . ,,28 W1t out representat10n. Thus in 1896 when the new Governor, Sir 
William Maxwell drafted a Hut Tax Bill which purported to impose a tax 
of 10 shillings per hut or household, his deputy, Hodgson was quick to 
point out the security dangers inherent in such a course. Hodgson 
wrote: 
Even with the employment of force the full collection of the 
tax will remain doubtful, and the question arises therefore 
whether in order to collect say £70,000 it is worth while 
to stir up the country and create an interference with trade. 29 
Consequently, the authorities retreated to the less radical position of 
the indirect taxation of exports and imports trades. (see table 7.8). 
While the Colonial Administration was willing to impose indirect 
taxes on Africans, who were the principal consumers of imported goods 
and producers of cocoa exports, the expatriate mining and trading 
firms were by contrast, to a large extent, exempted from taxation. The 
mining companies did pay royalties, but by 1929, such payments amounted 
to £38,000 or about 1 per cent of total government revenue. The 
Merchant Houses did not pay any income tax or profit tax at all. Such 
taxes were paid in the U.K.o The White Settler Dominions, unlike 
the Crown Colonies, received one-half of the income tax derived from 
British firms operating in their territories. In 1921, Governor 
Guggisberg wanted such a concession granted to the Gold Coast in order 
,,30 
to "open a new lucrative source of revenue for public works. He 
argued that not only did the Colony derive no revenue from the operations 
Table 7.8 
Indirect Taxes/Direct Taxes (£OOOs) 
Date Total Import Export Other Koyalties Profit Mineral 
1{evenue JJuties Uuties Items Tax Duty 
1900 385 281 
- - 1 - -1901 496 351 
- - 7 
- -1902 512 382 
- - 3 - -1903 578 370 
- -
2 
- -1904 682 384 
- -
5 
- -1905 586 334 
- - -
- -1906 683 386 
- - 9 - -1907 709 414 
- -
18 
- -1908 752 490 
-
-
15 
- -1909 779 459 
- - 22 - -1910 1,007 611 
- - 18 - -1911 1,112 663 
- - 25 
- -1912 1,231 736 
- -
28 
- -1913 1,302 780 
- - 25 - -1914 1,332 769 
- - 24 - -1915 1,456 828 
- - 26 
- -1916 1,886 1,150 32 
-
17 
- -1917 1,624 683 211 
- 24 
- -1918 1,299 489 131 
- 28 - -1919 2,601 1,253 419 
-
21 
- -
1920 3,722 1,711 571 
- 23 
- -1921-22 3,016 979 798 
- 24 
- -1922-23 3,357 1,494 541 
-
20 
- -1923-24 3,743 1,682 473 
- 18 - -1924-25 3,971 2,000 283 
-
23 
- -1925-26 4,116 2,165 274 
- 41 
- -1926-27 4,365 2,075 318 16 31 
- -
1927-28 4,112 2,890 272 19 41 
- -
1928-29 3,914 2,264 321 18 38 
- -
Source: Gold Coast, Treasury Reports, 1900-1928-29. 
of British firms, but more importantly, non-British expatriate companies 
were also exempted from taxation. Although the Colonial Office conceded 
that profits earned in the Colony should be ideally subject to income 
tax, it turned down Guggisberg's proposal on the grounds that it, "will 
h f T ,,31 diminis returns 0 the United Kingdom Income ax. Clearly, one 
perceives a conflict of interests between the Colony and mother country, 
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and the Colonial Office decided to subordinate the needs of the local 
Treasury to that of the metropolitan. In short, given the constraints 
on its revenues, the government of the Gold Coast could not finance 
transport infrastructure and other services desirable from both an 
economic and social standpoint. It elected to give priority to 
railways and harbours. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the Gold Coast railways were owned by the 
Colonial Administration meant that issues relating to their finance were 
inextricably intertwined with the broader issues of Crown Colony financial 
policy. Constrained by narrow revenue bases and prospects of high 
interest rates, the Crown Colonies at the end of the nineteenth century 
were unable to pursue development projects on their own accord. Joseph 
Chamberlain tried to redress this imbalance by asking for direct 
imperial financial assistance to Crown Colony public work projects, 
including the West African railways, though he was only able to obtain 
Parliamentary Guarantees for Crown Colony Loans which placed them on the 
same status as the Settler Oominions. 
However, the 1900 Colonial Stock Act marked a significant 
turning point for the West African railway projects because it allowed 
the Colonies to borrow money from the market place under Imperial Guarantee 
at the normal rate of interest. But this Act was still very conservative 
and operated under extreme caution mainly because of the controls exerted 
by the Colonial Office to ensure that the Government Guarantee would not 
have to be called upon. So the Colonial Office consistently insisted 
that Colonial budgets remain in surplus, not only as a means of advancins 
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money towards the building of the railways, but also as a security for 
the Colony's financial obligations in general. 
Con~equently, a large portion of the funds needed for the 
building of the Gold Coast railway system and associated harbours had 
to be advanced from the Colony's own resources pending borrowing from 
the London money market. Although such a policy may have prevented 
heavy external obligations as a result of open market borrowing, because 
such loans were never really raised until the projects were about to 
start yielding revenue, they nevertheless acted as a constraint on 
the Colonial Administration's activities in other sectors of the 
economy. Thus, the Colony was only able to build a mere 500 mile 
railway network, which was confined to a small part of the country. 
More importantly, although on the whole, the financial situation at 
the time may have seemed to be very stable and sound, the lack of 
"rural development", in an essentially agrarian economy, may not have 
augeroo well for the future - although this question is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
193 
NOl'f:.S 1'0 CHAP U:'l{ 7 
1. Quoted in Allan McPhee, The Economic Kevolution in West Africa 
(London, 1926), 208. 
2. M. Abramovitz, liThe Economic Characteristics of H.ailroads and 
the Problem of Economic Development", far Eastern ~uarterly, 14 
(1954-55), 169-178. 
3. Ibid, M.J. Ulmer, "Trends and Cycles in Capital Formation by United 
States Railroads, 1870-1950", National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Occasional Paper 43 (1954). 
4. S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (London, 1938), 160. 
5. Abramovitz, "Economic Characteristics of Railroads." 
6. Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord Russell's Administration, 
(London, 1853), 281. 
7. The first public loan to be raised by Sierra Leone under the 1877 Act 
was issued at 6 per cent interest but it failed to attract buyers. 
See Hemming's Minute to Lord Knutsford, 12 October 1889, c.o. Print, 
Africa No. 464. 
8. R.M. Kesner, Economic Control and Colonial Development: Crown 
Colony Financial tlanagement in the Age of Joseph Chamberlain, 
(London, 1982), 293. 
9. Sir Edward Hamilton to Colonial Office on Suez Canal Shares Scheme, 
14 September, 1895, P.R.O: c.o. Print, Africa No. 464. 
10. Hamilton to Colonial Office, 10 October, 1895, P.K.O: c.o. Print 
Africa No. 464. 
11. See Hicks Beach's minute to Hamilton, 16 October, 1895, quoted in 
Kesner, Economic Control and Colonial Development, 76. 
12. See Crown Agent's minute, 14 December 1899, on the Colonial Loans 
Act, 1899, P.R.O: Africa Confidential Print, No 563. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Crown Agents to Colonial Office, 27 Narch, 1902, P.R.O: c.o. 96/400. 
16. G.B. Kay The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, (London, 
1972). 
17. R.E. Dumett, "Joseph Chamberlain, Imperial finance, and Kailway 
114 
Policy in British West Africa in Late Nineteenth Centuri', English 
Historical Review, 90, (1975), 287-321. 
18. Crown Agents to Colonial Office on Statement of Railway Accounts, 
April 1903, P.R.O: c.o. 96/~00. 
19. Colonial Office Ninute, 25 June 1895, P.R.O, c.o. Print, Africa 
No 464. 
20. Crown Agents, April 1903, P.K.O: c.o. 96/400. 
21. Governor's despatch on the Gold Coast's financial position, 
10 January 1905, P.R.O: c.o. 96/427. 
22. Governor to Secretary of State and copied to British Cotton 
Growing Association, 29 November 1905, P.R.O: c.o. 96/433. 
23. General Nanager, Railway Oepartment Report, 1916, 17-18. 
24. See Guggisberg's despatch on the state of Public Health and Native 
Education to the Secretary of State, 16 April 1921, P.R.O: c.o. 
96/623. 
25. R.H. Green and S.H. Hymer, "Cocoa in the Gold Coast: a study in 
the relations between African farmers and agricultural experts", 
Journal of Economic History, XXVI, (1966). 
26. Ibid.; see also Kay, Political Economy of Colonialism, 12-13. 
27. C~vid Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, (Oxford 
1963), 168-191. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Governor to Secretary of State, 18 April 1896, P.R.O, 96/314. 
30. Governor to Secretary of State, 18 February 1921, P.R.O: 
c.o. 96/623. 
31. See H. Bushe's minute on Guggisberg's proposal, Colonial Office 
22 March 1921, P.R.O: c.o. 96/623. 
195 
CHAP fE.K 8 
THE NANAGENENT SYSTEM, PEKSONNEL AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
The difficulty of organising and administering a new 
railway system such as that of the Gold Coast cannot be overstated. 
In both the United States of America and Britain it has been observed 
that because of the size and complex needs of safety and efficiency, 
the railway systems completed by the mid nineteenth century were 
forced to pioneer new techniques of modern corporate management. 
Consequently, by the turn of the century, the main features of 
present day railway management had in general been established. 
This included the separation of the main functional departments 
of accounting, traffic, locomotive, and maintenance of line one from 
the other as well as the division of rail networks into a number of 
sections. 1 The ultimate management of a British railway company 
for instance, was entrusted to a board of directors elected by the 
shareholders, with a Chairman whose function was to control the 
general policy and finance of the company. The day-to-day 
administration of the railway however, was the prerogative of a 
General Manager who also co-ordinated the activities of the heads 
2 
of the various functional departments. 
In the Gold Coast where neither large scale commercial 
or industrial enterprises, nor the skills of managing such enterprises 
existed around the turn of the century, it proved necessary to import 
the management structure and the skills to administer it from 
19b 
Britain. But as Miller has pointed out in respect of Latin American 
Railways, to introduce modern administrative practices into a less -
developed country did not inevitably mean that the management itself 
ld b ff " 3 wou e e 1C1ent. This chapter will examine the management of the 
railways by focussing on the administrative structure, the recruitment 
and training of personnel and the conduct of labour relations. 
THE AlJl1INISTRATIVE STRUCTURE Of THE RAlLWAYS: 
Uiagram I shows both the hierarchical administrative 
arrangements and the functional organisation of the Gold Coast railways. 
UIAGt{Al1 I 
Secretary of State Crown Agents 'nsulting Engineers 
Locomotive 
Superintendent 
~ ________ 4Legislative Council 
Naintenance 
Superintendent' 
Nanager 
Traffic 
Superintendent 
Accountant ( 
Following the British model, a centralised and functionally-departmentalised 
structure was established. However, given that the Gold Coast 
!~ilways were publicly owned, the upper tier of decision-taking was 
not the Chairman and board of directors to be found in a British 
Joint Stock railway company. Instead, final responsibility lay with 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was expected to outline 
broad managerial, technical and financial goals. In practice, much of the 
general policy making originated from the Governor, as representative of 
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the Secretary of State. In carrying out this function, both the Governor 
and the Secretary of State relied on the Crown Agents and the Consulting 
Engineers for commercial, financial and technical advice. But although 
the role of the Crown Agents was advisory, in practice because of their 
wide experience in commercial operations for the Crown Colonies, their 
opinion was crucial in such important railway matters as rates, and 
recruitment of skilled labour. In their combined role, the Secretary 
of State, the Governor, the Crown Agents and the Consulting ~ngineers 
performed the functions normally carried out by the board of directors 
of a British railway company. The day-to-day management of the railways 
was closer to the British railway company model in that a General 
Nanager co-ordinated the activities of the four main functional 
departments of Locomotive,Maintenance,Traffic, and Accounts. These had 
their headquarters at Sekondi. As the Railway Department operated as one 
of the several branches of the Colonial Civil Service, the entire labour 
force, including management, were considered to be public servants and 
therefore directly responsible to the Governor. 
There were certain inherent weaknesses in the administrative 
arrangements. One such weakness concerns the difficulty in the flow 
of information. In the early days, when communications between Africa 
and Europe were still poorly developed, the system was not conducive to 
the smooth running of the railways because the General Manager, Governor, 
Secretary of State, Crown Agents and Consulting Engineers were not only 
geographically separated one from the other, but institutionally too they 
operated as distinct entities. Policy proposals emanating from the 
General Hanager at Sekondi for instance, took weeks to arrive at the 
seat of the Colonial Government in Accra. Despatches from the Governor 
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could take months to reach the Secretary of State in London, who as a 
matter of course, referred such matters to the Crown Agents. They in 
turn obtained the professional advice of the Consulting Engineers after 
which recommendations were submitted to the Secretary of State for 
approval. After approval, the proposal went back to the Governor who 
then passed a bill thcough the Legislative Council to give the policy 
a legal backing. The whole cumbersome system was vulnerable to delays and 
inefficiency, but as Chandler has aptly pointed out: ~the safety and, 
indeed the lives of passengers depended on continuous effective decision-
4 
making." The fact that the Gold Coast railways possessed no such 
attribute which was crucial to the successful administration of the 
system, was clearly demonstrated in 1~04. In that year, an ihquiry by the 
General Manager of the Railways as to the suitability of wood fuel for 
the locomotives took no less than six months to reach the attention of 
the Crown Agents and the Consulting Engineers. Their advice was that 
the locomotives should first be provided with spark-boxes and fire-
arresters, and that the suitable type of wood, usually mangrove, should 
be cut and properly dried before being used. In the interim, the 
Railways had started burning wood, incidentally of the wrong type, and 
without first adapting the locomotives to its use. Consequently, there 
were several accidents due to engine failures and a general deterioration 
. he 1 . 5 1n t ocomot1ves. One solution to the problem was to circumvent the 
bureaucratic line of communication by allowing the General Manager 
to deal directly with the Consulting Engineers on purely technical 
6 
matters. In addition, with the improvements in tretelegraph, steamship 
and mail services during the first decade of the century, the chronic 
7 
delays in the flow of information had been largely alleviated. 
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But a more fundamental problem, which ~as to remain throughout 
the period under review, was that of managerial autonomy in railway 
administration. Because the Kailway Uepartment was an integral part of 
the bureaucracy, its administration was centralised in the hands of the 
Colonial Government. Thus the 1898 Ordinance which formed the basis 
for railway administration clearly stated that by-laHs and railway 
regulations were the prerogative of the Governor with the consent of the 
Legislative Council. Such regulations were to be subject to the 
I f h S fS f h Cl ' 8 approva 0 t e ecretary 0 tate or teo on1es. Hence, there was 
little scope for decentralisation. But as we have already argued, 
railway operation demanded prompt and efficient decision-making which 
in its turn required a fairly high degree of managerial autonomy. Not 
surprisingly, a report on the railways in 1906 attributed some of the 
operational problems to "the inexperience of Government in railway matters 
k 1 
,,9 
and a tendency to eep a somewhat tight lwnd on the Genera I'lanagers. 
The Governor accepted the report's recommendation that the 1898 Ordinance 
be amended so as to give the General llanager potvers to make certain 
by-latvs l'1hich tvere to be subject to the approval of the Government. But 
he rejected any predisposition towards autonomy in such matters as 
railway rates and financial administration because: 
The legislative Council is clearly the proper authority for 
dealing with the financial policy of a railway the interest on 
the loan for the construction 0fOwhich is provided out of 
general revenues of the Colony. 
There He re thus two main a reas of clisagreemen t be t\,'een I:ai lwa)' tlanagemen t 
at Sekondi on the one hand, and Colonial Officials in :'~ccra and/or London 
on the other hand. The first, (the detailed discussion of which is 
deferred to the rExt Chapter) concerned railway rates. Because the 
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General ~lanager lacked control over tariff policy, and because such 
issues were effectively decided either in Accra and/or London, the 
expatriate mining lobby, it will be shown, were able, through the 
Colonial Office, to influence rates in their own interest. The result 
was that "uneconomic rates" were imposed on the iJepartment. Second, 
because the Colonial Loans Act 1900, under which the Colony borrowed 
money to build the lines made interest and sinking funds chargeable 
directly on Colonial revenues, the railways did not keep a separate 
account from that of the central government. Thus the Colonial 
Treasury both provided funds for railway maintenance, capital developments 
as well as debt charges and also reaped any profits. J~ noted (see Chap. ~), 
the railways produced excess revenue over expenditure throughout the 
period under review. Consequently, the question as to who controls 
railway surplus revenue became a major bone of contention. Naturally, 
management demanded a greater say in the allocation of such profits. 
As early as 1905, the General Uanager called for the creation 
of a Railway Renewals Fund into which any surplus revenue was to be 
credited but the Governor rejected the proposal because: "so long 
as anything stands to its credit, it will be a strong temptation to the 
d d " .. 11 ~ailway Authorities to carry out unnecessary an extravagant expen lture. 
Instead, the Department was asked to submit ad hoc estimates for capital 
improvement. However, the ability of the Colonial Treasury to meet any 
such demands was dependent on both the financial position of the Colony 
as well as the priorities of the Government. Consequently, successive 
Kailway Annual Keports reiterated that nothing short of an independent 
denewals Fund and/or total separation of Railway Accounts from that of 
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the Colonial Treasury would ensure that current and future needs of the 
railways were adequately provided for. It was argued, for instance, 
that in other Colonies, such as the Federated Ualay States and 
Ceylon, where Government railways produced significant profits, such 
surplus funds were not only employed in improving existing lines, but were 
also largely responsible for major extensions of the networks. In the 
Gold Coast on the other hand, it was argued, net revenues were as high 
as 9.01 per cent by 1910, but railway buildings still remained the 
original temporary structures used for construction labour.12 Hence, 
the implication was that, lack of managerial control over railway 
finances impaired improvements in the system. Such a situation would 
suggest that Colonial Officials tended to brush management's demands for 
improvements under the carpet. The railways seemed to them to be doing 
perfectly well so long as they continued to make profits. It is however, 
imperative that any such s\veeping assumptions must be treated with caution. 
First, although financial policy was centralised in the Colonial 
Government, the General Nanager had always been considered a senior 
member of the Executive Council which advised the Governor. Consequently, 
the railway administration was not entirely voiceless. Second, it 
would also seem that the railway management, at least in the early days, 
complained about their lack of power whilst at the same time did little 
in the form of practical proposals for improvement. This is illustrated 
by the fact that although the Colonial Office approved a sum of £12,800 
in 1911 for capital improvements, especially the relaying of the western 
13 track, nothing immediately came of it and later on management blamed 
the delay on the outbreak of War. It appears therefore that on occasions, 
management simply used the issue of railway finance as a convenient 
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weapon in its struggle for overall autonomy in railway administration. 
Nonetheless, the system may not only have discouraged managerial 
initiative and foresight, but policies were also likely to be unduly 
influenced by political and administrative imperatives. Such considerations 
were to dominate official thinking after the war. 
Afte~ the war, the issue of railway financial administration 
resurfaced. In 1921 for instance, Colonel Hammond reported on the 
Railways and concluded that the lack of a Renewal Fund for the effective 
maintenance of the system was handicapping the general development of 
the network. The report was particularly critical of what it described 
as the "neglect" of the western line beyond repair," as a result of which 
that 1ine had to be reconstructed after the war at a cost of £1 million. 14 
Hammond had however, failed to point out that it was precisely the relaying 
of the w~stern track that the Colonial Office had approved the capital 
expenditure of over £12,000 in 1911, and that the "neglect" he had 
described was due to a combination of managerial inactivity and war time 
interruptions rather than to lack of control over railway finance. 
Nevertheless, the report recommended that an annual contribution of about 
£100,000 should be paid into a RailHay itenewal r~und. This fund, under 
the management of the General Hanager, was to be employed in providing 
for capital improvements and replacement of OelG.p'~~ equipment. 
Although this recommendation was accepted and the fund established, matters 
did not change in any really significant respect, because the central 
administration remained in sole control of policy. This point is 
illustrated well by the fact that when railway revenues plummeted from 
1929 onwards (partly as a result of trade depression and partly due to 
motor competition) the fund was actually suspended. 1S The railways being 
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publicly owned, it~ fortune wS! inextricably tied to that of the 
Colonial Administration. 
Nevertheless the 1920's also witnessed some of the most radical 
recommendations for changes in railway administration policy. In 1924, 
the whole issue of the administration of Crown Colony railways was 
extensively examined by a Committee appointed by the Colonial Office to 
inquire into Private Enterprise in British Tropical Africa. The report 
was critical of the control of the H.ailways by officialdom and recommended 
that all H.ailway Departments should be "de-bureaucratised and 
'1' d ,,16 commerC1a 1se • In other words, railway budgets were to be totally 
separated from Colonial budgets. The upper tier of decision making 
was now to be the responsibility of locally constituted Railway 
Advisory Boards under the Chairmanship of General llanagers. Such boards 
were to liaise with a Central l{ailHay Inspectorate to be created in the 
Colonial Office which was to be manned by people with the appropriate 
technical skills rather than by bureaucrats. But although this report 
was radical it made no immediate impact on the administration of the 
Gold Coast railways. Thus throughout the period up to 1929 there was 
very little change in the management structure of the railways. However, 
the important thing about the 1924 report, and indeed the whole question 
of railway administration \vas the fact that all discussions centred around 
the problem of finding an appropriate organisational arrangement for a 
publicly owned commercial enterprise. Thus the railways were 
i()o.d~e'<'tClY\t\~ grappling \vith an issue that \vas to become a common 
phenomena throughou t pos t \.:ar Bri tain and the newly independen t s ta tes of 
Africa. 
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One of the principal and perhaps most difficult problems 
facing the managers of the Gold Coast ~ailways was that of staffing the 
railway system. As the network was constructed, a need for manpower 
arose at all levels, from the office of General Manager down to a large 
number of unskilled labouring jobs. The staffing problem first emerged 
with the opening of the Sekondi-Kumasi line, which an estimate of 1902 
17 
suggested would need a total staff of 1,444 men to run. By 1928-29 
6,120 people were employed by the t{ailways Uepartment. How to find and 
retain employees with levels of skill, training and experience appropriate 
to what was a complex and technologically sophisticated operation, in a 
country with virtually no prior history of industrially-oriented 
employment, was a constant issue facing the Colonial Government and the 
railway managers. A three-tiered structure evolved, reflecting the 
broad categories of manpower requirements - managerial and supervisory, 
clerical and technical, and unskilled manualo The first category of 
posts was filled exclusively by expatriate staff, recruited mainly from 
Britain. Clerical and skilled or semi-skilled technical positions 
were filled partly by European and other expatriate employees, but 
increasingly by locally recruited African employees, while manual 
labour was performed in the main by men hired on a casual or temporary 
basis. Comprehensive data on the composition of the workforce is 
available only from 1916 onwards (Table 8 0 1). Unfortunately, the 
categories inTable 8.1 -of European staff, permanent .\[rican employees, 
and temporary .~frican workers - does not indicate precisely the function 
carried out by each, and can only be used as a rough guide to the 
three-tiered structure. 
Year 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
Source: 
J • 
. . 
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Table 8.1. 
Kailway Workers, 1916-1930 
No. of No. of African 
Europeans Clerical & Unskilled 
119 888 
99 798 
115 976 
129 1083 
136 1093 
142 1228 
141 1344 
146 1484 
163 1711 
168 1686 
185 1730 
181 1658 
169 1786 
Gold Coast Blue Books 1 1916-1929-30. 
No. of African 
Labourers 
1758 
1625 
1797 
2308 
2568 
2706 
2801 
3302 
3047 
2828 
3'+26 
4281 
3107 
A reliance on e;~patriates for In:1n~gerial and supervisory 
positions was probably unavoidable, given that the organisation and 
technology of the railway system had been imported wholesale from the 
United Kingdomo But in the years before the first h'orld \-lar it was not 
alh'ays easy to recruit such expatriates, not least because of health 
hazards in the tropics and the general shortage of railway skills at 
the time due to the world wide expansion of railway-building. In 1905, 
Nr J.Hansfield, a former permanent way inspector whose appointment had 
been terminated on the grounds of inefficiency stated on his return 
home tha t: 
It is nothing less than murder the way the l{aili-;.)y is managed,· 
and were there a better management, many of the Europeans 
that are buried would still be alive. 18 
20b 
There is little doubt that 11ansfield Has aggrieved by his dismissal from 
the Railway Service but the observation indicates that there were inter-
related problems of health and managerial competence. These, it 
seems, rendered it difficult to recruit efficient expatriate staff, and 
in July 1905, a Crown Agents' l1inute stated: 
Within the last two years th~ee separate officers had had 
charge of the Department and each had left the service 
more or less in disgrace, while the condition of the 
Department deteriorated badly.19 
The following year a ~ailway Committee of Inquiry concluded that there 
was gross inefficiency amongst the expatriate staff generally, and 
the various departmental heads in particular. On the Committee's 
recommendations all sectional heads with the exception of the Chief 
\ d · . d 20 • ccountant were 1sm1sse. 
Part of the problem was that experienced railway managers and 
supervisors were in such short supply that the Crown Agents found 
them virtually impossible to come by. The solution to this difficul.ty " 
was to offer higher salaries. Thus, in 1905, the salary of the 
Locomotive Superintendent was increased from £500 per annum to £700, 
21 
rising to £900 after two years, with a twenty per cent duty allowance. 
Although the Colonial Government was hostile to the idea of paying 
higher salaries to railway officials, whom it considered inferior to 
administrative officers, nevertheless the evidence suggests that only 
by raising the levels of salaries, housing and leave entitlements was 
the t{ailway iJepartment able, by the early 1920' s to establish a relatively 
efficient corps of managerial staff. .\ high rate of turnover among 
expatriates gradually gave way to more permanent employment. This 
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is illustrated by the case of IJr Cozens-Hardy who carne to the Gold 
Coast in 1901 as Assistant Surveyor of Koads, and was transferred to 
the Railway Department, as Assistant ~ngineer, in 1903. Three years 
later he became head of the Maintenance Section, a post he held until 
1919 h h b G 1 11 f h u· 1 22 . , w en e ecame enera 'anager 0 t e ua1 ways. Longer per10ds 
of residence by European staff became more common after the First 
World War, when health and living conditions were significantly 
improved. Men stayed longer in the Colony and began to bring their 
f ·1· 1· h 23 am1 1es to 1ve t ere. 
The costs of attracting and retaining expatriate staff were 
high. By 1920 the salaries of European employees, who constituted 
only 3.75 per cent of the total work force, took 44.33 per cent of the 
total wage bill. (See Table 8.2). A 1922 enquiry into the railway 
explained that: 
A European in West Africa is a costly commodity; he costs the 
Railways anything from 80 to 100 per cent over and above his 
salary for every month he puts in, depending on whether he is 
on the twelve or 18 months rule for leave. He never costs 
less :han 800 poun~~ sterling and usually at least 1,000 pounds 
sterl1ng per year. 
The costs of expatriate staff illustrates the obseryation that the s~i~led 
f.uropean in the tropical Colonies was "one of God's most expensive 
,,25 
creatures on earth. 
The Europeans employed by the Gold Coast Railways, although 
growing in number, declined slightly as a proportion of the total labour 
force between 1916 and 1929-30 as did the large section of the work 
force comprising casual manual labour. The most striking feature of 
change in the composition of the workforce is to be found in the rise 
Year 
1 ')10 
1 ')17 
1<)10 
1 ')1 ') 
1 C)20 
1921 
1()22-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1 'J2 5-2b 
1 ()2 6-2 7 
1 ') ~ 7 - 28 
1 C) 2. 8 - 2 ') 
1()2'l-JO 
Total 
Number 
of 
:.ai lway 
.~orkers 
27:;5 
2522 
2888 
3520 
37() 1 
4076 
4186 
:"") 32 
4()21 
4032 
53':'1 
6120 
4539 
Table 8.2 
0istribution of ~ailway Operation Wage Income 
t' 0 t 3 ~ '.. abe s 
Total Uage 
Bill (ie both 
Salaries and 
Wages). 
£ 
i.. 
109,000 
112,000 
109,000 
159,000 
196,000 
200,000 
226,000 
246,000 
258,000 
267,000 
269,000 
:'..74,000 
279,000 
E.uropean Staff 
as 
percentage of 
Total H.ailway 
Labour force 
"~I 
I. 
/ .. 
4. 4~j 
n.d 
n. ,1 
3.75 
3.58 
3.38 
3.32 
3.77 
3.77 
3.40 
3.20 
3.02 
3.17 
01 
E.uropean African 
Staff as Permanent 
percentage Employees 
of total ego clerks, 
;~age _BilL \ Signalmen 
10 as 
/0 
41.96 
n.d 
n.a 
44.33 
37.82 
40.58 
34.11 
32.11 
30.59 
32.56 
34.26 
37.33 
37.29 
Percentage 
of Total 
l.<o.3ilway 
Labour 
I .. 
4.23 
n.a 
n.a 
5.31 
9.11 
8.40 
<) .17 
().24 
(). 67 
12.36 
10.26 
').11 
14.98 
Total 
\"ages of 
Permanent 
.L.frican 
Staff as 
percent of 
total wage 
bill 
! 
10 
8.68 
n. ;1 
n.d 
13.28 
18.13 
21.c)6 
22.36 
23.22 
23.31 
28.10 
28.67 
26.23 
28.07 
.:) 0 u r c e :~ l) 1 d Coast Blue Books, 1 9 16 -1 () 2 9 / 30 • 
.. ~frican 
manu31 
labour 
employed on 
temporary 
basis as 
percent3ge 
of tot31 
t~age Bi 11 
91. 29 
n.d 
n.d 
90. ()4 
87.31 
88.16 
87.51 
86. ()l) 
86.56 
84.18 
86.54 
87.87 
81.85 
To tal \Jages 
of .\.fric3n 
manudl 
labour 3S 
percentage 
of Total 
\~age Bill 
10 
49.3b 
n.d 
n. ,1 
42. Jl) 
44.05 
37.40 
43.53 
44.68 
46.1 
39.34 
37.07 
36.44 
34.64 
N 
o 
a.: 
• 
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in the number and proportion of perrnanent African empl9yees - up from 
4.23 per cent of the total in 1916 to 14.98 per cent in 1929/30. The 
ratio of European to permanent African staff declined from 1:7.4 in 
1916 to 1:10.5 in 1929/30. Although this trend cannot be measured 
before 1916, it would appear that the most pronounced change in the 
composition of the labour force from 1903 to 1929/30 was the emergence 
of a stratum of permanent African railway employees, engaged in a variety 
of occupations requiring some degree of skill and/or experience. How 
far was this development based upon the substitution of cheaper local 
manpower for more expensive imported skilled manpower, and how far was 
it based upon the shift from casual to more efficient permanent unskilled 
employment? 
One possible solution to the manpower problem would appear to lie 
in the establishment of a staff development scheme such as the training 
of Africans both locally and abroad on a long term basis. Apart from 
the obvious advantages of better health and better knowledge of the 
environment, the training of the African to replace tIle European 
expatriate would also be more economical in the long run. As far as 
the managerial and supervisory grades ,~ere concerned, however, no such 
possibilities were ever contemplated. Part of the reason was that 
there was a great deal of tacial prejudice regarding the placement of 
Africans in positions of responsibility. For instance, in 1907, when 
vacancies occurred in the Colonial Civil Service for which qualified 
Africans were available, the Governor ruled that natives were not to be 
appointed as District Commissioners and Ilagistrates because they would 
have little influence among their people. 26 
/ 
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As regards the middle stratum of railway employees - clerks, 
fitters, drivers, artisans, etc. - however, the authorities favoured 
the substitution of the African for the expatriate not least because 
of the cost and difficulty of obtaining such skills from abroad. 
Initially these skills were obtained from Britain and the West Indies. 
Black West Indians in particular were preferred to white expatriates 
not only because they could adapt to the climate and food more 
easily but also because they were less expensive. Wages for locomotive 
drivers in 1905 for instance, were £40 per annum for the African, 
£100 for the West Indian and £250 for the European. the lowest paid 
white man at the time received £250. 27 A proposed scheme in 1905 to 
recruit black West Indians on a large scale however, fell thDough partly 
because there was a general shortage of such skills in the West Indies 
itself, and partly too because West Indian Governments were opposed 
28 to the schemeo Thus although a few such workers joined the Department 
they never constituted any significant proportion of the labour force. 
By 1908, no more than 7 West Indians were employed in the Central 
d h d b " d . d . ,,2 9 Workshop at Sekondi, an t ese were repQrte to e 01ng goo serV1ce. 
In default of imported black West Indian skilled labour, the 
Railway Managers concentrated their efforts on creating an indigenous 
African skilled labour force. It proved easier to recruit and/or train 
. 
people in the clerical and accounts O(~~r~~O~! than in the artisan 
and technical jobs. This VIas not only because the nature of the Colonial 
education system suited "white collar" skills, but such skills were also 
readily available from the existing bureaucracy. Thus initially, clerical 
and aCCOUGts workers were simply seconded from the Treasury and other 
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departments of the Colonial Civil Service but increasingly, they were 
30 
recruited from the growing army of primary school leavers. This 
group of workers, it will be argued, were the most secure and most 
stable within the middle stratum of railway emptoyees, making the 
Accounts and Traffic Departments relatively more efficient than others. 
The creation of the technical and artisan class on the other 
hand, was much more problematic. One solution was to develop and 
increase the skills of existing construction labourers. The process had 
begun in 1902 when 32 men were "hand picked" from construction labour 
and with the aid of one West Indian Inspector and four Lagos sergeants, 
they had been trained to form the nucleus of a Kailway Police Force. 31 
The following year, the Construction Engineers' Heport stated that a 
greater number of such labourers including Nigerians had been offered 
permanent employment in the new Hailway Department as locomotive 
drivers, signallers and fitters. 32 Although exact figures are not 
available, the evidence suggests that the Railways, at least in the pre-
war years, largely relied on the strategy of developing the skills of 
manual workers in meeting their technical skill needs. J\.S early as 
1908, the services of Europeans in the Hailway Foundry had been replaced 
by Africans and two years later the General Manager reported that: "all 
the brass engine axle boxes being made entirely by native labour are 
. . 1 ,,33 
running very satlsfactorl y. By 1912, it had become evident that 
not only had the policy of substituting the African for the expatriate 
in the lesser skills attained ~ high degree of success but it also 
appeared that the Gold Coast was more advanced in this aspect of 
railway management than the other West ,\frican Colonies. A 1912 Report 
observed: 
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The natives of the Gold Coast unlike those of Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone turn out, I am told very efficient drivers, 
fitters and mechanics. They are largely employed in 
driving trains, and to do much of the work. in the shops~ 
which would elsewhere on the Coast be left to whitemen. 4 
Although the policy of training manual workers in railway skills was thus 
a success, its main weakness as Guggisberg pointed out later, was that, 
h k bl t d . 35 suc wor ers were una e 0 rea or wrlte. Hence, not only were 
prospects of advancement restricted, but overall efficiency may also 
have been impaired. Consequently the emphasis shifted from improving 
the skills of manual labour to more formal training schemes. 
As early as 1906, the General tlanager submitted two proposals -
one to train railway artisans abroad, and the second, to establish a 
Technical Training School, to produce skilled workers for the 
. 36 
railways - but nothing immediately came of the suggestlons. Although 
an apprenticeship training programme was formally introduced from 1907, 
the scheme, at least initially, met with limited success. For instance, 
by 1921, no more than 8 trainees had successfully completed the course. 37 
Part of the problem ,~as that conditions of apprenticeship were initially 
unattractive. Boys of fourteen years of age for instance, who could 
read and write and had knowledge of arithmetic were to be employed as 
apprentice fitters, turners, blacksmiths and machinists in the 
Railway Workshops. The apprenticeship however, was long and poorly paid. 
Apprentices served first, a six month probationary period at 3d per day 
subsistence, then five years of training, after which they were to 
serve an extra two years before being offered employment. Cases of 
desertion, particularly to the mines were common. Following post 
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war labour unrests (See PLlJ below) however, conditions of apprenticeship 
significantly improved. The duration of training was now reduced to 
three years with daily wages at 1/6d for the first year, 2/3d for the 
second, and 3/- for the third. Kegular Sunday classes were also 
introduced. There was a big response: by 1925 total apprenticeships 
h d h d 85 ·th 15 th .. 1· 38 d a reac e W1 on e wa1t1ng 1st. Besi es, at the time, 
a new source of recruitment of artisan skills had opened to the 
Railways, when the first batch of graduates - 3 carpenters and 3 metal 
workers - arrived in the Department from the newly established 
Technical Training School in Accra. These were described as "well 
trained, well disciplined, and have a satisfactory attitude towards 
h . k ,,39 t elr wor • Hence, as a result, Africanisation did occur in the 
lesser technical skills. for instance, by 1926, there were only seven 
European drivers as against 68 Africans in the Locomotives lJepartment. 
The recruitment and training of Africans in railway skills 
was however, only one step towards the creation of a permanent work 
force to run an efficient railway service. Just as higher salaries 
and improved living conditions promoted stability among the European 
managerial/supervisory staff, so too wage levels and the provision of 
fringe benefits determined the permanence of the African skilled workers. 
Although the management was aware and frequently commented on these problems 
they did very little in fact to improve conditions for the large majority 
of the African labour force. It will be argued, later that, such 
inactivity, largely stemmed from Colonial policy which advocated low 
production costs, and the fact that it was believed that certain improved 
conditions such as pensions would undermine management's control over 
labour. 
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In the absence of a coherent managerial policy regarding 
living conditions for the African skilled workers, such conditions 
varied from one place to another. At the smaller railway stations in 
the interior, some workers, especially the clerical occupations, were 
able to occupy houses (consisting of temporarily erected wooden and 
corrugated iron sheets) which had originally been used for construction 
labour. These houses were however, extremely basic and uncomfortable, 
and their maintenance costs were very high. 40 But living conditions 
appeared even more difficult in the urban areas which were springing up 
as a direct result of the railways and harbours. The populations were 
expanding in areas with little in the way of existing housing stock. 
Consequently, insanitary towns proliferated. Apart from the obvious 
social problems associated with such living conditions, the railway 
itself found that the efficiency of workers was impaired. The General 
Manager at Sekondi wrote in 1912: 
This is an upstart town ••• Houses are almost impossible for 
the new men to find, rents are exorbitant and incidentally, 
the cost of living is high ••• At present the men live all 
over the place in wretcz1d conditions, and when urgently 
wanted cannot be found. 
He requested that living quarters be constructed for the clerical and 
accounts staff for which a reasonable rent would be charged, but nothing 
immediately came of the proposal. 
Wage levels and social security provisions also differed from 
one skill to another. The accounts and clerical staff experienced greater 
job security and better working conditions than the artisan and technical 
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group. The clerical workers were in an advantaged position because they 
had been seconded from other Government Departments and as such were 
already well entrenched in the Colonial bureaucracy. As early as 1907, 
a grading system, with fixed salaries and pensions had been established 
42 for the entire accounts and clerical employees, with the result that 
there was a relatively high level of stability among such workers. As 
the Chief Accountant observed in 1916: "there is more than one native 
who is distinctly qualifying for the highest rank of the civil 
. ,,43 
serVl.ce. 
In contrast, managerial attitudes towards the technical and 
artisan workers was one of ambivalence. Vne problem was that, unlike 
the clerical staff, who had been able to establish their skills and 
secure their positions, the artisans were still acquiring their 
skills through training on the job. Once these skills were acquired, 
such workers were shifted from the daily wage rate of 1/- - 1/6d for 
manual workers to one of 2/6d for skilled workers. But payment remained 
on a daily basis, and the artisans were not salaried. Consequently, 
they were excluded from such fringe benefits as pensions, annual 
paid leave, and sick leave which accrued to the accounts and clerical 
occupations Such conditions made the technical worker feel less secure 
in his job, and possibly helps to explain a higher turn over among 
such workers: 
the native artisan failed to realise that railway work is a 
career and not work to be taken up for a year or two 
interleaved with other employments. 44 
Consequently, in 1916, the General Nanager stated that the provision of 
more stable conditions, such as pensions, were needed to give the 
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artisans "fixity of tenure and ensure their contentment and willingness 
t .. ." 45 o remaln ln serVlce • the l1ana6er's proposals had been influenced 
by changes that had been taking place on the railways in other parts 
of British \~est Africa, whereby pensions had been introduced for all 
skilled railway workers who had spent seven years or more in the 
service in Sierra Leone, and in Nigeria a Provident fund had been 
46 
established for all workers. Although discussion after discussion 
took place nothing seems to have actually materialised in the form 
of changed policy. Such inactivity was to have far reaching 
consequences for labour relations after the war. 
rhe first significant industrial dispute on the Railways occurred 
in .June 1918, when workshop mechanics at Sekondi laid down their tools. 47 
The immediate cause of the conflict was related to the setting up in 
1917 of a new railway workshop near Ketan, 3 miles outside Sekondi, 
to which workers had to be transported by train. When the works had 
been based at Sekondi, both the clerical and artisan staffs worked 
from 7.00am to 11.00am and 1.30pm to 4.30pm. However, following 
the move, hours for the clerical and accounts staff were changed to 
8.00am to 2.00pm daily, without a lurich break. A request for 
similar hours from the artisans was turned down because "the work is 
never as efficient when the men do not have a break in the middle of 
d ,.48 the aye The result, as one official put it, was that the 
mechanics saw the clerks' train "steaming away" shortly after they 
49 
themselves had returned from their lunch hour break. uiscontent was 
aggravated still further when the mechanics were informed that their 
hours of work were to be extended by half an hour to finisll at 5.00pm. 
lhey argued that because ot the shortness of their lunch hour break, 
the majority were forced to return to work without eating, as there was 
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insufficient time to cook, while by the time they arrived back from 
work in the evening the markets and shops were closed. 
These grievances, which turned upon differential treatment of 
.. hOt 11 It "bl " w 1 e co ar and ue collar workers led to the workshop 
mechanics declaring a strike on 13 June 1918. Management ordered 
the men to return to work on the promise that their grievances, once 
submitted in writing, would be considered. The strike (which was 
confined to the workshop mechanics), lasted for one week. 
One significant result of the 1918 strike was that it triggered 
off a series of petitions from several sections of the labour force 
about working and living conditions. It thus appeared that the dispute 
over hours of work at Sekondi was merely a symptom of a general feeling 
of discontent amongst railway workers. The petitions all seemed to 
follow a similar pattern. They were mainly concerned with such issues 
as wage increases, pensions, annual and sick leaves, arbitrary 
dismissals, housing and promotion. However, when these complaints 
are examined closely, there seem to··be,·two main problems at their roots. 
The first, which has already been identified, was management's 
differential treatment of clerical and accounts staff as against their 
technical and artisan counterparts. Table 8.3 shows wage levels of 
the two categories of skilled railway workers in 1905 and 1918. While 
both minimum and maximum salaries for clerical workers nearly doubled 
over the period under review, minimum wages of artisans remained frozen 
at 2/6d - although once appointed, the latter received annual 
incremen ts 0 In addi tion, the adminis tra tion gran ted a "~Jar Bonus" to 
all salaried staff whicl1 further aggrieved the non-salaried workerso 
One official summarised the position thus: 
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Ever since the railway clerks were given pensionable status, 
the man who wields the hammer clains to be put on the same 
footing as the man who wields the pen. 50 
Secondly, inflation during the First World War led to a very 
high cost of living. By 1918, food prices in Accra were 50 to 60 per 
cent above the pre-war prices, while in Sekondi price increases were 
as high as 400 per cent (Table 8.4). Thus massive inflation was 
Accounts/Clerical Staff \Artisan/Technical Staff 
uate Hinimum Salary (Probation) ilaximum sala~nimum Wage Naximum Wage 
1905 £25 to £40, p. a. £150 to £200 p.a. 2/6d p.d 3/-
1918 £48 to £72 p.a. £.240 to £336 p.a. 2/6d p. do 5/-
Source:- Memorandum Suggesting Uifficulties as Kegards the Proposed 
Extension of Pensionable kights to the Uaily Paid Staff of the 
~ailways, General Manager, Sekondi, 1919, Appendix XV in Report and 
~ecommendations of a Committee Appointed to Consider the Conditions 
of service of H.ailway Native Mechanics, Session;:t 1 PaDer _t-b. XIX, 
1918-19. 
Table 8.4 
Prices of Commodities at Sekondi 
Commodity Pre 1914 Price Prices in 1918 
Cassava 6 Big ones for 3d 3 small ones for 6d 
Plantains 8 to 10 for 3d 3 to 4 for 3d 
~cwt bag of rice 7/6 30/-
Kerosine oil per tin 3/6 10/6 
Hatches per packet 3d 1/-
Shirt 1/9d to 2/6d 3/- to 6/6d 
Wearing cloth per piece 5/- to 9/- 15/- to 21/-
House ~ent per month 5/- to 8/- 18/- to 20/-
Source:- Nemorandum Suggesting Uifficulties AS rtegards the Proposed 
Extension of Pensionable Kights to the Uaily Paid St~ff of the 
Kailways, General Manager, Sekondi, 1919, Appendix XV, in ~ailway 
Nechanics l~eport. 
p.d. 
p.d. 
I 
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occurring at a period of stagnant money wages, resulting in a drastic fall 
in real wages for the majority of artisans. Indeed one petition from 
Accra succinctly described the plight of railway workers who were 
forced to take goods on credit or borrow money from petty traders and 
money lenders, who were exploiting the situation. The result was a 
high incidence of indebtedness among railway workers. 51 
How then did the authorities respond to the workers' grievances] 
In No~t~ber 1918 (six months after the mechanics' strike), the Government 
appointed a Committee of Enquiry under the Chairmanship of J. Maxwell, 
Commissioner for Western Province. (Other members were i. Cogill, 
Secretary for Mines Department, and L.G. Corney, President of the Mines 
Managers Association). Significantly, the main demands of the artisans 
- differential treatment of white collar workers and rising cost of 
living - were carefully excluded from the Commission's terms of 
reference. They were instructed to consider 1) flow conditions of 
service of native mechanics on the railways compared with those of the 
mines and elsewhere for similar labour, 2) whether any, and if so, 
what appointments should be made pensionable, and 3) if not what 
steps could be recommended to give greater security to such workers. 
Both the limited jurisdiction of the Committee and its very composition 
_ representatives of Government and mining companies, was to affect its 
findings. 
The report of the Committee which was presented to the 
Government early in 1919 found that rates of pay on the railways 
compared favourably with those of the mineso lienee, they did not 
recommend any major improvements in pay. However, they did argue that 
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improvements in conditions were necessary and advocated several 
changes: 1) the provision of housing accommodation near the workshop 
for which a reasonable rent would be charged, 2) the introduction of 
night and travelling allowances, 3) granting of gratuities in cases 
of permanent disablement not resulting from the fault of the workman, 
4) the system of dismissal and suspension should be modified so that 
in cases of long service each dismissal came before the General 
Manager, 5) the working hours in force prior to June 1918 should be 
restored and 6) the creatimof 13 pensionable posts of Senior 
Locomotive Drivers, Leading Fitters and Artisans, and Workshop 
Foremen for African staff. 
Clearly, the Committee did not achieve much: there were no 
general wage increases and the majority of artisans remained on daily 
wages. There seems to have been several inter-related reasons for this. 
First, the need for a permanent committed railway work force was 
contradicted by the need of management to have maximum control over 
labour. Thus the Committee recognised that in order to secure a more 
stable labour force and thus increase productivity, it was necessary to 
award pensionable status to those artisans who had served for seven 
years or more as had been the case on the Sierra Leone Kailways since 
1914. On the other hand, management objected because it would reduce 
their control over workers in that such employees would have increased 
security and could not be sacked on the spot. The newly promoted 
General Nanager, Hr Cozens-llardy explained to the Committee: 
It is highly desirable that the powers of the General Manager 
relating to the employment and dismissal of the workshop 
staff should not be curtailed in any way which would certainly 
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be the case were any of them to be made pensionable and the 
difficulty will be to retain the former and at the same time 
ensure the artisans some fixity of tenure. 52 
The General Nanager favoured the establishment of a Provident Fund on 
the Nigerian model because it functioned as a control mechanism over 
workers in that workers became hesitant or even powerless to leave 
their employment whilst the railway administration was holding a portion 
of their wages. However, because of the high cost of living at the 
time, it was decided to defer the Funds' implementation. There is no 
record to show that this was ever implemented. 
Secondly, the need for a permanent and stabilised work force 
also contradicted what appeared to be a Government low wage policy 
which aimed at minimising costs. For instance, the committee did 
consider the extension of the \~ar Bonus to the non-salaried workers 
in order to meet the rising cost of living. lim·lever, the cost of 
implementation, estimated at £9,000 per annum was considered too high 
53 
and the idea was dropped. This was, in spite of the fact that, at the 
time, the railways were making handsome profits. Instead, the 
traditional African social economic system would continue to be used 
to supplement wage labour, so that employers would not have to pay the 
full cost of subsistence in the form of a living wage and pensions. 
As C.H. Harper, the Colonial Secretary, forcefully arguedt "the 
native family stool, rather than pensions, should provide protection 
. ,,54 from destitution on ret1rement. 
finally, the relatively undeveloped labour market for artisan 
and technical skills - the itailways and to a lesser extent the mines -
did very little to enhance the bargaining power of such workers. Thus, 
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whilst the Government refused to grant wage increases to artisan 
workers, on occasions it was prepared to respond to similar demands for 
wage increases for unskilled labourers. (see below). 
So limited were the results from the commission of ~nquiry, at 
a time of post war inflation, that it is not surprising that more 
. 
strikes occurred from 1919 onwards. The 1919 strike was also started by 
the workshop staff at Sekondi but was rapidly joined by their colleagues 
in the running sheds, and power house, and by the crane operators at the 
dock. All attempts by the authorities to intimidate the strikers back 
to work failed, and the strike lasted for five weeks. 55 By 1920-1 
strike action had spread to Accra and the outstations. However, 
Guggisberg who at the time was still calling the workers' demands 
" b·" . d h d 1· exor 1tant , was comm1tte to a ar 1ne. As he later reported to 
the Colonial Office: 
We had a practical cessation of all labour at the beginning of 
the year, 1921, owing to strikes by workers ••••• All 
employers of labour stoog firm and artisans eventually 
returned to their work. 5 
The wave of strikes between 1918 and 1921 represented a major 
problem for a management struggling to keep lines open and meet the 
needs of railway users. However, it achieved little for the workers 
involved. Nost strikes were sporadic and short lived, and men returned 
to work without their demands being met. Two factors explain this lack 
of success. First, there was little solidarity and " ." group conSCiousness 
among the workers themselves, so that each struggle was fought on an 
atomistic basis. Uuring the 1918 strike, for example, all the 
locomotive drivers continued working, for which they were awarded a bonus. 
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Again in 1919, apprentices returned to work after one week on the promise 
of a bonus and improved conditions of apprenticeship. furthermore, 
European workers were always more than willing to cover the duties of 
striking J~frican workers. Second, the Colonial administration, which 
regarded strikes on the railways as a direct challenge to its 
authority was prepared to use coercion to break strikes. It was 
particularly encouraged to do so by an abortive attempt to derail a 
train during the 1919 strike at Sekondi. Leaders and pickets were 
constantly arrested, tried and convicted. 57 Because the employers stood 
firm, there were no wage increases for the technical/skilled railway 
workers between 1918 and 1921 - nor indeed over the entire three 
decades before 1929. Gains were limited to the change to salaried 
staff status for thirteen of the most senior artisans in 1919, which 
may have had the effect of reducing their "leadership" role in the strikes 
of 1920-21, and to the introduction of improved housing quarters. By 
58 1923, some 103 new housing units had been completed, and presumably 
helped to dispell some of the labour unrest. 
The General Manager's Keport for 1920-23, indicated that labour 
protest had subsided "and there was no appreciable shortages of labour 
as well as artisans during the year.,,59 !Juring the rest of the 1920's, 
there was no repetition of the strikes which had marked the years between 
1918 and 1921. Why did labour unrest subside after 19211 It seems 
unlikely that the modest gains made during 1919-21 were enough to 
defuse the workers' sense of grievance. Although a definitive answer 
is not possible, it is more 
pressures in the Gold Coast 
probable that the slackening of inflationary 
60 
economy, together with a gradual acceptance 
of the decline in real incomes which had occurred during and immediately 
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after the war, underlies the more peaceful period of industrial 
relations from 1922 to 1929. 
Uespite the d\f~~~ faced ~y the railway artisans, the 
most disadvantaged group of railway workers was the army of manual 
labourers, whose numbers roughly doubled between 1916 and 1929-30. Their 
living conditions were always poor. Because there were no houses for 
them, such workers had to construct their own huts out of grasses and 
palm leaves and initially these were built clustered around the station 
buildings on railway land. Not only were their conditions unsanitary, 
but such dwellings were also considered an eyesore to the travelling 
public. In 1917 therefore the Ltailways decided to ban all such 
huts from the immediate vicinity of station buildings and at Uunkwa, 
Jim Abufu, Edwadin, Bekwai and Kumasi, new plots were acquired and 
. 61 
allocated to manual workers to re-erect thelr huts. 
Wages were generally low but also varied from one area to 
another. The most important influence on wage rates was competition for 
unskilled labour from other sectors of the economy, more especially 
the mines. In 1904, when the completion of the Western line, and the 
collapse of the gold boom led to a general contraction of demand for 
unskilled labour, the dailway Department reduced minimum wages from 1/3d 
62 per day to 1/- per day. .Iowever, by 1912 when the mines were once 
again paying as much as 1/6d per day for unskilled labour, the General 
Nanager warned that unless wages were raised to at least 1/3d per day, 
the maintenance of the line would suffer considerably.63 The following 
year the Government approved discriminatory w~ge increaseso Permanent 
way gangs on the Sekondi line from mile 0 to mile 68, including 
Prestea, where competition was most acute, were granted 1/6d per day~hile 
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those on mile 68 to Kumasi received 1/3d. However, wages for non-
permanent way gangs on the western line as well as the entire manual 
work force on the Accra line, remained pegged at 1/_.64 Again, during 
the War time and immediate post-war inflationary pressures management 
was similarly prepared to respond to demands for wage increases for 
unskilled men. By 1920, the post war labour unrest among the artisans 
had spread to the manual workers when three stoppages of work were 
reported among the permanent way gangs. It was then found necessary 
to raise the price of ordinary labour from 1/- -1/6d to 1/9d per day 
throughout the system. Consequently, "one can (now) select suitable 
h h h ,,65 men w 0 are wort t e extra money. 
Clearly, the existence of a relatively more sophisticated labour 
market for manual workers than their artisan colleagues explains 
managerial willingness to respond to the demand for wage increases for 
the former category of railway employees. 
Although the post-war labour protests achieved little for the 
large majority of African railway workers materially, the period is 
nonetheless significant because it marked the emergence of workers 
organisations. The history of trade unionisation among ~old Coast 
66 
railway workers has been extensively covered elsewhere and, 
therefore need not be recounted at length here. In Colonial Africa, 
organisations often appeared first among railway and dock workers 
partly because skills acquisition had created permanence in employment 
and partly because the very nature of the job encouraged contact 
67 between workers. In British West Africa although the formation of 
trade unions were legally permitted only in 1938, the roots of such 
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organisations on the Railways have been traced as far back as the 
68 immediate post First World War years, and in the Gold Coast in 
particular, following the post ~:ar labour protests, railway workers made 
two major attempts to form unions - first in 1920 when an Artisan 
and Labourers Union was formed in Accra, and second, in 1923 when a 
itailway Workers Association was formed in the Locomotive Workshop at 
69 Sekondi, none of which, however, was successfulo In fact, as 
Chada points out, the activities of the latter organisation was limited 
to such issues as the provision of financial assistance to bereaved 
members, finding accommodation and credit for new employees and 
organising social functions such as entertainments. Thus throughout the 
1920's, the emphasis remained on welfare provision on a co-operative 
basis rather than trade union activities in the real sense of the 
word. On the other hand, both Hughes and Cohen's work on Nigeria, 
and Conway's on Sierra Leone have indicated the development of much 
more permanent and stronger railway unions in those countries right 
from the early 1920's.70 The question therefore arises as to why 
effective unions appeared on both the Nigerian and Sierra Leone 
railways at the earlier stage than they did in the Gold Coast? 
One explanation, often stressed, is that the Colonial 
Administration in the Gold Coast was more antagonistic to trade unions 
than those of the other Colonies. for instance, in 1920, when the 
Colonial Office advised all Crown Colony administrations to treat workers 
organisations in accordance with the International Labour Convention 
of 1919, the response from the Gold Coast Government was evidently 
negative: Guggisberg cautioned the Secretary of State to lido nothing 
h I h f 
. . ,,71 
to asten tle growt 0 unlonlsm. i~ot surprisingly, when the 
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newly formed Accra 'lrtisan and Labourers Union demanded a solidarity 
oath of allegiance from its members, the Government promptly arrested 
and charged union leaders under African customary law for swearing an 
72 
oath. The administration was particularly keen to suppress the 
nascent union because its leadership which had James ak!'ong, an 
Accra Journalist and a non-railway employee as General Secretary. 
Besides, the obvious political ambitions of the union included the 
establishment of branches throughout West Africa. Nothing was heard of 
the Accra Union after 1920. In Sierra Leone on the other hand, the 
authorities appeared more sympathetic towards the unions. for instance, 
there were no dismissals nor the use of coercion to break strikes during 
the post war labour unrests in that country.73 Consequently, a Union 
was formed in 1919 which lasted throughout the 1920's. Although this 
explanation is highly tenable, the fact remains that when workers want 
to organise they do so irrespective of government policy. Indeed, 
no employer has ever encouraged the development of Unions. Historically 
they have always been frowned upon. Thus offical attitudes alone 
cannot wholly explain the relative failures of the early Gold Coast. 
railway unions. There are two other factors which may be important. 
first, the Gold Coast Unions, by concentrating on welfare co-operatives, 
may have provided a more tangible social security which the employer 
had failed to doc Consequently, workers may have become less inclined 
to take on wha t they vie\ve d as an in tr ans igen t au thor i ty. The second 
factor revolves around the issue of pensions. In Sierra Leone and 
Nigeria, the provision of pensions policies in one form or another, 
possibly provided for the existence of a higher incidence of stability 
and group consciousness ar.1ongst workers. \~hereas in the Gold Coast 
only white collar occupations and a minority elite of the artisan group 
were offered such benefits. '[his may have had the result of pacifying 
the very people who would have been the possible leaders of a new Trade 
Union. 
\Jhilst these early attenpts at Unionism were largely ineffective, 
nevertheless, it is argued, they did much to develop the skills and 
leadership need for the unions that eventually developed at the eve of 
the Second World War. 74 
CUNCWSION: 
The system of railway management in the Gold Coast was based on 
the British model. But as the Gold Coast railways were publicly 
owned the upper-tier of decision-tllking was not the Board of 
Uirectors to be found in a British Joint Stock Company, but rather 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In practi~e, however, most 
policy emanated from the Governor, who relied on the Crown Agents 
and Consulting ~ngineers for advice. The system had several 
inherent weaknesses. One was the slowness of information flow which 
led to delay and inefficiency, and was caused by the geographical 
and institutional separation of the bodies concerned in policy making. 
The major problem though was that of managerial autonomy, especially 
over the railways' financial administration. In the three decades 
before 1929, the railway was run as part of the Gold Coast 
bureaucracy which meant that its finances came under the direct control 
of the Colonial freasury. Consequently, railway surplus earninbs 
accrued directly to the central government. Expenditure on the 
railways was thus always dependent up~n the financial 
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position of the Colony and the colonial Government,' s own priorities. 
Partly as a result of Management's objections to this procedure, there 
was a move from 1~21 to separate it from the general administration and 
turned it into a self-contained service - thouyh with no immediate result. 
-.J 
The railways, being publicly-owned, found its fortunes inextricably 
tied to that of the Colonial Administration. 
Another problem was that of staffing the railways. A three-tiered 
structure evolved, which reflected the broad categories of manpower 
requirements - managerial and supervisory, clerical and technical, and 
unskilled manual. Because the railway technology was imported 
wholesale from the United Kingdom, the skills to administer it had to be 
imported. Thus the managerial and supervisory positions were filled 
exclusively by European expatriates recruited mainly from Britain. But 
in the years before the iirst World War, it was not easy to attract such 
skilled worker~, not least because of health hazards in the tropics. 
One solution was to offer higher salaries, better housing and leave 
entitlements to the European expatriates am as a result of which a 
high turnover gave way to a more permanent staff at the managerial 
and supervisory level - though the costs of maintaining such workers 
was very high. 
However, the most pronounced change that occurred in the 
composition of the railway work force in the three decades before 1929, 
was the emergence of a middle stratum of sl~illed African workers. It 
was easier to recruit or train clerical workers than technical partly 
because the colonial educational system was geared towards white collar 
skills and partly too because clerical skills were readily available 
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from the existing colonial bureaucracy. but the railway authorities also 
pursued a policy of preferential treatment of white collar workers. 
Thus the clerical staff enjoyed higher salaries and better working 
conditions than their artisan counterparts, who were paid on a daily 
basis and were excluded from the fringe benefits of pensions, annual 
leave and sick pay granted to the clerical skills. 
Such a preferential treatment experienced by white collar 
employees lay at the root of the post war labour unrests on the 
railways, especially among artisans, but to a lesser extent the manual 
labourers. The workers grievances were also exacerbated by the fact 
that wages remained stagnant at a time of massive inflation during and 
after the War, which resulted in a drastic fall in the standard of 
living of most artisans. Although the Kailway authorities recognised 
the necessity to improve working conditions so as to ensure stability 
among the artisan work force, they failed to grant the workers' demand 
for higher wages and pensions because of the need to keep production 
costs low. 
finally, the 1920's also marked the emergence for the first 
time, of workers organisations on the Railways. Kailway work was 
condocive to the development of frade Unionism, as skills acquisition 
created permanent employment, as well as contact with other workers. 
Hut in the period before 1929, the emphasis was confined to a sort of 
voluntary "welfare" associations, rather that what would now be 
regarded as normal Trade Union organisation. Nevertheless, such early 
attempts at workers orbanisation on the railways may have laid the 
foundations for the future Unions. 
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Al though the recrui tmen t of manpm·ler and the conduc t of 
industrial relations perhaps constituted the largest set of problems 
facing the railway managers, the managerial and technical staff were 
also called upon to solve a wide range of problems relating to the 
day- to-day opera tions of the sys tern. l~l though more mundane than 
issues relating to manpower, these difficulties demanded no less 
attention if the network was to function smoothly and efficiently. 
Broadly speaking, there were three principal areas of operational 
concern - safety and maintenance of raih.'ay stock ;-md tr~ck, tariff 
regulations, and general efficiency. 
The Gold Coast :~.'1ihJays h~td a relatively [Joor safety record. 
Accidents Here commononplace and frequently resulted in fatalities. 
(fables 9.1 and 9.2 respectively provide data on the safety record and 
working expenses in the major spending Uepartments of the railway).~ 
Several points can be made about both tables. first, the incidence of 
falling trees, (although the largest single cause of accidents when the 
railHays were first opened), rapidly declined from a peak of 261 in 
1909 to a mere 3 by 1917. ~econd, the nu~ber of accidents resulting 
from derailments increased [roln ~j!1 in 1()l)5 to 121 in 1923/4 - (which was 
the last year [or , ... hich the data h'dS ~.tthered). As a ratio to total 
mileaGe Horked, as the system expande,j o\'(~r tiflle, it appears that the 
problem of derailments, althou:.;h [luctuatin~, actu.'llly Horseneu by the 
Ucl te 
1<)05 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1<)10 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1<)16 
1<)17 
l C)18 
191() 
1920 
1 ()21 
1t)22-3 
1 () 23-':' 
1 ()24-25 
1 ')25-26 
1926-2.7 
1 ') 27- 23 
102S-2() 
1 C).!. C)-30 
";ource:-
... • J.) ......... l). 1 
i:lajor C~~uses of Accidents Clnd l'lu::1be:s of ,,'atulities on the .~Clihvays 
----
.~o of .~a tio or do. of ,~a tio of No. of .~cl tio of 
accidents :'allen.Trees Clcciuents uerailments accidents :?ngine 
caused by to :'1umber caused by to i:~umber caused by .. ,'ai lures to 
fallen trees 0';: miles ouen derailments 0':: miles ODen :':'n~ine failures :10. or miles 
146 1.2(miles) 54 3.1(miles) 36 4~7(miles) 
95 1.8 41 4.1 16 10.5 
195 .9 59 2.8 20 8.4 
230 .7 39 I 4.3 3 56.0 
261 .6 24 ! 7.0 1 168.0 
112 1.5 49 I 3.4 5 33.6 
56 3.4 65 i 2.9 27 7.0 
62 11.1 78 I 2.8 20 11.1 I 
na na na ! , na na na 
I 
46 4.9 92 i 2.5 \ 19 11.9 8.2 71 I 3.5 6 40.8 30 i I i I , 24.8 6 41.3 74 I 3.4 10 
3 89.3 96 2.8 17 15.8 
I 
na na na ; na na na i 
3 89.7 78 I 3.4 24 11.2 
92 1 2.9 31 8.7 
- -
! 
I 
140 I 2.0 54 5.1 
- - : 
2 167.0 211 ; 1.6 65 5.1 I , 
- -
121 I 3.1 37 10.2 
na I na na I na 
- -
- -
na na 61 6.5 
-
-
na na na na 
- -
na na 36 13.3 
- -
n.3. na 41 12.1 
-
-
na na na na 
- --
~enerul ,:an~:.cr, .~aih.Jays .. nnual ~~eports, 1<)05-1920/30. 
~'o. of 
/atalities 
7 
12 
2 
11 
14 
4 
11 
7 
na 
14 
9 
9 
7 
na 
5 
10 
7 
4 
8 
16 
9 
10 
16 
13 
12 
I 
, 
~ 
I 
, 
I 
, 
I 
N 
\"oJ 
0' 
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laGlc 9.2 
• 
Uate Proportion of Proportion of Others (Traffic) Proportion of 
Lxpenditure on E.xpenditure on Administration, Railway 
track Locomotives & Hisce llaneou s l{enewal fund 
maintenance and Raihlay To total Working 
to total stock to total Expenses 
working \Jorking 
E.xpenses E.xpenses 
1904 44.3 32.64 22.93 -
1905 39.89 35.96 24.15 -
1906 36.21 25.45 28.34 -
1907 38.26 35.14 21.16 -
1908 39.11 33.85 27.04 -
1()09 3·j. 76 44.u7 16.57 
-
1910 37.70 37.02 23.2ti -
1911 36.24 39.u5 24.11 -
1912 34.21 40.03 25.76 -
1C)13 33.59 42.15 24.20 -
1914 31.02 45.09 23.93 -
1915 30.96 4j.21 23.85 -
1916 30.S5 42.45 26.97 -
1917 na na na -
1918 29.07 46.24 24.69 -
1919 23.64 48.17 23.19 -
1920 10.69 60.40 20.91 -
1<)21 1<).11 54.71 2.5.38 -
1)22-23 1).85 46.88 33.27 -
1<)23-24 16.59 37.96 27.36 1J.9 
1924-25 1-';.05 37.91 20.51 17.53 
1925-26 17.37 37.84 27.56 17.24 
1()26-27 17.G5 37.4u 27.32 17.55 
1927-20 17.63 37.77 28.61 15.99 
l')2(j-2() nn na na na 
1929-30 na na na na 
::;ource: licneral Hana;;cr, .• nuua! .. ail\!.:lj _~CpOl-ts, 194-1929/30. 
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early 1920's - 1:3.1 in 1905 and 1:1.6 in 1922/23. Lxpenditure on 
track maintenance - which also had the Qnst direct bearin; on the 
problem of derailments (poor track) - shop,:,:d a continuous dowTHvard 
trend from 44.43 per cent of total workin; expenses in 1905 to below 
20 per cent by the 1920's. Thirdly, the number of accidents caused by 
engine failures fluctuateu strongly both in 2.bsolute terms, and as a 
ratio to total mileage worked - although the latter also improved 
from 1:4.7 in 1905 to 1:2.1 in 1928-9. ~ignificantly, expenditure in 
the Locomotive UeparL!cnt - i::lich ,~lso affectf"'rl the problelll of engine 
failures - rose from 37..64 per cent of total \7orldng expenses in 1904 
to as much as 60.40 per cent by 1920, after which it came to settle 
at around 37 per cent beti·:een 1923-4 :md 1927-8. HON do h'e explain these 
trends, 
l\.S observed in Chapter 7, the problem of trees falling on the 
track had tHO mnin causes - fir.~t, tlte inherent problems of constructing 
a railway through a tropical rain forest, and second, a lack of 
foresight on the part of planners in fniting to 2cquire sufficient land 
on each side of the track on which all trees could be felled. fhe 
problem first appeared with the opening of the Western line \oJhere 
1 
as many as 45,000 trees along the line constituted a danger. This 
problem was at its most acute during the tornados of ,~pril-June: 
I'in one tornado 56 trees fell accross the line in one locality, wrecking 
. ,,2 
sixteen miles of track and telegraph I1nes. [he solution was the 
decision in 1908 to secure more land on each side of the track on which 
all trees were to be felled, making this one of the most easily solved 
problems. 
ilut perhaps a more familiar safety concern than falling trees 
23<J 
was derailments. The widespread incidence of derailments on the 
railways had several causes. iirst, the tracks were badly laid, due 
to the fact that the terrain which had to be covered was difficult, 
and secondly, (as we have noted in Part I) incidences of 
shoddy construction were frequent. .\.s the Ceneral IJanager stated 
in 1904: 
The soil through which the railHay passed whilst standing 
well in cuttings was generally friable on banks and wastage 
under tropical rains is heavy.3 
On one occasion, a bank sunk whilst a train was passing over it -
. 4 
although it had been tested only one hour prev10usly. Une solution 
was to reballast the whole line. The original shoddy ballast which 
consisted of laterites had to be replaced with broken stones and 
gravel. imother solution was to plant specific types of grasses which 
had the ability to protect the tract from erosions "Lemon grass forms 
an almost perfect protection to the ~ess of the bank" and "bahama 
grass binds the soil well but has the tendency to get amongst the 
ballast from which it is difficult to eredicate." S Similarly, sweet 
potato were planted alongside the line to inhibit the incessant 
penetration of the bush onto the track. Although this was necessary 
to reduce bush cutting, "where allowed to grow up to the edge of 
embankments, it has some small effect in lessening wastage and protects 
. f . ..6 cuttlngs rom raln-scour. 
Another major factor responsible for the problem of poor track 
and consequently derailments was related to over utilization of 
railway capacity. 'fhe railways, especially the western line, were 
originally designed to carry light traffic. But as the system expanded, 
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both in length and in terms of tr~rfic, so the track proved 
inadequate. Thus by 1913 "'hen locomotives and rolling stock of heavier 
capacity were introduced on the lines, "it \Vas found that the tracks 
got much displaced. 1I7 Consequently, speeds had to be severely 
curtailed to 10 miles per hour. The problem was further aggravated 
during the \Var when both funds and materials were no longer available 
for track and general maintenance. 
At the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the Colonial Uffice 
instructed that surplus Colonial revenues should be used in subscribing 
to interest free IGperial '.Jar LO:lI1S. .By the time the .~ar ended, the 
Gold Coast's subscriptions had totalled £500,000. This Kas in addition 
to the Colony's £20,000 annual volulltary contributions in aid of the 
8 
war. The effects of such measures was to starve an already strained 
raihwy system of much needed funds. l'urthenltore, the shortage of 
materials, especially metal products durin3 the w~r aa:entuated the 
problems of raihvay maintenance. ThBs the railways were forced to 
experiment with locally produced wooden sleepers instead of imported 
steel but the former was found unsuitable because red ants destroyed 
9 
them. In fact, throughout the war, existin~ sleepers, rather than 
being replaced had to be turned over to present the umvorn sides to 
the Thus by 1917 the ~eneral llanager reported: 
Sleepers bet\veen :";ekondi anr l rarkHa, and to a lesser extent 
beyond Tarkwa, are so he.1.vily corroded, especially under the 
rail-seating, and in some C:lses ll.1ve bent or even broken 
under traffic. Un certain \vorst lengths, sleepers have 
become so weakened that it is no lonser possible to lift and 
pack the rO:ld, as the lip bending of the sleeper-ends dangerously 
tightens the gauGe or breaks the sleepers. 10 
consequently, by the end of the war, the western line was in such a 
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state that repair was no longer possible, and the whole line had to 
be reconstructed. This war time deterioration explains the dramatic 
rise in derailments that took place during the early 1920's. The 
reconstruction lessened the incidence of derailments from 1924-5 
onwards and helps to explain the sharp decline in the cost of track 
maintenance during the 1920's. 
The third major cause of accidents, and perhaps the one for 
which management had been unable to find a permanent ·solution throughout 
the three decades before 1930, was that of engine failures. frequent 
engine failures had several causes not least the difficulty in 
attracting experienced locomotive engineers - especially during the period 
before the \-Jar. Thus a simple change of fuel in 1904 from coal to 
firewood ruined the engines. 
Lnck of regular h7nter supply, e~;pecirtlly during the dry seasons, 
was another problem. J~lthough 'vater trains \·:ere run to supply designated 
filling stations, the practice proved expensive, a~ often unreliable, 
with the result that locomotives fre1uently either ran out of water or 
, 11 had to use d1rty water. It was only by drilling wells along the 
lines and the commencement of urban 'vater Hork proGrammes after the 
1 l ' d 12 war tha t the \va ter proben Ha s aile lora te • 
In spite of such improve':lcnts, deficiencies in locomotives 
remained a fairly persistent problerrt throughout the 1920' s. One 
difficulty '-las that there were such se:1,Sonal shortages of locomotives 
and railway stock, especially during the main cocoa seasons, that 
not only \\'ere locomotive cnpacj tif"s fn~(IUently exceeded, but durin;; 
such periods, it ,'.'as simply iml'ossible Lo withdraw the engines into 
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the workshops for servicing. These prolJlems were further exacerbated 
by the fact that locomotive maintenance involved the most complex 
and technologically sophisticated aspect of railway operation - ,.rhich 
required workshops, machinery, electricity power; all of which became 
13 generally available only towards the end of the 1920's. Thus not 
surprisingly, the maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock absorbed 
the lion's share of 40 per cent of annual recurrent expenditure. 
But while problems associated with track and railway stock 
maintenance were probably u~3voidable there also seemed to be a 
noticeable lack of initiative on the part of the authorities regarding 
general safety precautions. As early as 1904, the ~eneral l1anager 
reported an incident involving an excursion train full of Ashanti 
Chiefs and their entourage which had run out of control down a slope 
for one mile, and warned that unless safety measures were adopted to 
alleviate the frequent accidents on the railway, its popularity among 
14 the Africans would suffer considerably. lie wanted the provision 
of automatic vacuum brakes and lighting systems. Such improvements 
, ... ould not only ensure the safety of the trains but would also make it 
possible for traffic to run at night. However, the Crown ,\gents 
seemed more concerned about minimising operating costs than safety 
per see Thus the General Hanager was advised to adopt manual braking 
systems so that, one brake boy running between two vehicles would 
be responsible for stopping the \vheels "by placing pieces of wood 
in front of them. illS Besides, such brake boys would undertake 
the handling of traffic and other station duties thereby reducing 
resident manpower requirements at railway stations. 16 There was also 
a need for a standard code of signalling and the widespread use of 
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railways as footpaths by traders and carriers along with the use of 
shunting and marshalling yards as thoroughfares for passengers was 
also a safety risk. Although management was aware of, and frequently 
commented on, these problems, they did little to improve the 
situation. Thus as late as 1912 lvhen Cruikshank arrived in the Colony 
as the new General l1anager of the railways he was shocked by the 
neglect of safety precautions: 
I have already referred to the tortuous nature of the railway, 
and for this reason alone it is to me surprising that engines 
and rollin~ stock are not fitted ,·lith continuous autO'1atic 
brakes. Practically all the stock of every other railway is so 
equipped, and here we have a most difficult road through 
dense bush with sharp curves and heavy grades, the danger of 
falling trees, the railway treated by natives as a public 
thoroughfare and no means of quickly stopping trains. 17 
J~lthough by 1916 the trains had been provided with automatic brakes, 
and a uniform code of signalling had been established throughout the 
systerri,18 it was not until the 1920's, Hhen the incidence of accidents 
involving motor traffic became prevalent, that there was any talk of 
bl · h· 1 1 . 19 esta 1S 1ng eve crosslngs. l'U r the rlilOre, a 1 though the rai lways 
had become thoroughfares for pedestrians no fences were erected. 
Admittedly, inquests were held into all fatalities on the railway, 
but no real blame was attnched to raihvay management or employees. 
Safety and maintenance were 0[ mnjor importance for the smooth 
running and efficiency of the r~il~~ys, but attracted little public 
interest. rite issue of tarifl.'s, by contr:1st, could not escape public 
attention. .~fter all, railHay rntC's h:!d direct ir:lplications for the 
wider public. This section identifies the main determinants of tariff 
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pol i cy, and cons i der s the deS rce to \,-11 i cll the eXl),1 tr i.1 te mining and 
commercial interests influenced the settinE; of rates [or traffic. 
The !:lain iactors that influence tr.'1ffic development on a railway 
are the existence of competition -:.nd th~ rate levels. In the Gold 
Coast, there were at first no major competitors, apart from traditional 
headloading. Consequently, it woul~ seem, that the railways enjoyed 
a near monopoly. Initially, railway tariff rates in the Gold Coast 
were relatively high, especially when cOlllpared with those or the other 
British \~est African raih.;ays. In l':W3, three classes of passenger 
fares were charged: 5d per mile for first class, 2d for second, and 
l~d for third - though the latter was not immediately implemented 
because it was thought that all African users would be employed by 
the mines or trading f~rms, to whom the second class rate was aimed. 20 
Goods traffic was similarly ckEsified into three classes which were 
charged at the rate of 2/6d per ton mile for the first, 1/8d for 
21 
second, and 1/- for the third. Clearly such rates compared 
unfavourably with Nigeria's 9d, 6d and 3d per ton mile for goods 
traffic and 9d, 6d and 4d on the Sierra Leone railways.22 It must 
be noted, however, that construction costs were higher on the Gold 
coast - an average of £10,314 per mile compared to Nigeria's £7,064 
and the Sierra Leonean narrow guage which cost a mere £4,316 per mile. 23 
l"urthermore, the ,,"shanti Goldfields Agreeillent of 1901, (under which the 
\Jestern line was extended to Kumasi) stipulated that railway rates 
15 "1 24 were not to fall below a minimum avera~e OL pence per ton m1 e. 
2f" 
rhe average for 1903 was 19.69 pence pe~ ton mile J but by the following 
yeal- it had fallen to 15.0() pence because o[ a deve lopint; traf f ic in 
" . 26 15 0 d "bush produce wh1ch was charged at low rates. .\t • l> per ton 
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mile the ~ailways could not revise rates without contravening the 
Ashanti Goldfields Agreement. Consequently, the authorities becaule 
keen to abrogate the agreelllent so as to allow railway officials a free 
hand in tariff policy. This became all the more urgent because the 
administration were unuer pressure from several quarters to reduce 
rates. After a lot of lvrangling on the part of the Corporation, the 
agreement was finally abrogated in ,qJril 1905. 27 
As early as 1903, the Lonclon Chamber 01 Commerce had made 
representations to the Colonial Office that not only should raw materials 
for export be charged at a low rate of tariff, but also capital imports, 
such as machinery and boilers for the mines, because such goods 
increased the productivity of the Colony. The Chamber noted the higher 
rates in the Gold Coast compared with Nigeria and Sierra Leone and 
called for a general reduction. It argued that ~overnment personnel 
and stores, (which under the Ashanti Goldfields Agreeiilent were charged 
at the cost of conveyance), sllould henceforth attract the same rates as 
public traffic, because the administration had already reaped the 
political and administrative benefits oJ.: the railwa}s.28 in the following 
year, thirteen mining companies operatin~ in the Colony banded together 
to further press the Colonial Uffice for rates reductions, especially 
on fuel. They argued that existinG rates of 5d per ton mile for coal 
and £2 per truck load of firewood (distance unspecified) were too 
high and demanded that coal be car~ied at 1d per ton mile whilst that 
01 firewood be halved. The mines threatened to withold all shipments 
29 from London until theil." demands were met. Official response was 
varied. The Consulting Engineers warned that i1 coal were to be 
carried at 1d per ton mile as the minin~ industry insisted, the 
railways would suffer great losses, and that it would even be 
unprofitable to carry it for 1~d per ton mile. 30 fhe General Manager 
artued that ocean rate charges were the problem and not railway rates. 
The more the railways reduced rates the more the shipping companies would 
take advantage to increase theirs. rurthermore, he argued, firewood 
tariffs could not be reduced because firewood loads caused heavy 
wear and tear on the wagons, and necessitated Sunday labour which was 
31 paid at a higher rate. Governor Kodger's response was, however, to 
assure the mining companies that their interests would be promoted as far 
as possible by cheap railway rates as this was necessary for the 
economical mining of low grade ore which was common in the Tarkwa 
d ' i 32 lstr cts. But the Governor also cautioned that the intention was 
not to go to the extent of actually subsidizing the mines. Although the 
administration might be willing to consider employin6 differential rates 
involving the cross subsidization of one traffic by another in order to 
promote particular industries, such preferential rates would not 
necessarily fall below levels that were considered "uneconomic". 
Subsequent developments however were to prove otherwise. 
Apart from the mining lobby, pressure also came from 
porterage competition for a downward revision of rates. ~roadly speaking 
there were two aspects to the competition. first competition over 
short distances was met by the introduction ot 1d per mile day market 
return tickets in 1904, to encourage the use of the railways by 
33 
the petty traders who had turned railway tracks into footpaths. 
Secondly, long distance competition (especially in spirits and rubber) 
was experienced on the routes to and from Ashanti. Ashanti Chiefs 
and traders still sent their carriers down the coast with rubber 
to return with spirits which they carried at 4s per case of twelve 
34 bottles as against 12s charged by the railways. Consequently, 
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European traders complained that they were unable to compete with their 
African counterparts in the ,,-shanti and i~orthern Territory markets. 
13esities, the revenue prospects 0;': the railways was impaired. for 
instance, out o~ 77,016 gallons or gin imported into Sekondi in 1904, 
only 18,300 gallons were carried by rail, the rest were carried by 
headloading. 35 
One of the earliest efforts to counteract long distance porterage 
competition and to attract traffic onto the railways was through the 
establishment of traffic agencies (working on a commission basis), which 
collected goods and transported them by carriers or wheel carts to the 
railways. Some of the most important agencies were located at Asafo 
(Cape Coast-Kumasi trade route), Atebubu (Ashanti-~olta ~iver trade), 
and $efwi, to collect rubber and palm produce that went to the ports 
01 SJltpond and Cape Coast. They quoted through rates from the points 
36 
of collection to the final destination. Although such agencies 
did much to attract traffic to the railways, tariffs ramained the most 
crucial factor in traffic administration. 
In July 1905, follm-lillt,; the abrogation of the .~shanti Goldfields 
A~reement, railway tarifis were rnJically restructured, and a new schedule 
of rates was introduced. (fable 9.J). Apart from periodic alterations 
the basic features of the new tariif structure remained in existence 
throughout the period before 1930. 
Perhaps the most important featu.ce 01. the new policy was a 
.eneral reduction in rates by lowerin~ all ~oods by one class. 'fhe 
Q 
principle 01 taper 011 rates, (ie the lOIl~er the distance the cheaper 
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To.1\e gIl 
1-50 miles .:51-100 miles 100-150 miles 151-
~pecial Class I s d s d s U s d 
.. ates: Brandy, 
~in, ~~ine 3 9 3 9 3 9 3 9 
pnd other Spirits 
Class I. 2 6 2 3 2 0 1 9 
Class II 2 0 1 0 1 3 0 10 
Class III 1 3 1 0 0 9 0 6 
r-:lass Ii 0 .J 0 4 L '2 0 4 0 3' 
Source: General llana~er; ~~ail\olays .teport, 1905, 1l.25 
the rates), was' also introduced to promote long distance traffic. 
furthermore, tile techniques 0 .... scientific costing were now more 
rigorously al)plied in the re-classi£ication of Joods. l'hree additional 
c~sses were introduced, makin~ a total or six. lor instance, goods 
that weighed little but occupied a larC;e alllount of space were charged 
at a higher rate than those with a heavy weigllt but takin;; little space. 
Goods were also charged accordin~ to "what the traffic can bear." 
That is to say, higher value goods such as bullion or perfumes attracted 
higher tariffs than bulky low value 600US such as timuer. llut perhaps 
the most striking application of the principle of differential rates 
was the reduction in rates for minin~ and mercantile interests. .\.ates 
on coal uere reduced fro:n Sd per ton mile to 8/- per ton up to the 
first 50 miles, and 1d per ton mile ueyond, and firewood rates halved 
from £.2 to £.1 per truck, \,;hi1st non minin~ firewood traffic attracted 
the ordinary class five rate. 
Sil:1ilarly, special 10\'; rates \-;erc introduceu Lor direct 
shipment 01.. rice, sugar, cotton t;ooJs and other illlpo .. ted provisions 
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from Sekondi to humasi, which was intended to promote the activities 
of the newly established expatriate tradin; finns in J\shanti and to a 
lesser extent the Northern Territories. 37 r'inally, special low 
differential rates "lere also introduced for "Uown" or Export traffic, 
which had hitherto been conspicuously absent on-the railways. In 1904 
'" the average carrying capacity of a train was 16-17 tons and on this 
/ 
basis it was calculated tha t trains were loadedup to 36.97 per cent 
of their capacity in the "Up" direction as against a mere 8 per cent 
38 
for "Oown". It is obvious that trains returned to the coast empty. 
To remedy this situation, foodstuffs and other export produce in the 
"Uown" direction were charged at lower rates. 
ilut how does one account for the existence of severe porterage 
competition for spirits, and the fact that such traffic remained the 
most highly rated on the railway, and to which the principle of taper 
on rates did not apply under the 1905 tariff changes (Table 9.3),1 The 
main explanation for the apparent anomaly is that the revenue needs 
of the railways were cons trained by a lon~ s tantiing ac;reel.lent among the 
Colonial powers to discourage the consuloption OL alcohol by the 
imposition of high customs and railway tariffs. Thus although railway 
management included rate reductions on spirits in the 190j proposals, 
. 39 1 the Colonial Office was hesitant to approve 1t. It was not unti 
1906 that a compromise was reached Hhereby a 2·5 per cent reduction \Vas 
effected on the condition that the commodity lIould not find its way to 
1 .1 1 'I' . t . 40 tle t~ortlern errl or1es, prcsum:lbly because of the prospects of 
utilising the region as a labollr reserve. 
In spite of these Hide ranging changes in tariffs the issue of 
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railway rates remained alive. The activities of the expatriate interests 
(especially the mining companies) mainly ensured this; for their interests 
conflicted Hith management's perception of sound commercial principles 
in rating policy. In fact, like the issue of financi21 administration 
(see Chap. 8), t~riffs on mine traffic resulted in a triangular conflict 
between railway management, the Colonial Administration and the 
Colonial Office. Jdthough rates on coal had been considerably reduced 
and that of firewood halved in July 1905, this concession did not 
satisfy the mines, l17h~ argued that nothing less than a flat 1d per ton 
mile for coal l17as acceptable. 41 tiu t the Consul ting f.ngineers rei tera ted 
their Harning that any such further reductions l-lould be uneconomic. 42 
HOl-leVer, under constant pressure from the expatriate lobby in the 
Legislative Council, the Governor instructed the management in Uecember 
1905 to introduce rebates on coal traffic. 43 Nothing immediately came 
of the instruction. fhe General IJanager insisted on guarantees from 
the mines that specific volumes of traffic would be forthcoming before 
the issue could be considered any further. 44 Consequently, the tariff 
lobby renel17ed their pressure on the Colonial Office for lower rates. 
H.ailway rates were discussed in the Hritish fJarliament in 1907, lolhere it 
was pointed out that they lolere higher in the Gold Coast than in any 
other Colony. J\.lthough the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
rebutted such arguments by pointing to the Gold Coast's higher construction 
costs, he indicated that reduced rates were in the pipeline. 45 By 
1909, in fact, the rating issue had resulted in the establishment of a 
Joint \~est African Consultative Committee comprising representatives 
of the West African mining and .;ommercial lobbies, the Colonial Office, 
and the Crown Agents. This excessive influence of business interests 
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over colonial policy attracted criticism, one member ot the Colonial 
Office staff tersely remarking that: "in adopting this method we fly 
in the face of all previous experience, and adopt all that has been 
f d t k b dl ,,46 oun 0 wor a y many years ago. Nevertheless, with the 
establishment of this Committee, the railway managers lost control over 
rating policy. Henceforth, their influence was limited to vociferous, 
but ineffective attacks on decisions introduced from London with little 
prior consultation with management. 
In 1910, the General lianager complained that coal was carried 
at a "positive loss" because of liberal rebates granted to the mining 
companies~7 By the follol-ling year, the ~{aihvays \vere for the first 
time, able to arrive at an approxim.ite tonnage of firewood carried to the 
mines. This amounted to 81,364 tons, or 44.38 per cent of total goods 
traffic. In terms of revenue however, the traffic produced a mere 
£3,523 or 1.6 per cent of gross goods receipts. But firewood traffic 
was both difficult and expensive to handle, involving the laying of 
several miles of shunting tracks along the main lines, and that of coal 
required special port facilities. Consequently, management argued 
.. II b ' d 48 that uneconomic rates had een Impose • 
uespite managerial concern 1912 saw yet another general 
reductionin rates for goods traffic, fuel,specie and bullion for the 
mines, as well as the introduction of privilege tickets for expatriate 
f 1 " 49 mining and mercantile employees along , .. ;ith T:linisters 0 re 19lon. 
fhe railway managers objected to the downward movem~nt in 
rates. rhey argued that lo,o:er rates did not necess:lrily ie .. ld to higher 
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demand and as a result, the ,;.ai1\-:ays did not benefit from economy 
of scale. rhus contrary to expectations that reduced rates in 1912 
would augment traffic, total goods tonnage for the year actually fell 
by 9,845 tons over that of the previous yea~s, and gross goods receipts 
fell from L213,507 to £199,124. The most conspicuous decrease was 
in firewood traffic for the mines which fell by 9,708 tons to 71,566 
tons in 1912. rurthermore, a counter-bnlancing increase in the volume of 
coal and patent fuel did not occur, coal tonnage being 949 tons less 
than that of the previous year. L'inally, it was argued that where 
reduced rates had resulted in increased tonnages (as it did in the case of 
imported provisions - which rose by 733 tons in 1912 but still producing 
£2,258 less than the previous year's) such lower rates did not result 
. d· d· . h fl·· 50 1n a correspon 1ng re uct10n 1n t e cost 0 1v1ng. The implication 
was that reduced railway rates benefited the expatriate mining and 
trading firms whilst the railways,suffered and prices of goods in the 
Colony remained high. 
But were the railway managers entirely right in their 
criticismsl The overall financial position of the railways and the 
continuous growth in traffic would appear to justify low rates. Between 
1908 and 1914, goods traffic rose from 47,629 tons to 258,627 tons which 
amounted to more than 500,0 increase, \vhi1st the number of passengers 
carried more than quadrupled - froln J10,003 in 1908 to 5L7,001 in 
1914. uuring the same period gross earnings rose from £151,423 to 
£383,009 whilst net revenue trebled - from L76,209 in 1908 to £208,919 
51 in 1914. But these ~igures conce~l the expansion that ~as taking 
place in the ra i lway sys tr~m, e s pecia 11y the opening of the rAOs tern 
line which by 1914, carried 46,830 tons of the gross goods traffic for 
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that year and produced £66,570 of the total goods earnin~s. Uut even 
so, traffic on the \Jestern line in 1914 also showed an increase of 
18,919 tons and yielding £9,450 more tharl that of the previous year. 52 
It would thus seem that management's criticisms ~ere based on one 
specific year and fail to take into account the lonver trends. 
o 
Nevertheless it will shortly be argued that there indeed seems to be 
little correlation between rate levels and traffic development. 
~ith the outbreak of War in 1914, the administrative 
infighting that had characterised tariif policy subsided although 
certain important changes did occur. The Imperial Government's 
financial demands on the Gold Coast at the outbreak of war meant that 
the Colony had to find ways of broadening its revenue base. Customs 
tariffs had been increased just prior to the \Jar, and in any case the 
prospects of customs revenue depende(l on the availability o[ shipping 
space over which the authorities had little control. ~ailway rates 
on the other hand had been considerably reduced in the years before the 
war and although railway revenue also depended to Gome extent on 
foreign trade it was nonetheless considered more reliable than customs. 
Consequently, the railways were called upon to meet the financial needs 
of the metropolitan war economy: a 15~ war surcharge was imposed on 
all passenger traffic and imported goods while cocoa exports attracted 
53 
a 50k tax. Significantly coal, firewood and general mining traffic 
were exempted from the surcharge.fhe results of such measures can 
partly be seen in the War time financial performance of the railways: 
Gross receipts more than doubled from £383,009 in 1914 to £737,362 by 
1920 - producing net revenues of £174,065 and ~365,309 respectively. 
~lore importantly, such increased rates did not discourage the growth 
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of traffic. Un the contrary, total goods tonnage increased from 
258,600 tons in 1914 to 371,400 tons in 1920 whilst the number of 
passengers carried rose from 527,001 to 1,334,286. Cocoa which bore the 
brunt of the tariff increase - 50 per cent - nearly doubled from 52,000 
tons in 1913 to 92,000 in 1917. 54 l~dmittedly the extension of the 
Eastern line to Tafo in 1917 partly accounts for the traffic growth. 
¥or instance, out of the 22,000 tons rise in cocoa tonnage in 1917, the 
Accra line accounted for practically 16,000 tons, "but the Sekondi 
railway also showed a gratifying increase" and "had conditions been at 
all normal the total exports would have been very heavy indeed.,,55 
The fact of the matter is that, "there is a conviction held by growers 
that prices offered were too low and were bound to rise (after the 
war)" and "a quantity of cocoa was held up until unfit for sale.,,56 
Not surprisingly, when shipping space became available from 1919, and 
producer price for cocoa began to pick up, 176,000 tons of the beans 
57 
were carried on the railways in that year alone. It is thus evident 
that high tariffs during the war did not prove a disincentive to trade. 
This proposition was later confirmed by Colonel Hammond's Report on 
the Railways in 1921 when he stated: 
That these rates, when compared without any qualification with 
the rates per ton mile charged on other railways in ~frica 
are high cannot be denied, but the existing rates are not 
preventing the development of the export trade ••• The point 
at which it will be necessary to bring in aGpreciable reductions 
in railway rates has not yet been reached. 5 
The important point to note about all this is that, in the period up to 
1920, the railways enjoyed a near monopoly in transport. Consequently 
the rate levels that were set were not so much influenced by either 
competition from alternative forms of carriage, or by managerial 
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perception of sound commercial principles, as they were by the demands 
of the expatriate mining and mercantile interests, and the financial 
needs of tIE Uri tish war eCOnOJ;1Y. fhese condi tions wou ld hm.:ever, not 
remain for long. 
Uuring the 1920's traffic policy moved onto new grounds. fhe 
issue was no longer confined to rate levels, but also the need to adopt 
administrative actions in order to safeguard the interest of the railways 
against the development of competition from r03d traffic. The 
challenge from roads, more especially from lorry-freighting of cocoa 
and spirits, broke the railway's near monopoly of transport. 
In the Gold Coast, motor transportation initially developed 
slowly. The first motor vehicle to arrive in the Colony was a 
paraffin - fired car, obtained in 1902 for the use of the Governor -
Sir Hathew Nathan. Hmvever, this \vas a white elephant, languishing 
unused in the Government ~ecretariat until, during a clean-up campaign 
59 in 1908, it \vas carried out llnd thrmvn into the sea. JJy il.HJ;'J, a few lorries 
had been imported inlo the country but it was not until the ye:us of the 
iirst World War that motor transport developed on a si~nificallt scale, 
partly because of the conditions on the railways at the time - high rates 
and p00r maintenance - and partly too because of the introduction of the 
l ' I'd 1 ' 60 19lt Amerlcan lor orrles. ,.1 though a l~oads uepartment of the 
Public horks iJepartment was established in 1910 to undertake the systematic 
reconstruction and bridging of main trunk roads, very little had been 
accomplished by the time the war broke out and caused government 
,,,61 b f expendi ture on roo ds to be "reduced to vanishing pOlnts. Thus e ore 
1920, any progress made in road building was due .mainly to the efforts 
256 
of Chiefs and their subjects, - especially in the cocoa producing 
areas. koad building by Chiefs and prominent cocoa farmers had begun 
in 1908 when several hundred miles of roads were reportedly constructed 
within the Eastern and Central Provinces. u2 lly 1920, no less than 
1,300 miles of such motorable non-government roads had been completed 
in the Colony alone {i.e. not including l~shanti and the LJorthern 
'f .. )63 errltorles • Because these roads were built in an ad hoc fashion 
by Chiefs and cocoa farmers, as and when they felt they were necessary, 
the system that developed did n)t [011(/1,] the e,uidelines of the 
government's policy, Hhich stressed that roads were to complement the 
railways (which it considered to be the principle arteries of 
64 
communication) rather than to compete with them. By the early 
twenties the railways were clearly under threat from motor traffic 
competition. 
i.toad competition raised issues related not only to railway 
rates but also to the very nature of railway finacial policy. Une 
aspect of the dilemma Has \·;hether l'1otor transport, (vlhich \.]as partly 
in the hands of ~uropean merchants, but was to a larger extent 
controlled by ,~fricans), should be allm.;ed to compete with, and possibly 
run down a government railway system which was financed by loans borrowed 
from the London money market. So here we perceive a conflict of interests 
between private, (mainly indit;inotls capital), and expatri;lte finance 
. 1 11 tIL' 1 vernment's o\~n needs for revenue. capl ta , as we as le co on1a go . 
In 1922, Governor Guggisberg had explicitly stated his opinion on this 
issue when he said: 
The critics of rail\.;ay r,'1tes nppear to t:.onsider that no 
profits should be made at all on government railways. By 
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opinion is that the profits should be reasonable, but I 
entirely disagree that no profits at all should be made in a 
country whose railways have been constructed by money 
borrowed from stockholders. 65 
Clearly, the administration Has committed to protecting the interests 
of the railways against the threat from motor transport competition. 
This became all the more urgent because at this time, fakoradi was 
under construction, and the administration had to ensure that the 
railways transported maximum traffic to the harbour in order to make 
it viable (see Chapter 4). 
In 1924, the Government established a Special l{o,-~ds IJepartment 
whose aim was to re-organise the road network in the Colony and 
Ashanti so as to make it complement rather than compete with the 
'1 66 ra1 ways. The Oepartment's efforts \vere to result in the infamous 
"Koad Gaps" policy, under which gaps were deliberately maintained 
in "strategic portions" of the road system so as to prevent lorries 
running on them. The nature, extent and unpopularity of the road gap 
policy is \vell illustrated by the General llanager's observations: 
The policy is intensely unpopular with the unofficial 
communities, distasteful to the administration staff, a~I 
trust that you will agree that it should be abandoned. 
Admitting fully that it is the duty of the government to see 
that its railway, on which some £8 million of capital have 
been spent are not allowed to become an undue burden on the 
tax payer it cannot, I think, be contended that government can 
properly continue to bolster up railway traffic by retarding 
the normal development of cheap communications ••• a policy 
of road gaps which prevents the development of normal 
, d" " d f 'ble 67 connect1ng roa s, 15 1n my op1n10n un e ens1 • 
Apart from the unpolularity of the policy, the measure also proved 
grossly ineffective in curbing the incidence of motor competition. 
This is demonstrated by the Ceneral l1anager's account of how gin was 
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transported to Kumasi in 1925: 
Gin for Kumasi is being lorried up the ~rahsu road to 
Brofoyedru, head loaded to ~amena over the three miles road 
gap, lorried from l"omena to ,\.krokeri, railed from ,\krokeri 
to Bekwai, and then lorried to ,-umasi. 68 
iI .. s the Hanager stated, "this is farcioal but real." 
Following the General Manager's criticisms the policy of road 
gaps was revised. Gaps were no longer maintained in the road system. 
Instead, certain traffics, especially cocoa and spirits were outlawed 
on specified roads. The aim was to allow the lorry freighting of 
passenger and ordinary foodstuffs and imported provisions, but not of 
cocoa and spirits which were considered vital to the revenue needs of the 
69 
railways. 
Alongside the auministrativc actions, the railway managers 
also responded to motor competition by a reduction in railway rates. 
But the question was no longer the rates to be borne by particular types 
of goods on the railway system as a whole, but rather the need to 
introduce differential rates between the three principal lines -
differential rates that would reflect the geographical variations in 
the intensity of motor traffic competition. 
Tahle 9.4 
l{ates on Cocoa Traffic on the i(:lih:;lYS, ,\.verRge l'er fon lIile 
in Pence, Selected Years. 
Year destern Line Castern Line Central Line 
1922 7.87 7.R7 na 
1<)23 7.38 5. l.5 na 
1927 7.92 5.00 na 
1930 7.91 4.45 1.97 
Sources Kailway L(evenue ~rtlmi t tee, Jl. 
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Between 1922 and 1930, rates on cocoa on the ~estern line remained 
almost stationary at over 7d per ton mile while th1t of the Lastern 
line fell by over 40 per cent. nut the most strikin 6 fertture of the 
tariff structure is the comparatively low rate of 1.97d per ton mile 
on the Central Province line in 1930. fhe relative intensity of 
competition in a particular area determined rate levels that were set on 
the different systems. In ;'\.shanti "nel the ',lestern reGions where 
railway development preceded roads, motor transport tended to feed, 
rather than compete with the ~ekondi-i:umasi line. Consequently, there 
was no pressure for rates reduction on that section. In the Eastern 
Province on the other hand, road construction largely proceeded 
simultaneously with railway building with the result that it was not 
uncommon for the two systems to run paralle~ and hence compete with 
one another?O This is well illustrated by the impact that the Accra-
Nsawam road had on the movement of cocoa on the Accra line. Between 
1924-25 and 1927-28, cocoa traffic by rail between Nsawam and Accra 
decrease d from 91,643 tons to 51, 7 BO tons. In the 1 a t te r yea r, the motor 
road be tween Nsawan and j~ccra Has closed dO\vn for recons truc tion. This 
brought about an immediate increase in the tonnage which rose by 
25,578 tons to 77,358 tons in 1928-29, but on the rca d being re-opened 
71 
it quickly receded to 50,139 tons by 1930-31. 
lJut the system that faced the most sevcrp. competition was the 
Central line; a fact that was commented upon by the Ceneral lianager 
,.,hen he said they ,.,ere threatened by "established competition". (see 
Chapter 'd. In this case the ronds actually preceded the railway, 
the construction of which had attracted criticisms [rom several 
quarters. I~lthough rates were lowered in order to attract traffic to 
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Takoradi, the payment of hnrbour dues at the latter port also proved 
to be a disincentive since ships still called at the Central irovince 
7L surf ports, Hhere no dues were charged. The closure of the surf 
ports, which were tapping lorry-borne traffic of Central Province, was 
seriously considered, but abandoned because of expatriate mercantile 
and African opposition. 73 
The competition between road and rail, particularly for cocoa 
traffic, was proving to be unequal on the Eastern and Central lines, 
and this raised serious questions about the future profitability of the 
Gold Coast railway system. 
EfJ.'lCIENCY ,\NU Ltv l' I L'LBILITY: 
What were the implications of operational arrangements and 
tariff policies for the overall performance of the L{ailways? In 
other ''lords, were the Gold Coast i~,'lilh1ays efficient? Lfficiency can 
be distinguished between conveyance of passengers and carriage of 
goods. Some measures of the former are given in Table 9.5a. This 
indicates that the ratio betHeen the numbers of passengers carried and 
the naulage capacity of coaches generally deteriorated over time. 
Apart from the years immediately following the war, first class 
carriages, for instance, were rarely filled to more than 15 per cent 
of the ir carrying capaci ty. ,1.1 though 2nd class coaches \ole re fai r ly 
well loaded during the post war recovery - the highest level being 
65.10 per cent in 1920 - a deterioration set in. The ratio between 
the number of passengers to carrying capacity quickly dwindled to a mere 
5 per cent by 1925-26, after Hhich it settled at around 9 per cent. 
'fhird class carriages by contrnst, were often highly loaded - from 
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lJate 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class rotal 
1915 14.22 22.72 87.80 94.50 
1916 15.56 29.07 92.40 78.28 
1917 na na na na 
1918 12.31 18.94 81.50 68.77 
1919 25.95 52.72 101.12 97.45 
1920 20.90 65.10 115.12 101.85 
1921 13.85 35.31 95.38 80.23 
1922-23 37.09 13.18 75.58 66.05 
1923-24 19.08 10.96 58.93 51.81 
1924-25 18.45 7.16 61.01 52.05 
1925-26 12.77 5.32 52.88 44.09 
1926-27 13.83 5.13 46. fJ 1 40.33 
1927-28 12.29 9.59 50.85 45.56 
1928-29 13.29 9.01 50.25 45.31 
1929-30 10.07 9.38 43.99 39.62 
Source: General Nanager, L {il i 1 \'1 a 1 s t{eEort, 1915-1920/30. 
87.8 per cent of carrying capacity in 1915 it rose to above 
100 per cent during the post war boom. Clearly, third class coaches 
were being over loaded. ill though the posi tion later improved the 
number of passengers conveyed rarely fell below 45 per cent of capacity. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the first and second class 
carriages were run at well below capacity, whilst the third class was 
more substantially used. AS J~ldcroft aptly points out, however, 
"economical methods of handling traffic are crucial for improving 
"I "tt"" 1174 ral way operatlng e lClency. But by the 1920's the ~old Coast 
Kailways were clearly operating with excess capacity on the passenger 
side, most of this being explained by under-utilisation of first and 
second class carriages. The uneconomic operation of first and second 
coaching clnsses on the railways attracted managerial comment, first 
75 
durin6 the war years when rolling stock were in short supply, but 
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more especially during the period of motor competition in the twenties. 76 
The unification of these two classes was seriously considered. 
However, this suggestion was never implemented'because of opposition 
from the white community who insist~d upon segregation. as a result, 
second class carriages, which \~ere aimed at the .~frican elites, 
continued to be placed on the lines despite their obvious unprofitability. 
~hilst coaching trains were thus uneconomically operated, the 
handling of goods traffic demonstrates an improvement in railway 
efficiency over time. (Table 9.5b). In 1914, the average 
number of tons in a loaded train amounted to 48, tons, but by 1928/29 
the figure had more than doubled to 116.36 tons. The average carrying 
capacity of goods vehicles incrc3sed from 16.96 tons in 1915 to 22.48 
tons in 1929/30 while the ratio of freight to carrying c3pacity rose 
fro m 30. 88 per c en tin 1 9 16 too \' C r {~ 0 [J c r c en t t h r 0 ugh 0 u t the 
twen ties. Such irnprovemen ts were la r;~t; ly a consequence of the 
reconstruction of the western line, \\'hich made possiLle the running 
of locomotives and rolling stock of heavier capacities. l'urthermore, 
the punc tua 1 i ty of trains seerne d to h,1ve improve d cons i de rab ly. l,'or 
. 77 
instance, in 1904 only 48 per cent of trClins 'vere running to schedule, 
but by 1926/27 the figure had gone 
78 
ur to 83 per cent. lIence travel 
time from Sekondi to KUlnasi was practically halved from more than 
20 hours in 1906 to 12 by 1927.
79 
JUly discussion of efficiency on the railways must also take i,nto 
account the fact that the Gold ~oast ~ailway was a single track system. 
This meant that a large amount of time was wasted in shunting and standing 
in steam to allow oncoming trains to pass in the opposite direction. 
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Table 9.5b 
Goods Traffic: Average Carrying Capacity of/ehicles and ratio of 
freight to Carrying Capacity~ 
uate Carrying Capacity ,~a tio of ,i."reight to ,\.verage [,0. of Tons 
of Vehicles Carrying Capacity in a frain 
1915 16.96 33.59 ld 
1916 17.08 30.88 43 
1917 na na na 
1918 15.97 35.'+8 39 
1919 na na na 
1920 16.0 43.4'3 49 
1921 17 .0 1.4. 03 61 
1922-23 19.0 It4.18 67 
1923-24 21.09 4 r). 1) It 75 
1924-25 21.73 lfJ.O (:'4 
1925-26 21.96 45.11 98 
1926-27 21.86 44.18 105 
1927-28 21.9 42.71 108.52 
1928-29 21.84 41.06 116.36 
1929-30 22.48 40.06 109.62 
.source: General lIanager, .\<lih;a:t l~e Ear ts, 1915-1929-30. 
This situation became even more acute on lines experipncing high accident 
rates. If one train was involved in an accident, it necessarily entailed 
delays for many more. But even so, the proportion of train mileage 
\~as ted in shunting and s tanding in s team to total train mileage also 
indicate an improvement in efficiency - from 28.97 per cent of total 
80 
train mileage in 1907, to 18.97 per cent in 1928-29. 
Clearly, except for coaching, ,,'here capacity remained 
underutilised in the 1st and 2nd classes, it is fair to say that the 
overall operating efficiency of the ;,ailways improved significantly 
over time. 
J";110 ther impor tan t measu re of the per forrnance of ra i l\vay 
enterprise is related to the growth of tr;lffic and revenues. fable 9.6 
presents figures for the annual rate of growth of gross earnings, goods 
264 
traffic, and foreign trade by voluf1e in five year averages between 
1905 and 1929/30. It would seem that a period of relatively 
,. .. \a \ e. CI\." 
Cr~owT~"..p "Ol-PrPFle.l p_ ~',)e-""tA~ Pr .... .l 6lC~~"'A L Tttl\taF 
\~Oo_ \C\lO~ (S ~fiAtl A-ven.AIre-{J. '.J 
Jate Annual l{ate of 
~rowth of Gross 
E.arnings (a) 
1905-1908 1.7 
1909-1913 19.31 
1914-1918 5.16 
1919-1923-4 18.46 
1924-25-1929-30 2.69 
i~nnu;}l ,~::tte of :mnual l{ate of 
~rowth of Goods Growth of ioreign 
fraffic (b) Trade (c) 
by Volume 
15.14 
43.01 
9.26 
11f. 29 
8.02 
20.82 
10.11 
-1.42 
10.22 
15.7 
Source: Columns (a) and (b) are calculated from revenue and 
traffic Figures available in the Ceneral llanager's ,mnual l~eport 
on the ~ailways. Column (c) is calculated from data [or ~olume 
of foreign trade in L.ay, iJolitical Lconomy of Colonialism, 
Tables 20b and 21b. 
rapid growth in railway earnings and traffic up to 1~23/24 
(checked only by the w.ar years) gave way to a slower rate of 
growth by the mid twenties. Conversely, a relatively slow rate of 
growth in foreign trade between 1909 and 1924 had given way to a 
period of rapid growth during the second half of the 1920's. In other 
'oJords the i{ai l\oJays ini tially grew a t a f as ter ra te than fore ign trade 
but from the mid 1920's, the situation had reversed: foreign trade 
now experienced a faster grOlvth than the l{ailways. 
How doe s one account for such trends 7 . Be tween 1904 and 1908 
gross revenues fluctuated around a stationary state, as a result of 
tariff changes. The rapid growth in earnings and goods traffic from 
1909 onwards indicates a growing demand for transport created by nearly 
a decade of railway operation in the \Jestern Province. But the trend 
is also partly a consequence of the opening of the eastern line, in 
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1912 and its gradual extension to Tafo by 1917. UurinG the war, 
revenues suffered a set back as a result ofa contraction in railway 
capacity and the imposition of surcharges on tariffs. The rate of growth 
of goods traffic also slowed down. ~uch high rates, which remained 
in existence throughout the early t\venties, together with the extension 
of the eastern system to Kumasi by 1923, accounts for the recovery in 
the rate of gro~lth of revenues and, to a lesser extent, traffic during 
the post war years. 
The evidence suggests tlwt, Hhile the growth of foreign trade 
was probably responsible for the growth in railway traffic and 
revenues before 1908, internal traffic, particularly low rated 
firewood was the main determinin~ factor in the growth of railway 
revenue and traffic after 1908. i~ot surprisingly, the rate of growth 
of railway traffic generally exceeded that of revenues. jmring the 
War, while foreign trade recorded a negative grmvth in volume terms -
an annual avera~e of -1.42 per cent caused by shortage of shipping space 
- railway traffic experienced an annual growth of 9.26 per cent. 
However, a combination of high \·;nr time tarifls, increased transport 
demand, (especially in cocoa traffic), restricted railway capacity, and 
the preferential treatment of lClrge consignees, Hho ".'ere often 
Europeans, had also resulted in a loss of railway traffic, mainly from 
/'.frican shippers, to the nascent motor tr;1I1sport. ..[ter the war, not 
only did the .~3ilways fail to ~in back ~ll,of lost traffic, but more 
significantly, by the mid t\Ventic~; it bec.l"le evident that lorries had 
become major competitors to the r;1ill'ays. Consequently, the rate of 
growth of both rail\lay revenues and :.;ood.<': traffic slO\:ed dOHn considerably 
a tat i me 0 [ rap i d g r 0 \-l t h in for c i :, n t r a de. 
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.mother feature of the zrowth of revenues is the relative 
importance of goods traffic as opposed to coaching. (Table 9.7). In 
1906, goods traffic receipts amounted to £139,915, and apart from one 
Tahle 9.7 
dailH2.y L.1rnings 
Date Goods l~eceipts Proportion of Coaching Proportion of 
Goods ,;f'{:eipts L\e ce ip ts Coaching 
to '.;ross ,:eceipts to 
}:arnings Gross Earnings 
1906 139,915 81.71 28,130 16.42 
1907 128,257 77.14 31,989 19.24 
1908 118,718 78.40 32,452 21.43 
1909 146,824 79.19 35,886 19.35 
1910 204,303 80.65 45,181 17.83 
1911 220,113 76,98 61,872 21.64 
1912 237,233 75.22 73,901 23.43 
1913 263.874 73.18 90,445 25.08 
1914 281,781 73.57 92,274 24.09 
15 330,029 73.78 109,000 24.37 
1916 359,974 73.47 121,199 24.74 
1917 366,397 74.14 115,703 23.41 
1918 327,195 71.66 114,317 25.04 
1919 489,330 72.78 166,143 24.71 
1920 520,458 70.59 197,652 26.81 
1921 511,991 72.51 177,835 25.19 
1922-23 655,015 74.61 187,744 21.39 
1923-24 771,830 76.26 203,348 20.04 
1924-25 826,315 77. if 7 202,079 18.94 
1925-26 850,238 77.13 214,703 19.47 
1926-27 894,220 77.32 22':f,031 1<).37 
1927-28 904,817 74.42 '} 6 '.; l41 - ~, . 22.08 
1928-29 917,508 73. LQ 281,729 22.67 
1929-30 866,665 73.26 26~;, 885 22.73 
Source: General l-ianager, I • 1 . t ;.al H~ly .. eI2or s, 1906-1929/30 
or two slight fluctuations, continued to ~row steadily until it reached 
a figure of J:917,508 in 1928-29. \·Jhcn these goods receipts \"'ere expressed 
as a percentatage of gross e.:1rnill:','~ it is evident that they never 
accounted for less than three-':lI'lrtf'r:~ or :"r0SS revenues. It is 
therefore not surprising that t.Jri[( levels for goods traffic dominated 
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the debates over rating policy. The importance of goods receipts is a 
reflection of the Gold C02St'S a~ricultural development, more 
especially the rise of cocoa farming. The agricultural traffic was 
employed to provide SOMe degree of cross-subsidisation to the mining 
sector. This is illustrated by the principal goods tr~ffic transported 
on the railways in 1926 and their relative contributions to gross 
goods receipts. (Table 9.8). These five commodities together constituted 
o. \~b\.-e q \go 
Cc N\PCf'l TI GM (Jt=" 4-o0bf T~A-FF/L ft-N~ RG\J~HUE.t /'/2J, 
Commodity Tonnage 
Carried 
llanganese 
Ore 273,796 
L''i relvood 
(for mines) 110,307 
Coal 
(for l1ines) 9,079 
Cocoa 156,148 
Native 
l!:dible 
food 11,577 
Percent::lge of 
Gross Tonnage 
34.36 
13.84 
1.14 
1 C). 5') 
1.45 
9,3,180 
11,860 
4,992 
404,403 
11,963 
PercentaGe to 
Gross Coods 
~eceipts 
11.55 
1.39 
0.59 
47.56 
1.41 
.\verage aate 
Per Ton 
Iii Ie 
2d 
2d 
1.7p 
6.7p 
3.25p 
Source: Governor's llemo on Transportation to Honourable Ormsby-Gore, 
Visiting Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 3 llarch, 1926, 
C.O. 96/663. 
more than 70 per cent of the total tonnage hauled by the railways and 
produced more than 60 per cent of the gross receipts. The figures 
show that although cocoa tonnage amounted to just over half of that 
of manganese, the former produced as much as 47. 56.~ of the gross 
receipts as against 11.55h for manganese ore. Similarly, firewood 
for the mines which amounted to 13.04/~ of gross tonnnge, produced a 
mere 1.39,. of the total revenue. .ldll1i t tedly, fi rewood and manganese 
ore were short haul loads, but even so it can be seen from the 
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average rates per ton mile that \Vhcreas cocoa attracted a high 
6.7d per ton mile, and native foodstuffs 3.25d,manganese and firewood 
attracted a minimal rate of 2d, and even coal a mere 1.7 d per ton mile. 
Not surprisingly, when Ormsby-Gore, the ~arliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for the Colonies visited the Colony in 1926, he emphasised 
the important role cocoa played in the revenue of the railways. He 
stated that "Cocoa and cocoa alone enables the railway to pay its 
.. 81 
way. Consequently he was prepared to support administrative 
actions to protect the railway's cocoa traffic from road competition. 
But perhaps nothing better illustrates the fact that it was 
Africans, more especially the traders and labouring classes, \Vho bore 
the brunt of railway charges, than an analysis of coaching receipts 
(Table 9.9). It can be seen that between 1915 and 1928-29 (- other than 
Table 9.9 
) . t 1\.ece l.p s per lehicle llile (Hverage 1?ence) 
vate 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class Total 
1915 10.48 12.10 42.01 29.31 
1916 10. LI3 12.34 41.09 na 
1917 na na na na 
1918 8.12 9.35 40.42 25.98 
1919 12.41 14.65 L15.38 na 
1920 16.75 2 ').28 55.12 41.9 
1921 10.47 17.18 47.79 34.56 
1922-23 17.58 11.26 32.94 26.96 
1923-24 9.29 9.59 34.05 23.82 
1924-25 9.18 6.61 34.72 21.92 
1925-26 9.63 5.7 30.86 20.98 
1926-27 "1.44 L,.84 32.82 22.26 
1927-28 9.18 7.74 35.06 23.73 
1928-29 9. "1() 6.73 33. (Vi '8.28 
1929-30 na n.:l na IE 
Source: ~eneral l1anage r, .~.:li llV<1lS L\.e~orts, 
1915-1929-30. 
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the odd years 1920 and 1922-23) receipts per vehicle mile for first 
class traffic were generally low, at or below 10 pence. fhe position 
in second class coaching was even worse. ~rom 12.1 pence per vehicle 
mile in 1915, receipts rose to nearly 30 pence in 1920 (larGely as 
a result of the post war boom) but declined thereafter - to a mere 
6.73 pence by 1928-29. On the other hand, 3rd class receipts per 
vehicle mile were already signific:lDtly higher in 1915 than those for 
1st and second class. :~lthough third class receipts followed the same 
general trends over time as first and second class receipts - rising 
from 42.01 pence in 1915 to 55.12 pence in 1920, and declining 
thereafter - they never dropped below a level of 30 pence per vehicle 
mile. Clearly, the ~fricnn traders and ~orkers who w~re the principal 
passengers in third class were cross-subsidizing the Iflore privileged groups 
travelling by first and second clnss. fo measure the performance of the 
railways merely by total revenues would be to Iniss the extent to which 
certain categories of customers contributed more to the ~roHth of 
revenues than others. 
If raihlay revenues ,,;rere consistently rising (:faster in some 
periods than in others), were the -';olJ CO-1st .. ~.1ih7ays profitable? Because 
of the way the Colonial Government presented its accounting, the true 
profitability of the railways was usually misrepresented. Net profits 
were simply expressed as the difference between gross receipts and 
working expenses. Such "profitsll hO\vever, totally ignore the interest 
payments made by the Colonial Treasury out of general revenue on 
railway and harbour loans. Once these payments are taken into account, 
(Table 9.10), it would appear that the profitability of the railways 
was far less impressive than both the l{ailway accounts and commentators 
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on them would want us to believe. The railways were initially fairly 
profitable. As the figures for the net rate of return on capital 
outlay indicate, there seemed to be a fluctuating but steady growth 
throughout the first two decades, - (net rate of return reaching a peak 
of 10.3 per cent in 1919). However, the position drastically 
deteriorated throughout the 1920's. Not only did the rtnilways make losses 
in the years 1921 and 1925/26, but in the years in which there were 
profits, the net rate of return rarely exceeded 1 per cent. Clearly, 
by the twenties, the raih18Ys had censed to be, in IlcPhee' swords, 
II the mi lch-cow of a penurious i'rQssury. 1,83 Un the con trary, by this 
time, railway revenues were almost evenly divided between maintenance 
costs and interest payments on loans to the British creditors, leaving 
a very small profit margin for the Colony. Indeed if one \vere to include 
on the debit side of the balance sheet the lension charges for L~ailway 
staff, such gains Houlel becorne losses - by 1930, pension chnrges amounted 
84 
to 2.04 per cent of the gross earnin~s. 
BOH does one accoun t for the diminishinG re turns of the tlventies l 
first, operational expenses were much higher during the 1920's because 
of the need to repair deficiencies caused by war time dislocntions in 
the raih,'ay system. 1\.S the General LJana~er pointed out in 1917: 
The improved percentage of expenditure to working receipts 
\Vas not al together clue to rnore economical worldng, but to the 
fact that certain necessary stores 2nd !:13terials which the 
railHays are bauly in need of, ~,'ere practically unprocurable 
••• Upon the cessation of hnstilities there must be a heavy 
increase in expenditure to Bt:Flble the raihvny to be put into a 
proper state of efficiency. ) 
I~nd a he.:1vy (':~~)enditl1re there ,",';1:;. The' operation"l ratio dr;1"tically 
deteriorated from L~5.55 per cent in 1920 to 6t •• 47 per cent in the 
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follo"1in..; year •. ~lthough the s5_tu-'"ltion i:"rroved t 11ereafter, the 
operational ratio settled at around 50 per cent, as co~rared with 
around 40 per cent in the years bei0t"e the '.Jar. fhc improved efficiency 
in carry in;:; capacity seems to hav~ been acco:lpanied by higher working 
expenses. 
Jecondly, the huge rise in interest payments from 1920 is to 
be explained only partly by post ~ar inflation, during which time borrowing 
rates escalated to 6 per cent. uy 1925, interest rates had fallen 
back to their pre-Har levels of 1+ per cent. i;uch '"nore important than 
the rise in interest payments during the 1920's Has th,= substantial 
neH borroHings undertaken as a consequence of the Gug~isberg development 
programme. Capital investment in railways and harbours rose by nearly 
three hundred per cent - from £3,163,000 in 1919 to £11,791,000 in 
1925-26. Such outlays could not have been expected to have provided 
much in the way of enhanced revenue before the completion of the 
Central line and Takoradi harbour, in 1927 and 1928 respectively. 
In the meantime, the existing lines had to bear the interest charges 
on the new construction. However, any hopes for enhanced revenues 
and profits 'vere dashed by the continuing motor competition and by the 
onset of the Depression of the 1930's. 
Despite growth of operational efficiency an'~ rising revenues, 
the railuays ,·~ere operating at 1m: levels of profit;tbility during 
the 1920's. ~;hethcr this could be t~l:en as evidence that the era 
of railHay-building in <est .. ·.fr:-ic~! 1:')~ dr;t\!inz, to .1 close (as some 
critics of the Cuggisber,s pro:::rar1me inpIy), or Hhethcr the Guggisberg 
strategy w.1s essentially sound, Dnd likely to ha\c been successful, is 
still open to oebate. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE EOONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT Of THE RAILWAYS 
Traditionally, railways have been considered to be 
dynamic forces in economic development. Whilst Max Weber called them 
"the greatest innovation in history,,,l Joseph Schumpeter argued that 
American ecnomic history in the second half of the nineteenth century 
2 
could be treated solely in terms of railway construction and its effects. 
Writing earlier, in the 1850's Karl Marx had predicted that the 
construction of railways in India would automatically result in 
industrialisation: 
You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense 
country without introducing all those industrial processes 
necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of 
railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow 
an application of machinery to those branches of industry 
not immediately connected with railways. The railway 
system will theref05e become, in India, truely the forerunner 
of modern industry. 
For nearly a century, such ideas held great sway, especially as the 
construction of railways in most parts of Europe and North America had 
been followed by rapid industrialisation. Thus, to Rostow, the 
railways were the "leading sector" in the French, Gel'llan, American and 
Russian industrial "take offs.,,4 
Confronted with a historiography that made large claims 
for the impact of railways on economic development, economic historians 
in the 1960's began to quantify the precise contributions that the 
railways had made. By the application of modern econometric techniques, 
sdnlars were able to pose counterfactual questions: they measured 
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the differences in levels of national output between the actual 
economies of America, Britian and ~ussia with railways, and hypothetical 
alternatives without railways.5 They were then able to produce figures 
which indicated the "social saving" which accrued to a particular 
economy through the construction and operation of its railways. Their 
results have challenged the traditional view that railways provide 
sufficiently strong backward linkages to transform the entire economy. 
Thus, in Britain for instance, it is argued that the railways did not 
effect any structural shifts in the patterns of economic activity.6 
There is no doubt that the "social saving" concept 
represented a major break through because of its attempt to quantify 
the exact contribution a major innovation makes to economic development. 
However, apart from metoodoJogical and conceptual weaknesses inherent in 
7 this approach, there are other reasons why the social saving method 
cannot be applied to the Gold Coast Railways. First, there are no 
reliable data concerning the national income of the country during the 
8 period under review. Second, in the Gold Coast, until the development 
of motor traffic from the 1920's there were no real alternatives to the 
railways apart from traditional head porterage. As Colin White has 
observed about Russia, in a relatively backward economy which is poorly 
served by its natural transport infrastructure, the concept of social 
saving has failed "to gather into its net a whole series of significant 
benefits brought by the railways.,,9 Furthermore, in tropical Africa, 
it must be noted that railway communications were planned and executed 
from Europe to serve specific imperial economic objectives. Consequentl:' 
°d h" " any discussion of the impact of the railways must conS1 er t e nature or 
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"implications" of the type of Colonial economy created by the introduction 
of the railway system, rather than on "social saving" that accrued 
to the country as a whole. For instance, to what extent was the growth 
of railway traffic a reflection of the development of the mining 
sector vs agriculture, on the one hand, and external or internal trade 
on the other. Finally, the social saving method tends to concentrate 
exclusively on .1 . . I' econom~c ga~ns. As far as Colonial Africa is 
concerned howeve~ the social and political effects of the railw3Ys still 
awaits a thorough study. Thus, to concentrate solely on the social 
savings that accrued to the economy is to ignore other less tangible, 
but far reaching consequences of the railways. 
Consequently, although this work will adopt the new 
economic history approach by examining the role of the railways in terms 
of both backward (i.e. consumption of inputs) and forward (i.e. as a 
transport agency) linkages, it will not attempt a measure of social 
savings. On the other hand, an attempt will be made to evaluate the 
impact of the railways on output and employment in commerce and traditional 
crafts, as well as the effects on urbanisation ,and public health. 
THE SCALE OF RAILWAY INNOVATION 
There are two important factors that normally affect the 
impact that a railway has on an economy. First, the extent to which it 
lowers transportation costs, and second the geographical spread and/or 
size of the network itself. The longer the mileage, the stronger 
the forward and backward linkages established and the wider the spatial 
«istribution of lowered transportation costs. However, the advantages of 
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lowered transport costs would be limited by the fact that the system 
was not only small in mileage, but also confined to the southern half of 
the country. from an average of 1 route mile per 584 sq. miles in 
1904, the Gold Coast rail density rose to 1 route mile per 184 sq. miles 
in 1929/30. 10 Assuming, as the General Manager argued that the sphere 
of the economic activity covered a distance of 20 miles on either side 
11 
of the railway toacks, then by 1930 just over 20 per cent of the 
Gold Coast's land surface (i.e. including Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories) could be said to have fallen under the direct influence 
of the railways. However, even this estimate would appear to be an 
exaggeration of the spatial influence of the railways. As Fishlow's 
study of the effects of transport investment has shown, the sphere of 
the economic activity narrows directly in proportion to the distance 
from the coastal terminal: 
Figure 1 
( « 
I 
I 
c. 
---------
.------ ------------------------------------l 
the construction of the railroad, by reducing transport 
costs, immediately widens the area of profitable cultivation, 
as shown. Along the margins of the triangle, and at B 
itself, the sum of the lower tranpsort costs and constant 
production costs equals the former revenue •••• Kents 
will rise in this new zone, reflecting the new lower 
supply costs and prof11s potentially earned on land brought 
closer to the market. 
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If this is so, it is fair to conclude that the proportion of the Gold 
Coast's total land surface which carne under the direct influence of the 
railways was exceedingly low indeed - perhaps as low as 10 per cent. 
The smallness of the size of the network and its limited geographical 
spread would affect both the nature of the railway's demand for inputs 
and the spatial distribution of lowered transport costs. 
BAQ{WARD LINKAGES: A STlllULUS FOR THE GOLD COAST EOONONY OR NARKETS FOt{ 
THE METROPOLITAN INUUSTRIES 1 
Uid railways in the Gold Coast make any significant demands 
for inputs from the indigenous economy during the three decades preceding 
19301 Table 10.1 indicates the value of materials and equipment purchased 
by the Gold Coast Railways Department for construction and maintenance 
between 1906 and 1929/30 (i.e. excluding the construction of the Western 
line 1895-1905). It can be observed that out of a total of £6,225,043 
worth of stores purchased, only £271,211 - or about 4 per cent, was 
spent on materials obtained locally in the Colony; £459,487 - amounting 
to 7 per cent, was the cost of coal imports from Nigeria, while the 
remaining, £5,494,345 - or 88 per cent, was the cost of materials 
purchased directly in the United Kingdom. In fact, given that the "local" 
purchases included such imported items as cement, iron sheets, nails and 
even to some extent sawn timber, which were obtained locally, then the 
proportion of railway inputs which were supplied directly by the indigenous 
economy was very small indeed. 
Wood for fuel was the main item of railway consumption 
that could be regarded as a product of the Gold Coast economy. Initially, 
the railways relied exclusively on imported coal from Britain but by 1904 
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they had started burning firewood as well. Wood fuel was much bulkier 
and less efficient than coal, but it was cheaper. Firewood cost 10 
pence per train mile as against 40 pence for coal. 1) Although imported 
coal was always used, especially on the eastern line where suitable 
firewood (the kakur tree) was less readily available, the evidence 
suggests that wood accounted for the greater proportion of the overall 
fuel consumption of the railways. By 1919 the railways were Gurning 
14,000 tons of firewood annually as against 2,000 tons of coal. 14 The 
demand for wood fuel by the railways, but to an even greater extent the 
mines, posed serious environmental problems. Consequently, although the 
locomotives continued to burn wood, there was a move towards a greater 
reliance on imported coal from Nigeria from 1920 onwards. 1S 
Although the Gold Coast was endowed with rich timber 
resources, no attempt was made to establish a railway saw mill for 
processing timber for construction purposes. Instead, sawn timber was 
either imported directly from Britian, or purchased locally from 
merchants who had imported it in the first place. Thus, it was not until 
the difficulties of war time import restrictions were experienced that 
the idea of establishing a Railway timber processing mill was broached. 16 
Nothing immediately came of the proposal. Not only was the Hailways 
Department deprived of funds at that time, but necessary tools and 
machinery, such as saw mills, were virtually unprocurable. Consequently, 
it was not until in 1922 that machinery for timber processing was 
installed in the Railways Workshop at Sekondi17 - by which time the 
construction of most of the network had been completed. On the other 
hand the Hailway Department did develop its own granite quarries from the 
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very start of its operations, - one at Sekondi and another at Weija near 
Accra, which provided ballast and boulders for track construction and 
maintenance, as well as for harbour works. 18 
Clearly, other than wood fuel and ballast materials, and 
to a lesser extent timber, the Railways drew little of their needs for 
materials and equipment from the Gold Coast economy. 
Virtually all the Eequirements of the railway system -
the skills, locomotives, permanent way materials, coaches, workshop 
machinery and tools, and to a lesser extent fuel and timber - were 
imported wholesale from the United Kingdom. The expenditure on such items 
- £5~ million excluding the construction of the Western system -
constituted a substantial expenditure by the Colony in the metropo{itan 
country. Thus, the direct benefits of railway construction and operation 
(i.e. demand for inputs) did not accrue principally to the Gold Coast 
economy. Instead, they accrued to the well-established metal and 
engineering industries of the metropolis. It is thus evident that in 
the Gold Coast, the demand for railway inputs did not lead to the 
establishment of "those branches of industry not immediately connected 
with the railways.,,19 The railways failed to establish any significant 
backward linkages with the indigenous economy. 
Part of the problem was that prior to the construction of 
the railways, there were not industries in the Gold Coast capable of 
meeting the railway's demand for materials. Moreover, there were no 
coal deposits, and iron ore and manganese were not discovered until 
during the war. Furthermore, the size of the rail network itself -
500 miles - was too small to warrant the establishment of heavy metal 
industries. 
Nevertheless, it is equally true to say that the railways 
were intended to serve specific imperial economic objectives as much as 
they were intended to stimulate the Gold Coast economy. The economic self 
interest of the metropolitan country ensured that the Gold Coast 
Railways would only buy British goods. In 1893 when Chamberlain sought 
to publicise the West African railway proposals, he assured the British 
Parliament that the construction of such railways would stimulate 
British industry and provide jobs for the unemployed because, "all the 
work will be done in this country.,,20 Indeed, once construction was 
authorised two years later, and the Crown Agents charged with the· 
purchasing of materials, the Colonial Office explicitly stipulated that 
orders were not to be placed outside Uhited Kin~dom sources. 21 To this 
official policy of safeguarding the interests of the metropolitan industries 
must be added the self interests of the Crown Agents themselves. As 
builders of Crown Colony projects, the Office of the Agents expanded 
rapidly in the wake of the construction of the West African railways. 
In 1900, the Office conducted about £9~ million business for the 
Colonies, five years later the figure had nearly trebled' to £26 million, 
and the staff grew from 33 in 1881 to 200 in 1908. 22 This increased 
responsibility, Dumett argued, endowed the Crown Agents "with a vested 
,,23 1 h interest and a generating force of their own. Consequent y, neit er 
the Crown Agents nor the Colonial Office were willing to encourage the 
establishment of local industries that were capable of providing 
substitutes for imported materials. For instance, the railways demands 
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Table 10.1 
Value of Materials and Equipment Purchased for Kailway I}nd Harbour 
Construction and Naintenance, 1906-1929/30 
Year Total Stores Local Udi Coal U.K. U.K. Purchases 
Purchases Purchases as Percentage 
of Total Stores 
1906 £ 46,902 £ 10,040 £ - £ 36,862 79 
1907 26,798 7,134 
-
19,664 73 
1908 17,593 8,210 - 9,383 53 
1909 27,901 9,088 - 18,813 67 
1910 27,366 7,557 - 19,807 72 
1911 60,213 10,029 - 50,184 83 
1912 74,270 17,732 - 56,539 76 
1913 141,889 26,568 
-
115,321 81 
1914 na na - na na 
1915 187,417 6,079 - 181,338 97 
1916 128,240 12,562 - 115,678 90 
1917 na na - na na 
1918 73,032 6,464 - 66,568 91 
1919 211,417 9,081 - 202,336 96 
1920 933,786 19,558 - 914,228 98 
1921-22 1,742,276 31,323 - 1,710,953 98 
1927.-23 677,665 16,556 - 661,109 98 
1923-24 271,665 10,596 11,883 249,206 92 
1924-25 334,950 13,445 57,576 263,929 79 
1925-26 310,133 8,825 63,120 238,188 77 
1926-27 148,096 6,802 65,035 76,259 51 
1927-28 257,740 9,795 75,590 174,355 68 
1928-29 271,226 11,086 81,397 178,743 66 
1929-30 254,229 12,702 106,886 134,641 53 
trotal 6,225,043 271,211 459,487 5,494,345 88 
Source: Gold Coast Blue Books, 1906-1929/30. 
for bricks, drainage pipes and tiles, was one area in which opportunities 
existed within the Colony, and by 1913 the Uepartment had started 
manufacturing its own bricks. The official response from London, 
however, was hostile. The railway management was instructed to 
discontinue the projects, ostensibly because it "hardly comes within the 
f il ,,24 scope 0 a Ka ways Department, but in reality because bricks and 
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tiles were readily available for import from Britain. Similarly, 
during the War, when railway materials were unavailable in the U.K. 
and the local administration proposed to make purchases from the 
United States the Colonial Office objected because such a course would 
be "prejudicial to (foreign) exchange. II25 In fact, some of the 
constructional problems encountered by Stewart and McUonnell in the 
construction of Takoradi, more especially as regards the procurement 
of materials, were located within this conflict of interest, between 
the metropolitan country on the one hand, and the local economy on 
the other (See Chapter 4). 
The pattern of expenditure on railway materials and 
equipment was reproduced in that of manpower. Just as the direct 
benefits of railway demands for material inputs accrued to the British 
economy, so the lion's share of railway construction and operation 
wage income was spent on European imported goods. As we have observed, 
not only were the managerial and supervisory positions filled 
exclusively by Europeans, but more importantly, the cost of maintaining 
them was generally high - by 1920 the salaries of such workers, who 
constituted only 3.75 per cent of the work force, took 44.33 per cent 
of the total wage bill. Thus, the largest part of the wage bill went 
to Europeans, who had a propensity to buy imported consumer goods and 
foodstuffs. Even the modest per capita incomes of African railway 
workers failed to generate a substantial demand for local goods and 
services. This was partly because the majority of construction workers 
received part of their wages in kind, mainly imported rice and tinned 
fish. Moreover, a significant portion of workers' money wages was 
also expended on imported goods. As the Consulting Engineers report stated 
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in 1904: "expenditure in the Colony consists principally of wages paid 
to labourers, who spend the majority of it through the merchants on the 
th h f ,,26 coast upon e pure ase 0 European goods. Finally a proportion of 
the African wage income was also lost to the Colony through repatriation 
of savings by immigrant labourers who had been recruited from Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone. 
Clearly, wages and salaries from railway construction and 
operation did not provide any significant multiplier effect on the 
indigenous Gold Coast economy. Thus, contrary to Chief Commissioner 
Watherston's promises to Northern Territories Chiefs in 1907, cash 
earnings by Northern tabour on the railways and mines in the south did not 
lead to the establishment of "large scale commercial agriculture in the 
North. tt27 Instead, like expenditure on materials, the benefits of 
railway wage labour accrued mainly to the established consumer industries 
of the United Kingdom. 
FOf{WAf{U LINKAGES: PROUUCTION fOd LOtlESTIC NEEUS Ott EXTKACTION OF RAW 
MATERIALS FOR NETWPOLITAN INUUSTrl.IES] 
Although the Gold Coast economy was· little influenced by 
backward linkages from the railways, the provision of transport facilities 
by contrast, strongly affected economic activity. Once in operation, the 
railways offered substantial advantages over traditional human porterage. 
As well as being more readily available, faster, and more reliable, 
railways provided significant reductions in transport costs. Table 10.2 
shows comparative transport costs in the Gold Coast in 1903 and 1922/3. 
It becomes evident that railway charges in 1903 not only represented 
substantial reductions over that of headporterage, but transportation 
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Table 10.2 
Comparative Transport Costs, 1903 and 1922-23 
Type 
l{ailways (1903) 
Headloading (1903) 
Railways (1922) 
Lorry Traffic (1922) 
Headloading (1922) 
Per Ton Mile 
is - 2/6d 
15s - 24/-
3d - 7~d 
2s 9d 
5s - 6s 
Sources: Colonial Office to London Chamber 
of Commerce, November 6 1903, P.R.O: 
C 96/42; Governor's Annual Address, 
Legislative Council Debates, 1923-24. P 78. 
costs in general were reduced over time. 
By reducing transport costs the railways effected significant 
savings in the economy. For instance, labour that would have been 
used to transport goods was liberated for use in other economic activities. 
Although the extent of such savings is difficult to assess, Lugard's 
estimate that a railway train of average capacity will do the work of 
13,000 carriers at one-twentieth the cost28 gives some idea of the 
superiority of railways over head porterage. 
As to the role and impact of the railways in the economy however, 
opinion is strongly divided. Un the one hand Allan HcPhee, following 
the imperial tradition, stressed the "diffusionist" role of the railways: 
"the railways open up trade wherever they go", and "the expansion of 
the Gold Coast cocoa industry is simply the other side of the railways 
expansion. ,,2') To NcPhee then, the railways were indispensable to the 
Gold Coast's economic development. On the other hand, Rhoda Howard, 
writing in the dependency tradition, argued that the railways provided 
far too few opportunities for internal trade, and merely acted as 
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funnels to drain the country's raw materials to Europe in teturn for 
30 
manufactured trade goods. Like McPhee, Howard takes for granted the 
importance of the railways in the expansion of external trade, although 
she was pessimistic about the possibility of development following from 
export-led growth. However, Geoffrey Kay's argument that transportation 
policy favoured expatriate capital, as opposed to indigenous capital, 
introduces a further dimension to the discussion. Central to Kay's 
argument is his assertion that the railways were unimportant in the 
expansion of the cocoa industry, because neither the Eastern nor the 
Central line (both of which the administration claimed were designed 
to serve the industry) effectively "traversed" the cocoa-belt. Instead, 
apart from the lower stretches of the Eastern line, all the principal 
lines were laid through the fringes of the cocoa growing areas. 31 As 
far as Kay is concerned therefore, the main beneficiary of railway 
communication was the expatriate mining sector - the railways failed 
to serve (indigenous) cocoa production. Three views thus emerge about 
the effects of the railways:-
1. McPhee - the railways stimulated both internal and external trade, 
but the cocoa industry in particular; 
2. Howard - the railways had little impact on internal trade, and 
were largely instrumental in promoting import-export trades; and 
30 Kay - the railways primarily served the expatriate mining sector. 
The problem however is that like views on selection of routes (see 
Chapters 2-4), the empirical evidence upon which these conclusions are 
based is tenuous, mainly because such scholars were not so immediately 
concerned with the effects of the railways as they were with Colonial 
policy in general. 
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Gould's study of transportation patterns in Ghana by contrast, 
provides a much clearer picture of the effects of the railways. His 
claim that the railways promoted import-export trades mostly, but to a 
lesser extent internal trade, was backed up by a detailed analysis of 
traffic circulation. For instance, he showed the relative importance 
of the principal lines to the mines on the one hand, and cocoa farming 
on the other. Thus, the western system had the greatest flow in the 
"Up" direction (98 per cent of total traffic in 1904) while the eastern 
line depended upon a heavy export movement to Accra (70 per cent when 
first opened in 1912), reflecting the early importance of imported 
mining inputs on the former and cocoa exports on the latter. 32 While 
this work contains much information on the Gold Coast transportation 
system, its relevance for our present purpose is limited by the fact 
that as a Geographer, Gould's main concern was to measure the spatial 
movement of traffic. 
This section seeks to examine in greater detail the nature of 
the forward linkages provided by the railways. In view of the differing 
conclusions outlined above, the analysis will focus on the question: 
to what extent was the growth of railway traffic a reflection of the 
development of external vs internal trade on the one hand, and mining 
Vs agriculture on the other? In addition, the question will be asked 
whether the timing of railway innovation was of any significance to the 
emergence of the Gold Coast cocoa industry. 
An examination of railway goods traffic provides one means of 
evaluating the effects of the railways. Table 10.2 identifies the three 
broad categories of goods traffic carried on the railways between 1905 
Table 10.3 
Internal/External Trade Goods Carried on the Gold Coast Railways, 1905-1929/30. (000'5 of Tons, Excluding 
Livestoc~ 
Date Gross Internal I. of Imported 1. of Exported 1. of Exports Total % of Imports Traffic Traffic Internal Traffic Imported Traffic to Gross and Exports 
to Gross to Gross to Gross 
04 na na na na na na na na 05 32.2 .4 1 24.8 77 7.0 22 99 06 47.4 .6 1 41.1 87 5.7 12 99 07 51.1 .6 1 37.8 74 12.6 25 99 08 46.2 4.8 10 32.4 70 9.0 19 90 09 55.5 5.7 10 46.6 84 3.4 6 90 10 82.4 6.3 8 72.1 88 4.0 5 92 11 182.2 89.6 49 85.0 47 7.6 4 51 12 197.4 83.2 42 89.3 45 24.9 13 58 13 231.0 74.9 32 108.8 47 47.3 20 68 
I 14 258.6 91.5 35 118.2 46 48.9 19 65 15 269.2 115.7 43 92.1 34 61.4 23 57 16 297.8 134.8 45 99~9 34 63.1 21 55 17 335.1 151.9 45 69.7 21 113.5 34 55 18 316.4 169.7 54 45.9 14 100.8 32 46 
19 347.9 143.9 41 54.7 16 149.3 43 59 
20 371.4 145.0 39 81.2 22 145.2 39 61 
21 359.6 155.9 43 77.9 23 123.8 34 57 
22-23 439.1 131.2 30 72.6 16 235.3 54 70 
23-24 595.7 110.8 19 120.2 20 364.7 61 81 
24-25 702.6 123.7 18 136.4 19 442.5 63 82 
25-26 796.9 118.1 15 144.3 18 534.5 b7 85 
1b-27 805.2 120.7 14 131.7 19 552.8 67 86 
27-28 789 0 8 128.6 16 141.0 18 520.3 66 84 
213-29 818.8 120.7 15 145.9 19 542.2 66 85 
2()-30 932.2 135.8 15 139.3 15 657.1 70 85 
Source: General Manager, Kailways Keports, 1905-1929 
N 
-.D 
~ 
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and 1929/300 Internal traffic was comprised of firewood, local 
foodstuffs, fish, and sawn timber. Import traffic comprised coal, 
machinery, building materials, food staples, spirits, cotton goods, 
salt etc. Export traffic was comprised of cocoa, timber, manganese ore 
and small quantities of rubber, palm produce and kola. 
Looking first at internal traffic, it can be seen that movements 
of total tonnage fall into three distinct periods. Between 1905 and 
1910, such internal traffic was conspicuously absent from the railway 
system, amounting to a mere 6,000 tons per annum on average. Thereafter, 
the position improved dramatically - internal traffic rose from 89,600 
in 1911 to 169,700 tons in 1918 - but this short period of growth was 
followed by a significant decline throughout the 1920's. Thus apart 
from the years between 1911 and the early 1920's, the proportion of 
internal traffic carried on the railways, was generally low, amounting 
to no more than an annual average of 15 per cent of the gross goods 
traffic. Conversely, the proportion of external trade (i.e. imports and 
exports) carried on the railways, was always very high. From over 
90 per cent between 1905 and 1910, the proportion declined between 
1911 and 1920, but rose again throughout the 1920's-to between 70 
and 86 per cent. The strength of external traffic rested upon the 
role of exports. Although the tonnage of imports transported on the 
railways grew in quantity, it declined drastically as a proportion of 
the gross railway traffic over the three decades before 1929/30 - from 
87 per cent in 1906 to 15 per cent in 1929/30. This was· mainly the 
result of the appearance of a large export traffic, especially in cocoa 
and manganese ore during the War. Thus the decline in the proportion of 
imports was offset by the rise in the tonnage and precentage of export 
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traffic - up from 4 per cent in 1911 to no less than 70 per cent in 
1929/30. 
Clearly, other than during the decade 1911 to 1921, when the 
proportion of internal traffic accounted for an annual average of about 
40 per cent of the gross goods tonnage, railway traffic generally 
reflected a strong bias towards external trade, and particularly towards 
export commodities. 
To what extent were the changes in the composition of the 
railway traffic a reflection of the expansion of agriculture on the 
one hand, and the extraction of forestry and mineral resources on the 
other? ~ailway traffic was influenced to a considerable extent by the 
growth of the mining sector - gold, manganese and diamonds. In terms 
of import traffic (Table 10.4) a substantial proportion initially 
consisted of machinery, coal, and building materials which were hauled 
to the mining districts of Tarkwa and Obuasi. During the three decades 
before 1929/30, coal remained the most important traffic by weight, 
though its tonnage, like that of machinery, declined in the long run. 
From 4,800 tons in 1904, coal traffic expanded steadily to 42,000 tons 
by 1914 or 17 per cent of the gross railway traffic. Mining machinery 
increased from 1,968 tons in 1904 to 9,050 tons in 1912, while building 
materials rather halved from 4,300 tons in 1904 to 2,747 tons in 1907. 
Thereafter, the volume of import traffic carried to the mining companies 
declined considerably. Thus, coal traffic fell from over 40,000 in 1914 
to 2,514 tons in 1918 while that of machinery from over 9,000 tons in 
1912 to 2,459 tons in 1918. The decline in building materials, coal 
and· machJnery traffic is to be explained only partly by the war time 
import restrictions. Much more important was the fact that by 1912 
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Table 10 ... 
Principal Commodities carried on the Gold Coast Railways in Selected 
Years 
Commodities r();'t,L\~l:. 
1904 1907 1912 1918 1923/4 1929/30 
Building Materials 4,300 2,747 na na na na 
(Mines) 
Machinery (Mines) 1,968 4,475 9,015 2,459 1,224 689 
Coal (Mines) 4,800 13,793 28,834 2,514 13,070 13,033 
Firewood (Mines) na na 71,995 39,693 97,326 122,618 
Imported Food 
Staples 1,392 2,084 9,215 2,085 11,266 15,011 
Gin & Spirits 498 141 2,972 1,351 2,593 2,685 
Native Foodstuffs 1,047 4,476 11,167 26,728 11,426 868 
Exported Timber - 11,957 4,105 9,883 10,768 10,523 
Cocoa 50 557 20,752 73,254 164,329 139,462 
Source: General Manager, Kailways ~eports, Selected Years. 
most of the gold mines had "completed . the erection of plant and 
machinery, intr09uced cost saving techniques, and have extended their 
f 
,,33 
own irewood tramways. Thus, although coal traffic recovered 
somewhat during the 1920's, it now represented only around a half of the 
pre-war tonnage. 
Not surprisingly, the decline in coal traffic was accompanied 
by a dramatic rise in firewood railed to the mines. Wood fuel was the 
most important element in internal trade. Like the railways, the 
mining companies started burning wood from 1904 when they reckoned that 
it cost less than half the price of coal. Although the General Manager 
of the Railways was worried that, "fine timber is being cut for firewood 
. ,,34 
by the mines, and the railways and shipping companies lose frelght, 
firewood traffic grew rapidly, to a tonnage of fl)l~~ or 47 per cent 
of the gross railway goods tonnage by 1911. This figure dropped over 
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the next two years to 66,433 tons in 1913 (partly because the majority 
of the mines had depleted the firewood stock in their immediate 
vicinity and had started to burn more coal) but it rose again to 
record levels throughout the war years when imported coal became scarce. 
Thus, by 1918, 139,693 tons of firewood was carried to the mines, 
regaining its share in the total tonnage from 29 per cent in 1913 
to 44 per cent. The increased demand for wood fuel was reflected in 
higher producer prices though this varied considerably from one place 
to another. At Akrokeri near Obuasi, the price of soft wood (12~ cords 
of 144 feet) rose from 3s in 1914 to 5s6d in 1919 while at Tarkwa a 
similar quantity of hard varieties cost 12s6d in 1919. 35 The increased 
firewood business was also accompanied by movement of population 
settlements as the war years saw the establishment of firewood camps 
along the western line: nomadic in 1916 they had become permanent 
in 1917. 36 Although official policy after the war favoured the 
substitution of imported coal for local firewood because of the dangers 
of rapid deforestation, nevertheless, wood continued to account for the 
greater proportion of the overall fuel consumption of the mines. As 
late as 1929/30, 122,618 tons of wood fuel traffic, amounting to 13 per 
cent of the gross goods tonnage was railed to the mines as against 
13,033 tons ar 1 per cent for coal. 
Perhaps the most powerful evidence of the impact of the 
railways upon the mining industry, was the close correlation between 
fluctuations in the level of fuel traffic (coal and firewood) carried 
on the railways, and fluctuations in gold output. (Graph 1). Thus, 
from a mere 6,000 oz. in 1901, gold output rose steadily (as did fuel 
traffic) to record levels during the war years - but this period of 
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growth was followed by a significant decline during the 1920's. Such a 
close correlation between fuel traffic and gold output illustrates the 
observation that "bullion and firewood were more closely related than 
. , 37 
their names would suggest. ' In fact, almost, the entire wood fuel traffic 
of the railways was used by the gold mines, whose location in the heart 
of the tropical forest made it more economical for them to burn wood. 
On the other hand, the manganese mines which were situated only 25 miles 
from Sekondi harbour found it cheaper to make use of imported coal. 
Although diamond mining occured at Kade, 150 miles from the Sekondi 
port, it still proved more convenient to import coal because the spread 
of cocoa farming had depleted firewood stocks over most parts of Akyem 
Abuakwa. Thus, much of the coal traffic after the war went to the 
manganese and diamond mines whilst the gold mines depended largely on 
firewood. 
Apart from transporting fuel and stores to the mines in general,_ 
the development of manganese mining in particular generated a large 
export traffic for the railways, more so at a time of growing motor traffic 
competition for the conveyance of cocoa. Manganese traffic first 
appeared on the railways in 1916, when just over 4,000 tons of the 
ore was railed to Sekondi. Thereafter, other than a minor fluctuation 
during the post war depression, manganese traffic expanded rapidly to a 
figure of 507,073 tons or 54 per cent of total goods tonnage in 1929/30. 
Clearly, four major freight items (machinery, coal, firewood, 
and manganese ore) constituted the bulk of the railway traffic by 
weight - accounting for 41 per cent in 1907, and 69 per cent in 1929/30. 
The fastest growing freights were firewood and manganese ore, reflecting 
increased exports of the latter and the growth of the mining sectors in 
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general. 
One reason for the rapid expansion of the mining sectors is the 
fact that the mining companies benefited from a relatively low railway 
rate. As we have demonstrated in the previous chapter, agricultural 
traffic was employed to provide some degree of cross-subsidy to the mining 
sector - by 1926 average rate per ton mile stood at 2d for manganese ore 
and firewood, 1.4d for coal, while foodstuffs (both indigenous and 
imported) attracted 3.25d and cocoa a high 6.7d;8 Thus, by providing 
not only an improved and a more efficient transport service, but also a 
relatively cheap one, the railways effected substantial savings in the 
working costs of the mining companies. 
Despite the advantages offered to the mining industry, it did 
not prove to be the most important growth sector in the economy. Although 
the mines were a significant employer of labour, the total number of 
African mine workers between 1905 and 1929/30 amounted to no more than 
39 15,000 per annum on the average (as compared with cocoa farming whose 
employment capacity was estimated at one-sixth of the potential labour 
force by 1935). In addition to the numerous local wood cutters and 
fuel merchants upon whom no records were kept, the mines did create 
significant demands for local food production and protein supplies -
fish from the coast and livestock from the North. Nevertheless, compared 
with cocoa farming, the extent of the mining industry's linkages with 
the Gold Coast economy was relatively weak. 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that significant benefits 
from mining accrued to the metropolitan economy. The purchase of mining 
machinery, stores and to a limited extent fuel, from Britain stimulated 
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the metropolitan industries. More significantly, other than token 
concession fees and royalties paid to the Chiefs and the Colonial 
Treasury, profits from the mines accrued principally to the British 
investors and shareholders. For instance, in the 19 year period from 
1912 to 1930, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation produced some 2 million 
fine ounces of gold valued at eight million pounds sterling upon which 
dividends of between 62.5 per cent and 87.5 per cent were paid annually.40 
As the most profitable mining concern in the country, the performance of 
Ashanti Goldfields was not entirely typical. Nevertheless, its dividend 
distribution gives some idea of the nature of the distribution of 
benefits from the mining industry. 
The railways also had an impact on the development of forestry 
resources. Timber logs for export were the main fo~estry product carried 
on the railways. Prior to the railways the logs were cut as near to 
rivers as possible, and then floated down the coast. This made the 
Ankobra river and the port ofAxim the centres of the earliest timber 
trade. Although the appearance of the railways changed matters 
considerably, the volume of timber trade was never as large as one might 
have expected it to be, given the amount of resources available. From 
11,957 tons in 1907, the quantity of timber logs carried on the railways 
fell to 4,105 tons by 1912. Although the traffic recovered over the 
next two years, it fell drastically to just above a thousand tons per 
annum throughout the war years. Apart from shortage of shipping space, 
the decline in timber exports during the war is to be explained by the 
fact that the majority of the timber merchants were Germans whose 
businesses were closed down. Although the traffic recovered somewhat 
during the 1920's, it fluctuated only around 10,000 tons per annum on 
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the average. Clearly, the availability of rail transport was not the only 
determinant of the development of the timber trade. As the logs near 
the railways were depleted, it became necessary to move further afield. 
Thus, in the absence of motor lorries, such logs had to be dragged several 
miles from the forest to the railway lines. Moreover, at all the 
collection points along the tracks, special facilities such as cranes were 
41 
required for loading the logs on to the trucks. Consequently, although 
timber exports enjoyed a relatively low railway rate, the growth of the 
industry fell below official expectations. 
Apart from traffic in timber logs, the railways also facilitated 
the development of timber processing for domestic consumption. Although 
the Gold Coast was endowed with enormous forestry resources, initially 
the trend was for "raw" timber to be exported, in return for imported 
timber. As late as 1917, other than one small mill, located 12~ miles 
north of Sekondi, no proper plant for sawing timber existed in the 
42 Colonyo The war time shortage of imports encouraged timber processing 
for domestic consumption. The traffic in local timber, which first 
appeared on the railways in 1913, increased from an annual average of 0.5 
thousand tons between 1913 and 1916 to 1.6 thousand tons in 1917. In 
the following year, the General Manager reported a growing "native" industry 
in sawn timber, which was located chiefly at Tafo and Koforidua on the 
eastern line. In 1918 the tonnage of local sawn timber carried on the 
railways had doubled over that of 1917 - an increase which prompted the 
remark that sawn timber was an example of indigenous enterprise "profiteering" 
b h h f . 43 Y t e s ortage 0 1mports. 
Despite the war time boost to timber processing, the industry 
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never reached any high levels in the years before 1929/30. Apart 
from the obvious difficulties of cutting and transporting logs, wood 
processing had to face such problems as the acquisition of machinery, 
technical and entrepreneurial skills, as well as competition from imported 
alternatives. Thus, although sawn timber continued to be carried on the 
railways, its tonnage did not exceed 2,000 per annum on the average 
throughout the 1920's. 
The third and perhaps the most significant impact of the 
railways was the stimulation of the agricultural sector of the economy 
- the production of cocoa for export and the cultivation of foodstuffs 
for local consumption. First the role and impact of the railways upon 
the development of the cocoa industry. Was there a causal link between 
the timing of railway innovation and the rise of the Gold Coast cocoa 
industry2 The export of cocoa which started on a very small scale during 
the 1890's grew rapidly after the turn of the century to become the 
country's most valuable export by 1910. Although cocoa had been grown 
in the Gold Coast by the Basel Mission as early as 1858, it was never 
adopted on a commercial scale because there was no market for the crop 
at that time. 44 In 1876, cocoa was introduced into Akwapim by Tetteh 
Quarshie who had worked on the cocoa plantations in Fernando Po, but the 
. 45 
market for the crop was stlll very small. (In fact, it was not until 
after 1900 when the Quaker firm of Cadbury started buying its cocoa from 
the Gold Coast instead of from the slave plantations of Sao Thome and 
Fernando Po that matters changed significantly). Thus, after the first 
exports of 80, lbs-in 1891; ,e~pan~i6n'remained relatively slow so that 
by 1900 exports still amounted to just over 500 tons. But by 1905, 
when 5,000 tons were exported, it became apparent that cocoa farming had 
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been established on a firm basis. Allowing 5-7 years for cocoa's gestation 
period, it becomes evident that large scale cultivation of the plant 
46 began only from the 1890's. 
Cocoa cultivation was initially concentrated in the Akwapim 
and Akyem Abwakwa areas and shipment was chiefly chanelled through Accra. 
Of the 536 tons of cocoa exported from the Gold Coast in 1900 just over 
500 tons was from the rapidly expanding areas around Kibi which was tapped 
by t~aditional trade routes and the main road from Accra. From the 
Krobo plantations around Begoro, 25 tons flowed down the Volta to Ada, 
while small amounts head-loaded to Prampram, Winneba and Cape Coast make 
h . d 47 up t e remaln ere 
However, head-loading of cocoa was both a cumbersome and an 
expensive business at this time. In 1907, it took no less than 3 days 
to head-load the crop from Koforidua to Dodowa, from where the crop was 
barrell-rolled to Accra, and it cost between 2s and 3s per load for 
the last day's journey over the awkward Aburi hills - a figure which 
d d d . 48 excee e the pro ucer prlce. 
Given the high cost of porterage, the problem arises as to why 
cocoa farming should have expanded even into areas remote from the 
ports. Indeed the problem becomes all the more relevant because of the 
nature of the cocoa industry itself. To all intents and purposes, 
cocoa farming marked a turning point in the organisation of production 
in the Gold Coast. For the first time, on a large scale, exports were 
the result of "organised" cash-crop production, rather than the "gathering" 
49 
of naturally-growing produce from the land. Given the unique nature 
of cocoa investment on such a scale it seems unlikely that farmers would 
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have adopted the crop without some hopes or expectations of cheaper 
transport becoming available. 
What of railway innovation1 Like the early expansion of cocoa 
in the south-eastern parts of the country, the period from the 1890's 
to the turn of the century was one of survey mania, during which railway 
parties criss-crossed most parts of the Colony and to a lesser extent 
Ashanti (see Chaps 1-3). As proposals for railway construction intensified, 
they carried in their wake the promise of an impending transport 
revolution. The prospect of a new line often led not only to land 
speculation, but also to petitions from Chiefs for extensions into their 
territories. 50 Clearly, it is not unreasonable to suggest that some of 
the early cocoa farmers in the Eastern and Central Provinces must have 
planted in anticipation of the imminent arrival of the railways. 
Having established a causal link albeit indirectly, between 
the emergence of cocoa cultivation in the south-eastern parts of the 
Colony and the timing of railway innovation, we now proceed to consider 
the diffusion of the crop into Ashanti and parts of the Western 
Province. Gareth Austin's study of the history of cocoa farming in 
Amansie, south Ashanti, provides a useful insight into the timing of 
the spread of cocoa into these parts of the country. According to 
Austin, although cocoa was introduced into Ashanti in 1896, its rapid 
expansion did not occur until after the 1900 Ashanti revolt. 51 More 
importantly, Austin stated that it was the period 1901-1914 that was of 
supreme importance in the establishment of the industry in Amansie: 
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••• it (cocoa) was so energetically adopted ••• so that by 
1914, the majority of available land had probably already 
been planted with the trees that were to yield over 10,000 
tons of cocoa a year by 1921/2. 52 
Thus, in Ashanti the crop was adopted on a significant scale only 
after 1900. 
What of the timing of the pioneer western line? Started in 
1898, the railway reached Tarkwa in 1900. Between 1901 and 1903 the . 
line was quickly pushed into Ashanti partly with a view of putting down 
the 1900-1 revolt. Clearly, in Ashanti, the adoption of cocoa farming 
on a large scale followed close on the heels of the railways. What is 
more, once in operation, the railways were actively engaged in publicising 
the cash-crop "revolution". When the line opened to Kumasi in 1904, the 
authorities organised excursions to Sekondi for Ashanti Chiefs and 
their entourage, "to see the benefits of adapting themselves to the 
h 1 b h ,,53 new mode of transportation, and of utilising t eir a our on t eland. 
On their return such leaders tried to encourage production for the 
marketo In 1906, the General Manager reported that cocoa planting 
was being actively pursued in Ashanti, and wondered whether the crop had 
54 
started going to the coast by porterage. Then the following year, a 
two-day agricultural show was organised at Sekondi from 29 to 30 
November, during which exhibits were carried free of charge while railway 
fares were reduced. In addition no less than 450 Ashanti Chiefs and 
leaders were carried by special trains free of charge to attend the 
fair. Significant quantities of cocoa beans were said to have been 
brought ba.ck from the fair so tha t by the end of the year "near ly every 
.. 55 
village (in Ashanti) now possesses its own cocoa nurseryo 
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Clearly, if there was an indirect causal link between the 
emergence of cocoa farming in the Colony and the timing of transport 
innovation, the diffusion of the crop into Ashanti and parts of the 
Western Province depended even more directly upon the construction of 
the pioneer western line. I conclude that the Gold Coast cocoa industry, 
to borrow from L.H. Jenks, strongly felt the impact of the railways 
"id ,,56 as an ea. 
The record of the railway's conveyance of cocoa to the ports 
tallies with the foregoing analysis. The western pioneer line, far away 
from the earliest cocoa growing areas, initially carried only a small 
percentage of the cocoa exports to the coast. Between 1904 and 1910, 
cocoa traffic amounted to no more than a thousand tons per annum on 
average on the railways. In 1910, the year when cocoa became the 
Colony's most valuable export, the western line carried only 8 per cent 
of the total exports to the coast. On the other hand, the opening of 
the eastern line brought about a dramatic change in the railway~s 
conveyance of cocoa. Started in 1908, the Accra-Mangoase section 
opened to traffic in 1912. For the four-month period September to 
December 1912, 14,159 tons of cocoa were railed to Accra. The traffic 
then stabilised at around 28,000 tons over the next two years. 
Significantly, a high proportion of the cocoa traffic at this time had 
actually been stored over several years in anticipation of the arrival 
of the railways. Indeed, when the line was extended to Koforidua in 
1915, the railways gave preference to produce of the current cocoa 
57 
season so as to avoid the loading of rotten cocoa beans to the port. 
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As the tonnage of the railway cocoa traffic grew, so did its 
share of the national output until it accounted for over 70 per cent 
between 1913 and 1923/4. Thus, other than the odd year 1918 when 
shortage of shipping space meant that more cocoa beans were railed 
to the coast than steamers could load, both the national output and 
railway traffic moved in a remarkably close direction up until 1923/4. 
(Graph 2). 
Although it was the eastern line that was largely responsible 
for the rise in railway cocoa traffic at this time (70 per cent in 
1915), significant quantities of the beans began to appear on the 
western system as well. In 1912, the western line carried 6,593 tons 
of cocoa but by 1915, this figure had tripled to 19,191 tons. 
Unfortunately, separate figures for the tonnage of cocoa loaded from 
principal railway stations did not become available until 1926-27, which 
makes it impossible to ascertain exact trends in the spatial origin 
of cocoa traffic over time. Nevertheless, by the mid 1920's, cocoa 
farming had become well established in Ashanti and to a lesser extent 
the Western Province. Thus, by 1926-27 Kumasi was the most important 
. cocoa station not only on the western line but throughout the entire 
network, with a tonnage of 35,586. Other important stations on the 
western system for cocoa traffic were Bekwai (12,964 tons), Dunkwa 
(8,312 tons), Akrokeri(5,274 tons), and Obuasi (1,448 tons).58 Clearly, 
the western line which had promoted the diffusion of cocoa farming in 
Ashanti and parts of the Western Province in the first instance, had 
become a major carrier of the crop once the trees had started bearing 
fruits. 
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However, the rapid spread of cocoa farming into new areas was 
also accompanied by the rise of motor traffic competition especially 
in the Eastern and Central Provinces. Notice the divergence in the 
movements of national output and railway cocoa traffic from 1923-4 
(Graph 2). By the late 1920's the importance of the railways to the cocoa 
industry had completely shifted from the eastern line to the western 
system. In 1929/30, the eastern line accounted for only 38 per cent 
of the total railway traffic (as against 70 per cent 15 years previously) 
while the western line now carried 59 per cent. The newly constructed 
Central line carried only 4,026 tons of cocoa in that year, of which a 
mere 2,264 tons were actually forwarded to Takoradi, the rest being carried 
for short distances and unloaded at stations which were connected by 
road with the Central Province ports. 59 
Clearly, other than the Central Province Railways, whose 
construction followed the availability of motor lorries, the role and 
impact of the railways in the development of the Gold Coast cocoa 
industry has so far been underestimated. More specifically, Kay's 
contention that railways were an unimportant factor in the rise of the 
cocoa industry is somehow misplaced. Eulogistic though McPhee might 
sound, he is vindicated. 
While the railways may have aided the development of the cocoa 
industry more than some critics imply, reliance on rail transport was not 
without its costs for cocoa farming. In particular, railway rates on cocoa 
were set at relatively high levels. Although the beans normally accounted 
for less than 20 per cent of railway capacity on average, they contributed 
more than 50 per cent of the gross earnings. Given that direct taxation 
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was a politically sensitive issue in the Gold Coast, leading the 
government to depend upon indirect methods of taxation, the authorities 
came to regard high railway rates on cocoa as a means of raising revenues 
for the Colonial Treasury. Thus in 1923, Governor Guggisberg defended 
high cocoa tariffs as a "fair means odi taxation."bO In fact, some of 
the traffic policies pursued by the administration during the 1920's, 
i 11 th " d " 1 . d f d 1 more espec aye roa gap po 1CY to e en rai ways from road 
competition, are to be explained by a concern to protect an important 
source of revenue for the colonial administration. These measures 
anticipated to some degree the fiscal functions of the Marketing Boards 
from the 1940's. 
Cocoa farming was the most important growth sector of the Gold 
Coast economy. By 1935, total acreage was estimated at one million, and 
cocoa cultivation had an employment capacity of one-sixth of the potential 
labour force of the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. 61 
Perhaps more significantly, profits from cocoa farming, unlike mining, 
accrued principally to African producers, though some groups benefited more 
than others. 
Cocoa production did have some linkages with other sectors of 
the economy. It created new demands for commercial food cropping, 
fishing and livestock production. Income from cocoa farming stimulated 
construction activities including the building of residential and business 
premises, timber processing, furniture works, and above all road 
building. Nevertheless, cocoa did not stimulate a large demand for 
inputs from other sectors. After harvesting, the beans were simply 
dried and exported, and therefore did not lead to the development of any 
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processing activity. Cocoa production remained labour intensive and 
such modest capital investment as was required - on cutlasses, pesticides, 
spraying machines and sacks for example - tended to be spent on imports 
from Europe. In addition, the greater proportion of the cocoa farmers' 
income was spent on imported consumer goods. Undoubtedly this brought 
a higher standard of living to some people, as "every big village now 
manages to obtain a fairly constant supply of frozen meat. ,,62 But on 
the other hand, a significant proportion of imports consisted of what 
Lugard has called "sterile imports" - i.e. spirits. By 1927, the value 
of spirits imported into the Gold Coast amounted to no less than 20 per 
63 
cent of the f.o.b. value of cocoa exports. As the Omanhene of Brekum, 
Ashanti warned: "drinking two bottles of gin is equivalent to 
f 1 f ,,64 squandering the cost 0 two oads 0 cocoa. In short the strong bias 
of cocoa farmers' expenditure towards imports, helps to explain, at 
least in part, cocoa farming's failure to encourage the growth of 
industries that could service it. 
The other agricultural activity to benefit from the introduction 
and expansion of railways was food cultivation for local, internal 
markets. Although, around 1900, the railways brought in large amounts 
of food and provisions from Europe to meet the sudden demands created 
by mines and railway construction, indigenous food production was also 
quick to respond to such demands. Comprehensive data on the railways' 
conveyance of foodstuffs did not become available until 1912 (Graph 3). 
In that year, the tonnage of indigenous food items carried on the 
railways amounted to 11,000 as against 9,000 tons for imports. However, 
during the war years, consumption switched even more towards local 
commodities. Imported food traffic on the railways plummeted (from 
12,000 tons in 1914 to 2,000 tons in 1918), while indigenous foodstuffs 
rose equally dramatically (from 12,000 tons in 1916 to as much as 28,000 
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tons in 1918). This rise in conveyance and consumption of local 
foodstuffs, "when the European community too, now depends to an unusual 
extent on native food,,,65 was caused by war-time import restrictions. 
The imposition of a 15 per cent war surcharge on rates for imported 
goods placed Gold Coast food producers in a comparatively favourable 
position from 1915 onwards. By 1916, rice cultivation, which originally 
started in 1912 on a small scale around the mining towns, had spread into 
most parts of the Western Province. The Senior Curator of Agriculture 
stationed at Tarkwa believed that the annual output amounted to "several 
thousands of bags," and "there is ready demand for the grain at a lower 
. h h· d ff ,,66 A h G 1 M d i prlce t an t e lmporte stu. s t e enera anager reporte n 
1912, "trade in native foodstuffs and dried fish has replaced imported 
rice and tinned herring which before the war, were popular and cheap 
. 1 f f d ,,6 7 artlc es 0 00. 
The influence of the railway upon food production for sale was 
perhaps most significant in the western districts. Here, the Kroo, Mendi 
and Bassa "boys" who pioneered the local cultivation of rice were railway 
contract labourers from Sierra Leone and Liberia whose staple diet 
(unlike the plantains and cassavas of the Gold Coast) was riceo Thus, 
the railways contributed directly to the diversification of food crop 
production in the Gold Coast. However, opportunities for food cultivation 
for sale to the mines and the major sea port at Sekondi-Takoradi, 
together with firewood cutting and mine work, probably helps to explain 
the initially slow expansion of cocoa farming into the Western Province. 
The recovery in the level of imported food traffic after 1918 
resulted from renewed availability of imports after the war, together 
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with the removal of surcharges on rates for imported goods from 
1923/4. Why local foodstuffs were unable to retain the markets they had 
enjoyed during the war, in the face of renewed import competition, is one 
of the many unexplored issues of Gold Coast economic history. 
Although the railways thus provided significant forward 
linkages for the local economy, the distribution of the rail network 
was not without its negative effects on growth pattern of treColonial 
economy. On the one hand, the railways facilitated the development 
of regional economic inequalities. Historically, the pattern of economic 
activity in the Gold Coast was always based on the dichotomy between 
forest and savannah in which the former played the dominant role. Not 
only were the Mande traders from the north and Europeans from the south 
both attracted by the resources of the forest (gold, kola nuts, slaves, 
palm produce and rubber), but the forest states of Ashanti, Akyem and 
Fante had also drawn upon northern slave labour for mining and 
68 
agriculture in the south. Nevertheless, the railways and for that 
matter Colonialism could be said to have accentuated and institutionalised 
such divisions. Given that there were local labour shortages in the 
Colony and Ashanti, leading government public works, the mining 
companies as well as cocoa farmers to depend on external sources of 
labour supply, the authorities came to regard the underdevelopment of 
the semi-arid savannah regions of the Volta and the Northern Territories 
as a means of maintaining a permanent cheap labour reserve for both 
expatriate and indigenous employers in the forest south. Thus in 
1902, Governor Nathan decided against the construction of a Volta 
district line because "labour would be deflected from the mines and 
h K "1 ,,,69 t e umaSl ral way extenslon. Indeed, some of the ironies of the 
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Guggisberg administrations's policy regarding the economic development 
of the Northern Territories, more especially the governor's decision. 
against the construction of a northern line which had been intended to 
promote the diversification of agricultural exports, are to be explained 
by a concern to protect an important sou~ce of cheap labour for the 
mines and the cocoa industry. These measures were thus responsible to 
a large extent for the evolution of an uneven lopsided monocultural 
Colonial economy heavily dependent on cocoa exports but to a lesser extent 
gold, manganese and diamonds. 
On the other hand, the railways facilitated the integration of 
the Gold Coast into the world economy. Pre-Colonial West Africa did 
have a long established external trade involving far more than a minority 
of chiefs and rich traders: "humble commoners both bought imported goods, 
,,70 
and produced and traded a variety of export products. Despite the 
apparent widespread participation in external commerce however, the 
contemporary observer, Mary Kingsley, could still write at the turn of 
the century that,"there is not a single thing Europe can sell to the 
native that is in the nature of a true necessity, a thing that the native 
must have or starveo .. 71 - meaning that the West African societies were 
still at this time, relatively self-sufficient, and that dependence on 
the imports and exports trades was the exception rather than the rule. 
The construction and expansion of railways broug~about a dramatic 
change in this position. Over the three decades between 1900 and 1930, 
the Gold Coast's external trade grew by more than ten times, imports 
by seven times, exports by nearly fourteen times. This expansion of 
external trade brought considerable income to the Colonial Administration 
and public revenues multiplied nine-fold while government expenditure 
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more than quadrupled over the same period. (See Chap. 7, fables 7.4 
and 7.6). Thus from the economic and political points of view of the 
metropolitan authorities, railway and harbour construction were largely 
successful: they not only stimulated export production for the 
metropolitan markets and created new markets for metropolitan products, 
but the increased imports and exports trades also generated substantial 
revenues for the administration of the Colony. Nevertheless, as 
Hopkins points out: "economic development by way of staple exports can 
b . d 1 ,,72 e a precar10us an engthy process. Although there was a close 
correlation between fluctuations in the world prices, and fluctuations 
in local income and expenditure, West African producers had to accept 
the world price as given because they were unable to control the 
volume of their exports placed on the market. rhus, on an index in which 
1968 = 100, the Gold Coast's net barter terms of trade (which is a 
measure of the changes in the quantity of imports which can be derived 
from a given unit of exports) deteriorated by almost 50 per cent 
between 1900/04 and 1925/29 though the income terms of trade (which 
is simply the total import-purchasing power of the country concerned) 
73 
multiplied seven-fold. This improvement in income terms of trade 
reflects a general expansion of export volumes so that in the absence 
of technological improvements in agriculture, the maintenance of 
existing levels of purchasing power of exports became the function of 
increased inputs of land and labour. 
t(AlL\~AYS, CO~U1F.Kcr. A1~U CKAll'S: 
~ailways also had an impact on commerce and traditional crafts. 
By stimulating trade mainly in imports and exports, railways were 
instrumental in transforming not only the spatial distribution and 
• 
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organisation of commerce, but also the output and employment in craft 
production. Broadly speaking, there were three important aspects of 
change: 1) the physical penetration of European commercial and 
financial institutions into the interior; 2) a simultaneous expansion 
and contraction of opportunities for African merchants and traders; 
and 3) the changing fortunes of traditional crafts under the impact 
of mass-produced imported goods. 
First, the penetration of expatr~te trading firms and 
commercial banks. Before the advent of railways, European trading 
activity was confined to the coast, and trade was conducted with the 
interior through a network of independent African middlemen and traders. 
The control and organisation of this trade had long been a perennial 
source of conflict not only between the coastal principalities and 
inland state of Ashanti on the one hand, but also between European 
merchants and their African counterparts on the other. 74 Indeed the 
expansion of British Colonial rule beyond the fronteers of the Gold 
Coast Colony towards the ens of the 19th century was partly a response 
to the call of English merchants for the protection and free access 
to the hinterland trade. 75 
Although the imposition of British rule removed some of the 
76 institutional barriers to the smooth conduct of trade, there was no 
immediate dramatic change in the traditional organisation of commerce. 
Not only did trade continue to operate through the long-established 
middleman system, but more importantly the European trading firms were 
reluctant to penetrate directly into the interior. One reason was 
that, in the absence of improved transports, the trading firms were 
liE 
unwilling to assume the risks of internal transportation. uropean 
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. "Ot b d" compan1es , 1 was 0 serve, do not make use of the Volta, and 
individual merchants do so only if the canoe owner takes all risk of 
loss ,,77 Despite active encouragement from the authorities who • • • 
believed that increased penetration would augment trade which would in 
turn enhance the revenues of the newly acquired territories of Ashanti 
78 
and the North, there was little response from .the European firms. 
As late as 1901, other than the Basel Mission's trading store at 
Akropong-Akwapim, and the firms of F. and A. Swanzy who operated branch 
stores at the river port towns of Akuse and Kpong on the Volta, there 
d i t t . t . 1 . i . hi· 79 Th was no rec expa r1a e commerC1a act1v ty 1n t e nter10r. us, 
the penetration of the trading firms into the interior lagged behind 
Colonial expansion. 
On the other hand, the opening of the railways facilitated 
h 11 " h f f ° ,,80 what A.G. Hopkins as ca ed t e second partition 0 A r1ca -
that is to say, the enlargement and delineation of territorial operations 
by the European merchant houses. The railways were directly responsible 
for the spatial diffusion of the trading firms into the interior. For 
instance, in 1904, the year the railway reached Kumasi, no less than 
81 
eleven European firms opened branches there, and two years later 
the Bank of British West Africa followed, "and the town is now fast 
,,82 developing into the trading centre of the whole of Ashanti. The 
Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company Limited, a subsidiary of Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation, commenced operations at Obuasi, Sansu and Akrokeri 
by 1906. 83 Then the following year the Basel Mission Factory even 
took the unprecedented step of opening a branch store far beyond the 
Kumasi railhead at Kintampo, "and there appears to be no reason why 
other firms should not shortly follow its example, and for the town to 
JUS 
become a flourishing centre.,,84 In the eastern cocoa belt, the 
penetration of the trading firms similarly followed close on the heels 
of the railways. In 1909, F. and A. Swanzy and two other European 
firms had branches at Nsawam and many others including the Bank of 
British West Africa were negotiating for building sites at principal 
. 1 . 85 1 
ra1 way stat10ns. By 911, expatriate stores were firmly established 
at Koforidua, Kukurantumi, and Tafo. 86 From then onwards, this 
expansion of the European firms accelerated so that by 1915, "there 
are now numerous villages boasting one or more European stores, 
h t · d f d b b . d .. 8 7 were amos var1e assortment 0 goo scan e 0 ta1ne • The 
railways also carried a large import traffic in specie, which was 
distributed regularly at all principal railway stations, "and the 
markets are filled with imports of greater variety 
• • • besides 
locally grown foodstuffs, and they daily present scenes of the greatest 
88 
activity." 
~learly, by opening up the country to European commercial 
-
activity the railways were instrumental in the spread of the money 
economy into many parts of the countryo 
The penetration and intensification of expatriate commercial 
activity into the interior had important implications for African 
traders and merchants. Elswhere in West Africa, it is argued, 
penetration of the European firms resulted in the gradual decline of 
African middlemen from "wealthy entrepreneurs of the late 19th century to 
petty traders after 1930.,,89 Unfortunately, no comparable attempt has 
been made to investigate the fortunes of the twentieth century Gold 
90 Coast middlemeno Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that there was 
a simultaneous contraction and expansion of opportunities for African 
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traders and merchants. 
The expansion of expatriate trading activity created more 
opportunities for retail trade for a larger number of Africans, 
especially women. At Kumasi, there were 15 markets held during the 
week, and the produce changed hands several times, "and trade is almost 
exclusively in the hands of petty traders, mostly women ,,91 Indeed, ••• 
in most parts of the inaccessible rural areas were to be found itinerant 
92 
small traders who hawked their goods from one village to another. 
Moreover, in several of the minor towns, Africans were imployed in 
the expatriate branch stores either as salaried workers or commission 
93 
agents. Besides, the trading firms also employed a large number of 
Africans as produce brokers and sub-brokers, some of whom went to 
the bush to advance money to cocoa farmers while the crop was still on 
94 the trees. 
Yet, at the same time as the trading firms were opening up 
opportunities for some, they were the cause of loss of employment for 
others. As the firms became more established in the interior, they 
tended to trade more directly with the African producers and consumers 
and this in turn meant a contraction of opportunities for the 
middleman. For instance by 1906, Kumasi was said to have appropriated 
to itself the trade formerly existing between Ashanti and the coast, 
"and the native now buys his goods from the European store instead of 
from the coast trader.,,95 In South Ashanti, "people are now finding 
that their wants can be supplied nearer home, (I and, "Obuasi is becoming 
more and more a trade centre of the Province," and "a lucrative trade 
for the Ashanti middleman is now closing.,,96 Many independent African 
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merchants and traders also found themselves unable to compete with 
the bigger European companies. Rhoda Howard describes one example 
of European firms undercutting African traders and turning them into 
dependent retailers. In 1930, the United Africa Company informed 
the fish traders at Dunkwa of its plans to buy salt fish wholesale 
on the coast, transport it by rail, and sell it to the women who would 
become retailers. The traders protested to the authorities. that the 
U.A.C. could turn such a monopoly over salt fish distribution to its 
own future advantage by retailing the fish as well. 97 In response to 
the women's complaint, one official noted that the process of the small 
traders being outsted by the bigger firms was inevitable, "and already 
with respect to Manchester cloths, cigarettes and so on, the women 
buy these on credit from the European stores, generally at a stones 
'I ,,98 throw from the market itself, and proceed to reta1 them. 
Despite the undercutting of the small traders, one must 
not, however, assume a wholesale elimination of the traditional 
independent middlemen and traders during the three decades before 
1930. Firstly, there is evidence to suggest that some traders 
responded to the expatriate competition by simply shifting their traditional 
trading spheres of operation into new areas which were considered safe 
from European interference. For instance in 1905, the Chief Commissioner, 
Northern Territories, reported the case of a "displaced" coast merchant 
who had opened a large store for the sale of European goods at Kintampo 
"and is , ,,99 d01ng well. Then the annual report for the following year 
noted an influx of coast t.raders into the Protectorate though "the 
most notable-feature in this respect is the apathy shown by European 
,,100 
traders on the coast to avail themselves of this movement. By 
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1909, only one expatriate store operated in the whole of the Northern 
T . . 101 err1tor1es. Thus, by shifting their spheres of operation, some 
traders may have managed to maintain their foothold in the distributive 
trade. Secondly, others survived in the middleman trade by specialising 
and restricting their dealings to particular commodities. For instance, 
as a consequence of high railway rates on spirits, Ashanti traders and 
Chiefs who had access to cheap human porterage continued to outbid the 
European firms in the spirit trade well into the 1910's.102 - a position 
which became even strengthened by the availability of motor transport 
103 
after the war. Finally, the evidence also suggests that some traders 
may have successfully diversified into new commercial ventures. For 
instance, Nii Bonne, the wealthy Ga Chief who until the 1910's operated 
a prosperous middleman trade between Accra and Ashanti, had by the 1920's 
become a public works contractor. Some of his construction activities 
were said to have included street drains, houses and "factories" for 
104 Europeans, and the Dodowa market on contract to the Government. In short, 
the sheer increase in the volume of the import-exports trades, together 
with possible adaptations among the traditional middlemen and traders 
may have helped to offset any loss of jobs through the undercutting of 
African traders by the expatriate firms. 
The railways also had an impact on employment and output in the 
traditional crafts sector. By introducing mass produced imported goods, 
they forced local industries, previously sheltered from competition by 
the high costs of transport, to compete with imports. As in the case 
of the fortunes of African traders, however, the precise effects of 
imports on traditional crafts has been little investigated by historians 
so that the scale or extent and timing of any decline or contraction in 
322 
craft production is unclear. Railway sources and indeed Colonial 
administrative reports provide only cursory glimpses into the whole 
problem. For instance, in the case of the traditional weaving industry 
of the North, there is evidence to suggest that imports were ousting the 
northern supply in the Ashanti market by 1907. 105 The high prices 
and inferior quality of imports during the war seems to have helped to 
bring a temforary check to that process. As the Chief Commissioner of 
the Northern Territories reported in 1918, "native cloth is becoming 
. . 1 l· t d· A h ." 1 06 1ncreas1ng y popu ar aga1n as an expor commo 1ty to s ant1. and 
305 "loads" of the northern cloth were distributed by the railways in 
that year as against 30 loads during the previous year. But after the 
war, the situation may have returned to the pre-war position. 
Again, one must not however, assume a wholesale decline of 
indigenous industries because there were local tastes and preferences. 
For instance, in the case of the expensive kente cloth of Ashanti, the 
evidence suggests that the local industry experienced little competition 
from imports. As Rattray points out, traditionally, the design and 
production of the cloth came under the control of the King who would 
either reserve them for the court or allocate them to great men or 
f h · 107 women in the Kingdom as symbols 0 t e1r status. Thus in Ashanti 
only the wealthy and officials of state wore woven kente cloth. As the 
Chief Commissioner reported in 1910, "European fabrics are no substitutes 
. " 
108 . h h 1 1 k for country cloth of the handsome desIgns - meanIng t at t e oca ente 
industry which was used by the aristocracy was little affected by mass 
imports. Moreover, as Inez Sutton's study of the Ada salt trade 
demonstrates, despite the availability of imported salt, trade in the 
local commodity expanded throughout the Colonial period partly because 
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people preferred the taste of the Ada salt and partly too because 
people believed that it enhanced the virility of "men.,,109 
RAILWAYS ,URBANISATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH: 
The railways facilitated the imperial objectives of opening 
up the country to private enterprise and to effective colonial rule. 
The new railway stations became not only centres for the dissemination 
of the money economy and of new ideas, but also places where the 
agencies of colonial law and order were established and from whence their 
policies were implemented. As the nuclei for administrative and 
commercial centres, the new railway stations also became the focal points 
for urban development. This section examines three important aspects 
in which the railways influenced urban development in the Gold Coastr 
1) their impact on long established settlements whose commercial or 
administrative importance attracted rail connection; 2) their role in 
the creation of entirely new urban settlements; and 3) their negative 
impacts on traditionally important settlements which declined or 
stagnated as a consequence of shifts in centres of economic activity 
following railway construction. 
Accra and Kumasi are the most spectacular examples of towns 
among the first category of urban settlements. Kumasi, the capital of 
Ashanti has always been the most important administrative, cultural and 
commercial focus of the empire. 
population to be between 12,000 
Dupuis, in 1817, estimated Kumasi's 
110 
and 15,000. In addition to the 
King's palace, the town had a large market place, temples and 
sacrificial groves, a Hausa traders'longo with a large muslim population, 
and a British Embassy where European visitors to the town livedo 
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This position of Kumasi as capital of Ashanti made the town the object 
of British expansionary forces from 1874, onwards and eventually the 
military target of the Western railway extension in 1900. 
One of the most detailed and authoritative descriptions of 
Kumasi's physical landscape was the intelligence report prepared by the 
War Office in the aftermath of the 1896 invasion and which was later 
made available to the railway Consulting Engineers. In this report, 
Kumasi was described as a "nucleated" settlement built around the King's 
palace. "The town itself was located on a compact elavated ground, 
950 feet above sea level and was almost surrounded by the unhealthy 
swamps of the East and West Nsuben rivers in the form of an arch. The 
only natural outlet to the town was in the south westerly direction between 
111 the openings of the two Nsubens. The strategic significance of 
Kumasi's relief is obvious. 
From the beginning the choice of Kumasi as railhead posed 
serious planning problems to the engineers. Although the town 
contained "waste ground and remains of houses that had once been occupied," 
. f . 112 it was said to have reached its lim1ts 0 expans10n. Thus to push 
the railway line straight into the heart of the town involved not only 
the problem of attaining a high altitude, but even within the township 
itself there was hardly any suitable space for allocation to railway 
buildings and commercial activity. On the other hand, to locate the 
railhead outside Kumasi town would entail not only a heavy expenditure 
on drainage, but military imperatives also made delays unwarranted. 
For this reason, the authorities opted for the former option since it 
also had the advantage of affording direct rail link with the British 
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b b "l" "f ,,113 em assy now U1 t 1nto a ort. 
The imposition of British rule over Ashanti and the re-establishment 
of Kumasi as the administrative centre of Ashanti, together with the 
arrival of the railways there in 1903 reinvigorated the process of 
urban development. By 1906, "the town continues to extend" and "the 
old-thatched covered houses are rapidly disappearing, their places being 
taken by solid 'swish' buildings with iron or shingle roofs.,,114 
Although Kumasi was fast growing, the town could neither expand in size 
nor accommodate the rising population for obvious environmental reasons. 
An early feature of Kumasi's urban development therefore, was the 
proliferation of a larger number of small villages in the outskirts 
of the town whose residents commuted daily with the capital: "filled 
to overflowing in the morning, Kumasi has, towards evening, a comparatively 
,,115 deserted appearance. Within the town itself, the building of 
residential and commercial premises were so rapid that by 1915, there 
was "a high degree of congestion in most parts of the town, especially 
the area on either side of the railway track and close to the railway 
station. 116 Indeed when epidemic outbreaks struck the town in 1918 and 
117 1924, it was devastating especially in the overcrowded Zongo slums. 
Already during the war, the need for the development of 
entirely new settlement sites at Kumasi was becoming obvious. Significantly 
however, the main impetus for chanJe came from the decision to extend the 
Eastern railway to Kumasi so as to link the two systems. In order to 
enter Kumasi, the Accra railway had to traverse the East Nsuben main 
outfall and so a comprehensive drainage scheme was launched as part of 
the railway extension programme. The swamps near the Ejisu road were 
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dr5ined, and the reclaimed area developed into a railway station with 
commercial premises adjacent to it. To the north of the railway 
station the swamps at Kejetia were reclaimed and a market built there 
which was capable of accommodating 900 traders, while to the south, was 
located a neighbourhood area, with private houses and government 
118 premises. Clearly, the railways, after having initially accelerated 
congestion in the old Kumasi town, initiated the development of 
entirely new and well planned settlements which in Guggisberg's words 
"h d Kith d . t f W Af· ,,119 as rna e umas e gar en C1 y 0 est r1ca. Today, a visitor 
to Kumasi will not know that such outlying districts surrounding the 
old township, as new Tafo, Suntresu, Suame, the Residency, Cadbury 
House and Amakom were once the swampy valleys which acted as natural 
lines of defense for the ancient city. 
Accra, the other traditionally important settlement which attracted 
rail connection differed from Kumasi in many respects not least by its 
early European influence. As one of the most flourishing sea ports since 
the advent of Europeans on the coast, Accra had by 1877 also become the 
administrative capital of the newly established British Colonial 
Ad .. . 120 m1n1stratl.on • At the turn of the century, Accra constituted of the 
.James and Ussher Town complex which the Guggisbergs described as "an 
unimposing ramshackle collection of weather-beaten white-washed houses 
h ,,121 and uts. Thus Accra's unplanned agglomeration of buildings contrasts 
sharply with the traditionally planned Kumasio 
Unlike the "nncleated" ancient city of Ashanti, however, Accra 
had an open countryside and so there was no environmental obstacle to 
the physical expansion of the town. Thus when a Railway Site Board was 
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established for the town in 1908, to acquire land for railway works, 
it was easy to pursue a liberal acquisitive policy covering the entire 
townships of present day Adabraka, Osu, Ridge and Cantonments. 122 The 
railway station itself was located north of Ipon town, a small non-Ga 
native settlement which was a quarter of a mile from the beach. Ample 
land was allocated near the railway station for workshops and offices as 
well as a designated merchants' plots where the Seylwin Harket was 
eventually built in 1922. 
Perhaps the most significant impact of the railway upon the 
urban landscape of Accra however, lay in the outward extension of the 
township. In 1913, one year after the Accra railway opened, a 12 mile 
Camden commuter service was introduced between the beach and the outlying 
farming settlements of Achimota which in the General Manager's words was 
intended to "push the native towns further and further away from the 
" k f . I d . 123 coast so as to rna e room or commerC1a an government prem1ses. 
The availability of a railway service made the area on either side of the 
railway track the centre of gravity for the earliest proliferation of 
settlements and by 1920 when a town planning programme was launched for 
Accra one of its aims was to redress the imbalance in the township by". 
124 encou~aging new settlements away from the railways. Thus, in the 
case of the traditionally important towns, the main function of the 
railways was to speed up the process of urban expansiono 
The railways also created entirely new urban centres. Although 
Sekondi has always been visited by "irregularly scheduled trading 
vessels," it failed to develop into a settlement of any significance so 
that by 1898, the town was still "a mere fishing village consisting of 
h ,,125 a few mud utso The location of Sekondi as the coastal terminus 
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of the western pioneer line transformed the former fishing village 
not only into a prosperous commercial centre, but also an important 
administrative town. As the town's commercial and administrative 
importance grew, Sekondi's population rose from "a few hundreds" in 
1898, to 9,500 by 1911 and again to 16,900 by 1921. 126 
Sekondi's rise to prominence was however, not matched by the 
provision of houses and one of the earliest features of the town was 
the proliferation of an overcrowded slum constructed out of corrugated 
iron sheets and metal scraps which was nicknamed "Tin Town" at the northern 
end of the railway station, and close to the European township.12l 
Insanitary conditions at Tin Town together with its close proximity to 
the European settlement attracted protests from the expatriate community 
and so in 1909 the town was removed and relocated near Ketan, 3 miles 
f 01 0 128 rom the ra1 way statlon. Here too, availability of railway commuter 
service facilitated the spatial expansion of the town. "Location", the 
railway headquarters and workshop complex was later sited there as well. 
In addition to the major sea port of Sekondi the railways 
spawned a number of new settlements and converted several minor villages 
into important market towns. For instance, Koforidua in 1900 was only 
a small village and was still outside the mainstream of British 
o 0 dO i 129 Jur1s lct on. The increase in cocoa production together with the 
railway's arrival there in 1916 transformed Koforidua into the commercial 
and administrative centre of the Eastern Province where in addition to 
the European firms, Hausas traded in kola and meat, while Logosians 
130 were buying and trading cocoao Similarly, Nkawkaw started in 1923 as 
"a collection of houses around a railway station" but soon became a major 
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nodal point for the expanding cocoa growing areas of the Kwahu plateau 
towns and from whence farmers traded their produce for imported goods. 
Juaso, New l1angoase, and Konango were also minor rural settlements which 
developed into market towns shortly after becoming railway station 
towns. 
On the other hand, while contributing to the growth of some 
towns, the railways caused others to lose their economic importance. For 
example, Cape Coast, the key terminus of the inland trade, had been 
historically the most important commercial and administrative centre 
on the coast. However, as the major developments in cocoa farming and 
mining following railway construction occurred outside Cape Coast's sphere 
of influence, the large trading firms shifted their headquarters to the 
ports of Sekondi and Accrao Thus, between 1891 and 1911, Cape Coast's 
population stagnated at just over 11,000 and although there was an 
increase thereafter, the town's population growth lagged behind that of 
Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi and Kumasi. The growth rates for t~ four 
cities between 1921 and 1931 are: Sekondi, 600; Kumasi, 4.6; Accra, 4.0; 
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and Cape Coast, 1.7. As a consequence of losing its traditionally dominant 
commercial and administrative functions to Accra and Sekondi, the only 
position Cape Coast managed to maintain was as a centre of educationo 
Similarly, the river port towns of Kpong and Akuse on the Volta dwindled 
in size after they ceased functioning as ports because both the expatriate 
firms and the seat of the Provincial administration were moved to the new 
railway town of Koforidua. 
The railways were instrumental in the provision of social 
services in most of the growing urban areaso The origin of modern 
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electricity schemes, water works, and to a limited extent health 
facilities were closely related to the needs of the Railways. For 
instance, the idea of supplying water to the urban areas was a result 
of chronic water shortages that hit the trains. Thus, the Railways 
Department embarked upon the drilling of wells along the line which in 
turn led to the involvement of the l{ailways in the commercial sale of 
water to the publl.·c.132 S' '1 1 h f 1 1ml. ar y, t e irst e ectricity plant to be 
installed in the Gold Coast was that of the Kailway Workshop at Sekondi 
which started operating in 1918. Later, when Takoradi was built, the 
Sekondi power station was expanded to cater for the needs of the harbour 
and township. In Accra, electricity power from the railway workshop 
in 1924 provided the streets of Osu and James Town with their first' 
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electric lighting system in place of oil lamps. Indeed, during the 
War, the Colonial Office had considered building a dam across the Volta 
134 
so as to generate electricity power for the railways and the mines. 
Finally, the railways pioneered the diffusion of health facilities. The 
first government hospital to be established outside Accra was the one 
built at Sekondi in 1898 for railway construction labour. The Obuasi 
hospital was also built in 1900 for the same purpose, though it was 
1 f h . 1 . 13j sold to the mines on comp etion 0 t e ra1 way extenSl.on. 
On the other hand, railway development also had serious 
implications for public health. As transport agents, the railways not 
136 
only facilitated the spread of epidemic desease, but the growing urban 
centres were also breeding grounds from whence diseases were disseminated 
into the rural areas. Thus, "syphilis," in the Northern Territories was 
called the "Kufftasf Sickness" because it was associated with returnee 
-. 1TI 
migrant workers from the south. In short, given that Colonial 
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social services were hampered by lack of staff and funding, leading the 
authorities to concentrate their meagre facilities on the expatriate 
community and African government employees in the urban areas, the role 
of the railways as agents of modernisation were partially offset by their 
negative impacts, especially on the rural areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The Gold Coast railway system was so small in mileage that 
probably no more than 10 per cent of the country's total land surface 
could be said to have come under the direct influence of the entire 
network. As a consumer industry, the railways established very weak 
backward linkages with the rest of the Gold Coast economy. Most 
materials and equipment were imported from Britain. The only indigenous 
production that seems to have been stimulated was wood for fuel, ballast 
production from quarries, and to a limited extent, wood processing for 
construction and maintenance of the railways. Other than these, the 
railways derived little of their needs from the Colonial economy. The 
reasons for this lay not only in the absence of established capital goods 
industries that could serve the needs of the railways, but also in 
Colonial policy which demanded that any materials needed in the Colonies 
h " h ", d t t' 1 t must be imported from t e mot er country - 1n or er 0 s 1mu a e 
British industry. In addition to this, the participation of the Crown 
Agents in the commercial organisation of Crown Colony public work 
construction projects also meant tha the metropolitan authorities were 
keen on maintaining the status quo. Hence, there were times when 
incentives to develop local industries to serve the railways were 
deliberately halted. further, the larger part of the railway wage bill 
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found its way back into British coffers, as both European and to a lesser 
extent, African employees spent a large part of their earnings on imported 
consumer goods. 
Although the Gold Coast economy remained little influenced by 
backward linkages from the railways, the provision of transport facilities 
by contrast strongly affected economic activity because of its 
availability, reliability and above all, reduction in costs. The benefits 
of forward linkages accrued disproportionately to the expatriate mining 
sector not only because the location of the rail routes and associated 
ports and harbours favoured them but also because they benefited from 
cheaper railway rates more than any other sector. Thus, the railways' 
conveyance of heavy machinery and stores to the mines effected 
technological changes in the industry, more especially in the field of 
deep-level mining. As well as carrying imported mining inputs, the 
railways transported large amounts of cheap fuel (local firewood) annually 
to the mines, in addition to the railing of bulky manganese ore to the 
ports for exports. Not surprisingly then mining traffic constituted the 
bulk of all railway traffic - amounting to 69 per cent of total railway 
traffic by weight in 1929. Despite the special advantages that the mines 
derived from rail transport, it was the sector that benefited the Gold 
Coast economy least as all profits went to the British investors. Thus, 
it can safely be argued that the railways primarily served metropolitan 
mining interests more than expatriate and indigenous agrarian needs. 
The railways also had significant impacts on other sectors of 
the economy. The export of timber logs, and to a lesser extent wood 
processing for domestic consumption, saw a modest growth, as did food-
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cropping for local sales, especially when war time restrictions caused 
a drop in the levels of imported food items. Also the railways made a 
special contribution to the diversification in food crops in the Colony 
and Ashanti when migrant labourers from Sierra Leone and Liberia 
introduced rice cultivation to these regions for the first time. 
But the railways major contribution to the Gold Coast's economic 
growth was to be found in the sphere of cocoa production for exports. 
Here, Kay's interpretation that the railways had little impact on cocoa 
farming is wrong. It is true that railway charges, and the location of 
the routes and sea ports, did not favour the cocoa farmer. Only the 
Accra-Tafo section was constructed with cocoa producers in mind. But 
cocoa farmers certainly did use the lines to transport the crop in large 
quantities to the ports, and in some places the idea that railways were 
to be constructed within the near future may well have encouraged 
cultivation. In the Western Province and Ashanti in particular cocoa was 
actually planted because of the presence of the railways. Cocoa was 
thus carried on the railways to a significant extent and high railway 
rates on the crop were to be the Government's way of indirectly taxing 
the African population. 
Cocoa farming was the most important growth sector in the Gold 
Coast economy, and it was a sector whose profits accrued directly to 
the African producers. But again, like mining, cocoa production did 
not really lead to the establishment of other industries that could 
service it, as cocoa farmers too spent a large percentage of thelr 
income on European imported goods. 
As a consequence of stimulating activity in the fields ot cocoa 
farming and mining, the railways helped to introduce the Cold 
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Coast in a major way to world markets. A society that had been relatively 
self-sufficient was introduced to European imported goods upon which 
it became dependent. But because export commodity producers were unable 
to have any influence over world prices, the African exporters found 
themselves forced to put more and more land and labour into production 
in order to maintain their existing import purchasing power •. Furthermore 
the fact that the railways were restricted to the southern part of the 
country meant that the Northern Territories remained isolated and 
relatively backward, and so became a source of cheap labour to be used 
in the mines, on the railways and in the cocoa industry. 
The introduction and expansion of the railways also affected 
the way commerce was organised as well as traditional craft production. 
In fact it was not until the railways were in operation that expatriate 
traders, merchants and bankers ventured into the hinterland. Prior to 
this they had restricted their activities to the coastal areas, and 
relied upon African middlemen to carry out commercial activities further 
inland. The evidence suggests that as expatriate commercial 
endeavour spread throughout the Gold Coast, there was a corresponding 
decline in the opportunities available for the older, established 
African traders and merchants. On the other hand, this change in trading 
methods created more opportunities in retail trade for a larger number 
of Africans, especially women who were now selling European imported goods. 
Thus Gold Coast trading saw a massive change. The established African 
merchants were on the decline whilst European traders and an entirely 
new stratum of African society began participating in the distributive 
trades. Not only were the middlemen finding their services superfluous, 
but African traders found themselves being undercut by European trading 
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firms. But African middleman traders were not wiped out altogether. 
Some shifted their traditional spheres to new areas particularly the 
Northern Territories, which were not affected by the penetration of the 
expatriate firms, while others diversified their operations into other 
sectors. 
It would seem that the mass importation of European goods 
affected traditional craft industries as well. Although evidence is slight, 
it is interesting to note that in the case of the traditional weaving 
industry of the North, European imported cotton goods did oust the 
northern supply in the Ashanti markets except for the war years. On the 
other hand, certain traditional industries seemed to have survived because 
Africans either preferred their products to the European imports - as 
was the case with Ada salt - or because no real ~mported substitutes were 
available - as was the case with the traditional kente cloth of Ashanti. 
With the spread of the railways and of European trading came new 
urban development - in particular the growth of such towns as Accra, 
Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi. But on the other hand the construction of 
the railways caused such towns as Cape Coast and Kpong, which were not 
located on rail routes, to lose their commercial and administrative 
importance. Finally, the railways were instrumental in providing social 
services to these growing urban areas. Modern electricity schemes, water 
supplies as well as public health facilities followed close on the heels 
of the railways. But because such facilities were mainly confined to 
the urban centres, any modernisation effects of the railways were partially 
offset by their role in facilitating the spread of epidemic diseases, 
particularly into the rural communities. 
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WNCLUSIO.j 
This final chapter seeks to relate the findings of the 
individual chapters above to the concern of the thesis as a whole: _ 
the connection between railway innovation and economic development. 
In what ways, if any, did railways in the Gold Coast imitate the 
experiences of their western pr06enitorsi Can the history of railways 
in the Gold Coast serve as a paradigm for the introduction and expansion 
of railways throughout Colonial Africa? What is the significance of 
the Gold Coast's experience for our understanding of the relationship 
between railway construction and economic growth in the less developed 
economies of Africa, Asia and Latin I~ericai 
In contrast to Africa, the literature on the history of 
railways in the advanced industrial nations is noted for its relative 
consensus about the "progressive" contribution which railways have maLle 
to economic development. Despite the attempts by "new economic 
history" to play down the traditional indispensability thesis, it is 
nevertheless agreed that the potentialities of railways were dramatically 
realised in many parts of Europe and North America. tor instance, 
Albert Fishlow has argued that the prime beneficiary of railway 
development during the antebellum period in the United ~tates, was not 
industry but agriculture. He also pointed out that the railways were 
not crucial to the increased pace 01 economic activity befort the 
Civil War, and that the rapid growth of domestic industry was not 
dependent on railways' demanus for iron. 1 Similarly, io~el concluded 
that, despite its dramatically rapid 6rowth, the railways aid not make 
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a substantial contribution to the production potential 01 the U.~.2 
Hawke, applying the "social saving theory" to Britain, asked the 
question: what would have been the cost of dispensing with railways 
and transvorting passengers and goods by road and canal? His 
findings were that railway services in 1865 represented a social 
saving of between 7 and 11 per cent of the net national income of 
3 
England and ~Jales. Church took Hawke's figures to demonstrate that 
"railways as providers of transport services made a smaller contribution 
t th t · 1 h h b ,,4 o e na 10na economy t an as een widely assumed. O'Brien, 
on the other hand, has shown how it is possible to make the social 
saving ratio appear more impressive, by considering the implications 
of making up the income sacrificed over the long term. rhus, for 
1865-70, closure or the railways would necessitate a 40 per cent increase 
in the growth rate, a similar increase in the gross investment rate, 
5 d ·· 1 d' 5 and a per cent re uct10n 1n annua expen 1ture. But Gourvish 
remained unconvinced as to whether the soci al saving es tima tes "really,· 
mean very much at all,,,6 reasserting the importance OL "externalities" 
or "spin-off" effects from railways to industry and commerce - the 
majority of which defy precise quantification. Clearly, then, the 
"problem" abou t wes tern rai lway his toriography, unl ike t1:a t in Air ica 
or the Third World, is not so much about whether railways had a positive 
effect on economic development, but rather by how much - a task that 
continues to elude even "cliometrics." 
Given that economic growth is a phenomenon which occurs both 
over time and in societies which may be widely different in character, 
similar causes may operate in very dissimilar environments, and lead 
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to obstrusive differences in the timing, the pace, and many other 
facets of economic change. As a leading authority on economic growth 
stated: 
AS to conditions of growth, I started with the assumption 
that these conditions differ for different historical 
situations and that, while they may have some common elements, 
they are probably to some extent unique to each case, 
including the same country in different stages of its 
development, and difterent countries in generally similar 
stages of development as well as at different stages." 7 
Such national and inter-temporal differences stand out distinctively 
when we consider the opportunities afforded by railway innovation upon 
the very dissimilar social, political and economic environments of 
the advanced inaustrial West and Colonial Africa. Below, the broad 
characteristic features of railway development in the industrial 
economies anu a typical colonial economy (the Gold Coast) are 
juxtaposed: 
A An Advanced Industrial 
Economy (Britain).8 
B A fypical Colonial Economy 
«(.;old Coast). 
1) Initiative: ~lanned by 
local businessmen and politicians; 
reflects their perception of 
transport needs and potential; 
integrates the national economy -
domestic as well as exports and 
imports trades. 
2) Ca~ital: ~aisin~ of capital 
stimulates development of local 
financial institutions; raises 
levels of savin~s and 
investments, and helps to induce 
booms and alleviate depressions. 
3) fechnolo~y: Locally supplied, 
or initially imported, but 
gradually built locally by 
indigenous metals industry; 
boost to total demand 
l d b ill' II P anne y a 1en agencYf more 
receptive to forei 6n businessmen 
and politicians; bias towards 
serving foreign need - rather than 
internal commerce. 
tlorrowed from abroad - by state 
- no stimulus to local capital 
formation; leads to external 
financial obligations and balance 
of payments problems. 
Invariably imported - no stimulus 
to domestic heavy industrial 
sector; encourages dependence on 
external sources of technology. 
(particularly during 
construction) encourages 
economies of scale, leading 
to accelerated technical 
progress in metals and 
engineering industries. 
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4) Management and Technical 
Skills: Locally generated -
creating employment for new 
strata of society - engineers, 
surveyors, technicians, 
contractors; encourages 
creation of establishments 
for training, leading to 
continuous reproduction of 
technical and managerial 
knowledge; potential for 
diffusion to other sectors of 
the economy are much higher. 
5) Tariff Policy: Basically 
competition, with company profits 
as the major aim; s~ecial 
recognition for the 
development of the trade of 
particular regions - widens 
the market and leads to 
specialisation of commerce and 
industry. 
lmported - expensive - leakage 
of expenditure (salaries and 
pensions etc.) overseas; slow 
indigenization - lower levels 
of skills acquisition and 
diffusion. 
Monopoly, with revenue to 
Colonial Treasury as the major 
aim; discriminatory prices, bias 
in favour of expatriate mining 
vis-a-vis indigenous cocoa and 
agrarian interests, but generally 
promotes external rather than 
internal commerce. 
Because of the reasons enumerated above, the "progressive" 
influence of railways was bound to be less in a colonial or less 
developed economy. In Western Lurope, not only did an active business 
class evolve over a period of some hundreds of years, but more 
importantly, large-scale ventures in trade, mining and canals were 
not uncommon before the nineteenth century. Because Britain and other 
railway developers had already achieved considerable industrial 
capacity before the advent of the iron horse, they were able to capture 
the indirect benefits of backward linkabes from their own railway 
ventures, and indeed become suppliers OL technology and equipment to 
the rest of the world. Thus backward linkages from railways to 
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industrial development in the advanced economies, contrasts sharply 
with the case of the ~olo Coast, where railway construction provided 
virtually no stimulus for other sectors of the local economy. Nor did 
railways in the Gold Coast help to create "economic methods and 
institutions" which had beneficial effects on commerce and industry. 
Nevertheless, in one major respect - cheapening of transport 
costs - the effects of railway construction was potentially greater 
in a less developed economy. The more effective a country's waterborne 
and road transports are, the smaller the gains accruing to the economy 
from its investment in railways. Conversely, countries badly endowed 
with navigable rivers and a terrain less conducive to the construction 
of canals as well as poor coastal shipping facilities, tend to gain most 
from their investment in railways. Thus in Britain, the u.s. and France, 
where railways superceded canals and road carriage, benefits from forward 
linkages were relatively smaller. "British railways," Mitchell noted, 
"were built with existing traffic in mind" and 
the coming of the railways in Britain did not lead to a 
wavelike profusion of new enterprises of many sorts simply 
because there were already a great many enterprises wi~h 
their traffic already flowing in established channels. 
Furthermore, Mitchell noted, other than the perishable trade - fresh 
meat, fish, milk and vegetables - railways in Britain "did not ••• 
I · 'bl ,,10 simply make possible what had been previous y lmpossl e. 
In the Gold Coast by contrast, it is apt to assert that 
railways "made possible what had been previously impossible." Before 
the advent of railways, transportation was almost exclusively carried 
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out by human porterage. Unlike Britain, the U.S., or even rsarist 
Russia, the Gold Coast had no river system suitable for use in 
transportation. Moreover, since most of the population and economic 
activity had always been located far from the coast in the interior 
forest regions, coastal shipping never played the role in the Gold Coast 
that it did in Europe and the U.s. Gains from the provision of transport 
services were therefore dramatic. ior instance, railway rates in 1903 
represented well above a 90 per cent reduction in porterage costs, and 
between 1903 and 1922 tariffs fell by a further 25 per cent. Indeed, it 
is impossible to perceive the widening of the market or expansion of 
export production in the Gold Coast between 1890 and 1930, without 
railway innovation. Opportunities to produce for world markets did 
bring real, if still modest, improvement in incomes and standards of 
living for the members of the African society involved. Nevertheless, 
the pattern of railway development tended to reinforce production for 
external markets, rather than internal, leading to the growth of a lopsided 
export-oriented economy with regional economic inequalities and income 
disparities. 
How far was the experience of the Gold Coast typical of Africa, 
and·of the Third World in general? The few detailed studies of railways 
in Colonial Africa tend to concentrate on discussion of policy decisions 
leading to the construction and operation of the lines, as well as the 
11 h'l' , th 'd ' mobilisation of funds to pay for them w 1 e 19nor1ng e Wl er 1SSU~ 
of the relationship between railways and economic development. fhis 
inevitably makes any scope for generalisation limited. Nevertheless, the 
story of the Gold Coast railways does provide several points of comparison 
for railways in other parts of the continent, not least because of the 
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initiative which invariably carne from "alien" authorities. 
Broadly speaking, in most parts of Jlirica, railways were 
constructed in the twentieth century although they may have been planned 
earlier. The systems constructed most expeditiously were those 
viewed as strategically vital or commercially valuable. In West and 
East Africa, most of t~e railways were constructed primarily with a 
view to exploiting the export possibilities.of agricultural and mineral 
deposits. These systems were, for the most part, state enterprises as 
opposed to being financed and constructed by private enterpreneurs. In 
two instances, in the Sudan and Uganda, the railways \Olere built for 
strategic reasons. On the other hand, Central and South ,\frica 
contained a mixture of systems, some state, some private, but all 
designed to exploit the mineral deposits of the region. Throughout the 
continent, the railways. that \-lere established, with the exception of 
South Africa, were directed to either a mineral deposit or an export 
crop. They were built from a port from the coast into the hinterland. 
They did not constitute a dense communication network anYlYhere, except 
in South Africa, where branch lines were constructed during the 1900's 
to link the farming districts with the major trunk routes established 
earlier between the ports and the mines. Thus, apart from the latter 
system, railway densities per square mile remained among the lowest 
in the \-lorld, so that the greater proportion of the African land-mass 
12 
remained outside the direct influence of a" railway lineo 
As was in the case of the ~old Coast, railways were no 
"leading sector" anywhere in Colonial Africa. The backward linkages from 
railway construction accrued to metropolitan heavy metal and engineering 
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industries, so that as a consumer industry, the railways established 
no direct multiplier effect with the African economies. All manufactured 
goods, equipment and skills came from ~urope, and except for South 
13 Africa and later Nigeria, even fuel was imported as bunker coal. 
In East Africa, the British even brought in Indians as manual labour, 
while the Belgians in the Congo recruited Chinese indentured workers for 
construction. Nevertheless, as the experience of the Gold Coast 
railways convincingly demonstrated, in a continent chronically deficient 
in natural internal means of transport and communications, railways 
made possible what had been previously impossible. In most places, 
the volume in \:..~(A",spo",,-t-vv\:le. goods was not large from the beginning, but 
everywhere the lines penetrated, local entrepreneurs and foreign 
capitalists proved highly responsive, so that mining and agricultural 
export production boomed. Claims that certain Colonial dependencies 
, f '1 14 b bl b' d were mere creat10ns 0 ra1 ways are pro a y a 1t exaggerate. 
What can be said though, is that railways were among the most important, 
or even the prime, contributing factors to the expansion of commerce, 
and to such economic growth as occurred during the colonial era o In 
this regard, Crowder may be right in saying that railways represented 
the major economic legacy of the colonial powers in West rtfrica: 
"If the Colonial powers can be said in any way to have brought economic 
, ,,15 
revolution, it is through the construction of ra11ways. 
The transport "revolution' though was not only superficial 
in extent, because of its failure to incorporate the majority of the 
African population into the mainstream of economic activity, but the 
period of railways "indispensability" in Africa also appeared to be 
short lived. While the "pioneer" railway lines constructed before tl'E 
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l'"'irst World War were undoubtedly crucial in opening up ,\.frican 
hinterlands to trade and commerce, the same cannot be said of the 
subsequent extensions to the systems. O'Connor's carefully 
documented study concluded that the lines serving Uganda "appear to have 
been of progressively decreasing importance in terms of their impact 
16 
on the country" and that those built in the twenties "had very much less 
effect on economic development, for although they immediately handled 
a large volume of traffic, much of this was merely diverted from the 
1 k . ,,17 a e serVl.ces. His assessment of the contribution in Tanganyika 
. 18 
is not much brighter. There, the 93 mile extension to Kinyami was 
torn up before the Second Wor ld \Jar, as uneconomic, and the lloshi-
Arusha extension was intended for settler d.vel~pment, which never really 
became significant. In this respect, it is important to note the 
appearance of competition from a new and more flexible mode of 
transport - motor lorries - on certain sections of the Gold Coast system 
during the twenties. further research is needed to ascertain whether 
duplication of transport facilities or other exogenous factors were 
responsible for the diminishing returns in African railway investment 
from the 1920·s. All that can be said at present is that compared to 
Asia and Latin America, JUrica was a late comer on the railway scene, 
and this meant tha t the period in \"hich railways could be said to 
have been indispensable in the African economy was shorter - barely two 
decades. 
Whatever the differences in timing or rail densities per sq. 
mile, railway building in most parts of the periphery of the international 
economy, as in Africa, made their most dramatic contributions in terms 
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of market widening effects while establishing little direct linkages 
with local production. "India", Thorner noted, "alone of the countries 
with great railway networks is unindustrialised.,,19 While 
acknowledging the role of the railways in the elimination of inter-
regional price differences and the promotion of external trade, he 
nevertheless argued that there was a noticeable lack of backward 
linkages with the Indian economy, - blaming the british for orienting 
the transport system towards the satisfaction of metropolitan needs 
rather than those of India. 20 A parallel case is that or the Malayan 
railways, where Kaur found that backward linkages were also negligible, 
and that benefits from the cheapening of transport costs accrued 
21 disproportionately to the export sector. In this respect it is also 
important to note that the pattern of railway development in the 
Gold Coast itself was to a large extent, influenced by the Malayan 
model of railway development put forward by Governors Maxwell, and 
~odger, formerly long-serving Officials in the Straits Settlements. 
(see Chapters 2 eSc 3). The Mexican case, one of the few Third World 
railways to attract the F'ogelian approach of "social savings", provides 
a further point of comparison. Coatsworth found that savings on 
freight operations were higher than in the advanced industrial 
nations and that they accounted for more than half of the increase in 
the productivity of the Mexican economy before 1910. However, he also 
found backward linkages to be weak, foreign exchange costs high, 
22 
and institutional effects rather negative. 
Three major conclusions thus emerge about the connection 
between railway construction and economic development in the less 
developed economies of Africa, ~sia and Latin America:-
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1) Gains accruing from the provision of transport services were 
generally higher than in the advanced industrial economies. 
2) Backward linkages and spin off effects to local production were 
negligible and instead railway investment tended to reinforce 
existing technological and financial dependence on the advanced 
industrial nations. 
3) The pattern of railway development and its accompanyin~ social 
and welfare investments were-heavily biased in favour of external 
trade and urban development, while the rural communities remained 
relatively underdeveloped. 
What then are the lessons for tropical Africa in particular, 
where head loading remains even today the only medium of transport 
not only for such food crops as cassava, maize, plantaIn and wood fuel 
for local consumption, but even for the conveyance of the most valuable 
export commodities ot coffee, cocoa, and palm oil from the harvesting 
point to the nearest road transport or railway stationi The evidence 
suggests the need for a locally evolved, or a consciously borrowed and 
imitated, simple mode of transport, such as wheeled carts, to serve 
the African rural land mass, particularly small scale agricultureo 
In this case, not only would backward linkages from such an unsophisticated 
technology accrue directly to the indigenous economies, in the form of 
road building, wood-works, tyre production, and skills for construction 
and maintenance, but as providers of transport services, such a 
II 1'" f h t th techn~logy would carry a second transport revo utlon urt er 0 e 
doorsteps of the African rural communities. 
this thesis has examined three aspects of railway development 
in the Gold Coast: 1) the origins and causes of railways, 
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2) railways as commercial or business enterprise; and 3) railways 
as providers or transport services. It argues that in the Gold Coast, 
as in many parts of Colonial Africa and the Third World, railway 
projects were designed primarily to facilitate production for 
metropolitan and world markets. Benefits from backward linkages 
were negligible, and nowhere in the less developed economies did 
railways prove to be a leading sector. But gains from cheapening 
transportation costs were dramatic enough to make railways probably 
the most important single factor contributing to economic development 
in most parts of the periphery. But the patterns of the railway 
development nevertheless tended to reinforce production for external 
markets, rather than internal, and the creation of regional economic 
inequalities and income disparities. 
The thesis thus suggests the need for a simple mode of 
transportation that would provide both significant backward linkages 
to local produ~eion, and at the same time increase productivity on 
the land. 
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